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Information security is increasingly important to organizations, as security breaches 
are costly. Organizational insiders can be assets or vulnerabilities in the battle to secure 
information systems. However, organizational insiders’ security beliefs and behaviors are 
not well understood. In particular, little is known about how social influence affects 
insiders’ security behaviors, yet studies have shown that social influence is shown to be a 
strong predictor of security behavior. A deeper understanding of social influence is needed 
in the literature. Additionally, many security studies only examine a cross-sectional period 
with no concern for changes in beliefs and behaviors over time. Thus, little is known about 
how learning in previous life periods (e.g., childhood/adolescence and tenure at a previous 
job) influences insiders’ current security beliefs and behaviors.   
This study examines the influence that informal information security controls exert 
on the information security behaviors of organizational insiders. This study also identifies 
how perceptions of previous social learning experiences influence current security beliefs 
and behaviors. In particular, this dissertation highlights four security behaviors: security 
risk-taking behavior and security damaging behavior, and security compliant behavior and 
proactive security behavior. Through a qualitative study, a model of the effect of social 
learning on security behavior is developed. A quantitative test is then presented to further 
confirm the results of the qualitative study. Through the quantitative study, an initial 
exploration of social learning across national boundaries is also provided. The study also 
concerns itself with understanding how context influences information security beliefs and 
behaviors. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Overview 
Information system security is an increasingly important topic for researchers and 
practitioners alike, as security breaches are costly to organizations and their clients. In 
2012 in the US, data breaches cost organizations nearly $200 per compromised record, 
and on average, breached organizations experience approximately 30,000 compromised 
records per incident (Ponemon, 2013). Major breaches can be even more devastating. For 
example, a recent security breach at Target, a major US-based retailer, resulted in the 
compromise of as many as 40 million credit and debit card numbers and upwards of $18 
billion in total damages to banks, retailers, and customers (Harris, Perlroth, Popper, & 
Stout, 2014). 
To manage external and internal threats to information systems (IS), organizations 
implement a variety of security controls. In the context of this study, security controls 
refer to formal and informal mechanisms that influence employees with the intent to 
protect the organization and its clients from internal and external security breaches. 
Organizations use three primary forms of security controls to protect IS and informational 
resources, including: technical controls, management controls, and operational controls 
(NIST, 2009). Technical controls refer to safeguards and countermeasures for 
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information systems that are executed through technical means, such as software and 
hardware (e.g., firewalls, anti-virus software, trusted platform module chips) (NIST, 
2009). Management controls refer to safeguards and countermeasures for information 
systems designed to manage risk and manage security initiatives, such as vulnerability 
and risk assessments and security planning (NIST, 2009). Operational controls, also 
called procedural controls, refer to safeguards and countermeasures for information 
systems that are executed primarily by individuals, such as security education, training, 
and awareness (SETA) programs and sanctions (NIST, 2009).  
Technical controls are heavily studied in IS research; however, management and 
operational controls are studied far less frequently (Siponen, Willison, & Baskerville, 
2008). Although technical controls are necessary to protect IS from external and internal 
security threats, technical controls may not be sufficient to stop all attacks. Technical 
controls are particularly weak against threats posed by organizational insiders (Posey, 
Roberts, Lowry, Bennett, & Courtney, 2013; Warkentin & Willison, 2009; Willison & 
Warkentin, 2013; Workman & Gathegi, 2007). Organizational insiders refer to 
individuals within an organization, such as full- and part-time employees and board 
members, who are granted access to IS for legitimate work purposes (Posey et al., 2013). 
The trust invested in organizational insiders can lead to security breaches instigated by 
organizational insiders (e.g., stealing confidential records) or to vulnerabilities created by 
organizational insiders’ negligent and careless behaviors (e.g., sharing passwords). 
Organizations establish operational controls to minimize the potential of security 
incidents caused by organizational insiders. Operational controls are also used to promote 
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positive security behavior (Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu, & Benbasat, 2010; Herath & Rao, 
2009b). 
Although the study of organizational insiders’ security behaviors is an 
increasingly important topic in IS research (Guo, 2013; Posey et al., 2013; Willison & 
Warkentin, 2013), the body of research is in a nascent state (Crossler et al., 2013; 
Siponen et al., 2008). Much is still unknown about the way security controls, namely 
operational controls, influence employees’ security behaviors. In particular, research 
about organizational insiders’ risky and damaging security behaviors is underdeveloped 
(Guo, 2013; Guo, Yuan, Archer, & Connelly, 2011; Willison & Warkentin, 2013). Much 
more is known about positive security behavior (i.e., information security policy 
compliance). Understanding how controls influence organizational insiders’ security 
behaviors can assist managers and security professionals in their efforts to improve 
existing security controls and develop new security controls to prevent internal threats to 
IS and maximize proactive security behavior. Thus, to extend existing knowledge of 
security behavior, this study seeks to understand how security controls, namely 
operational controls, influence organizational insiders security behaviors.  
In this study, organizational insiders’ deviant behavior is conceptualized 
according to the four types of behaviors identified by Guo (2013). The four types of 
behaviors include security assurance behaviors, hereafter referred to as proactive security 
behavior, security compliant behavior, security risk-taking behavior, and security 
damaging behavior. Security assurance behavior or proactive security behavior (PSB), 
refers to proactive, directed actions taken by an employee with the intent of protecting 
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organizational information. Proactive security behaviors go beyond requirements in 
information security policy (Guo, 2013; Workman, Bommer, & Straub, 2008). Security 
compliant behavior (SCB) refers to actions taken to comply with information security 
policy. Security compliant behavior is refraining from breaking protocols and procedures 
(Guo, 2013). Security risk-taking behavior (SRB) refers to intentional violations of 
organizational information security policies (ISP) that create vulnerabilities in IS, but do 
not directly cause harm to the organization (Guo, 2013). Examples of SRB include: 
logging onto insecure networks with organization information technology (IT), writing 
down passwords, sharing passwords, and inserting personal USB drives into 
organizational IT. Security damaging behavior (SDB) refers to intentional and malicious 
actions committed by organizational insiders that cause direct damage to the organization 
(Guo, 2013). Examples of SDB behaviors include: password cracking, data theft, 
intentional destruction of computer equipment, and intentional deletion of crucial data.  
The body of literature pertaining to the study of organizational insiders’ security 
behaviors is generally referred to as behavioral information security (InfoSec) research 
(Crossler et al., 2013). This study seeks to assess existing behavioral InfoSec research on 
organizational insiders’ security behaviors to identify important directions for future 
research and to study some of these directions. To identify an area of behavioral InfoSec 
research that needs further study, a review of the research on organizational insiders’ 
security behaviors was conducted.  
Although positive compliant security behaviors have been studied more 
extensively, negative security behaviors have not. Thus, a typology of organizational 
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corruption controls was used and adapted (Lange, 2008) to classify the operational 
security controls currently studied in behavioral InfoSec research in relation to negative 
security behavior. Organizational corruption controls are operational controls in 
organizations that seek to minimize intentional misbehavior by employees (Lange, 2008). 
Corruption controls and organizational controls, controls that seek to maximize 
cooperation and efficiency in work processes (Cardinal, 2001; Lange, 2008), work 
together to minimize negative behavior and maximize positive security behavior. Given 
our focus on operational controls, Lange’s typology of corruption controls provides a 
useful classification tool for the review. Operational security controls are conceptualized 
herein as security-related corruption controls. This study also examines operational 
controls designed to encourage positive security behaviors, such as ISP compliance. 
Positive and negative security behaviors are not simply two sides of the same coin (Guo, 
2013). Similarly, the operational controls used to promote compliant security behavior 
are not the same as those used to deter noncompliant behavior (D'Arcy & Herath, 2011; 
Willison & Warkentin, 2013). Security-related corruption controls are a subset of the 
broader class of organizational corruption controls. Thus, security-related corruption 
controls are formal and informal operational interventions that seek to minimize negative 
security behavior. 
Scope and Unit of Analysis 
This paper seeks to understand the influence security-related corruption controls 
and controls that promote positive security behavior exert on organizational insiders’ 
security behaviors. Thus, the study is scoped to operational controls and individual 
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behavior. The unit of analysis in this study is at the individual-level. The choice to scope 
the study to operational controls and individual behavior is made for several reasons. 
First, technical security controls receive ample research attention, while operational 
controls are understudied (Siponen et al., 2008). Second, research on operational controls 
is in a nascent state (Crossler et al., 2013; Siponen et al., 2008). Much is still unknown 
about how operational controls influence security behavior. Third, our research focus is 
employee behavior, which is typically studied from the perspective of operational 
controls (e.g., Crossler et al., 2013; D'Arcy, Hovav, & Galletta, 2009; Puhakainen & 
Siponen, 2010; Siponen & Vance, 2010; Vance & Siponen, 2012). Management controls 
are frequently examined at the organizational level because management controls focus 
on organization-wide security requirements, plans, and assessments. Finally, research on 
SDB’s and SRB’s is underdeveloped (Guo, 2013; Guo et al., 2011; Warkentin, Straub, & 
Malimage, 2012; Willison & Warkentin, 2013). A single violation by an organizational 
insider can cause severe damage to an organization. Thus, understanding individual 
behavior is a crucial endeavor in behavioral InfoSec research. Conversely, organizational 
insiders’ positive security behaviors can minimize threats to IS (Bulgurcu et al., 2010; 
Herath & Rao, 2009b).  
This study also adopts a contingency perspective to study security-related 
corruption controls. Contingency theories seek to understand how phenomena operate in 
different contexts and under different constraints. The contingency perspective works 
under the assumption that context is a crucial predictor of how phenomena are 
manifested. Contingency theories can be conceptualized in many different ways, such as 
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through mediation, moderation, and profile deviation (Baron & Kenny, 1986; 
Venkatraman, 1989).  
Based on our review of the behavioral InfoSec research, most security studies 
about organizational insiders rely on mediation to explain security behavior. Mediated 
models explain average levels of a phenomenon across a variety of situations and 
circumstances (Baron & Kenny, 1986). In this way, mediation lacks specificity in 
predictions and explanations (Venkatraman, 1989). In a security context, this suggests 
that most of the behavioral InfoSec research explains and predicts the average 
relationship between key independent and mediating variables and organizational 
insiders’ security behaviors. Thus, most security research is unable to provide a nuanced 
view of how security behaviors differ in different contexts. For example, few studies 
examine how interactions between security controls influence organizational insiders’ 
security behaviors (Chen & Wen, 2012) or how context influences the effectiveness of 
security controls (D'Arcy & Herath, 2011). Yet, such research is necessary to assist 
managers in developing appropriate portfolios of security controls for their particular 
organizational contexts. Thus, different contingency perspectives, such as moderation and 
profile deviation, are needed to extend explanations of security behavior to particular 
contexts. Using other means of exploring contingencies, such as profile deviation and 
moderation, allow researchers to explain optimal levels of a phenomenon for different 
situations and circumstances (Barki, Rivard, & Talbot, 2001; Baron & Kenny, 1986; 
Mintzberg, 1979, 1983; Venkatraman, 1989).  
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Developing a contingency theory of the influence of security controls on security 
behaviors that accounts for context could assist researchers and practitioners in 
developing security controls suited for specific environments and employees. Further, 
contingency models, namely models with moderation, allow researchers to examine how 
controls interact to influence security behavior (Lange, 2008). Appropriate combinations 
of controls can maximize the effectiveness of control, while inappropriate combinations 
may diminish the effectiveness of control (Chen & Wen, 2012; Lange, 2008). Thus, this 
study adopts a contingency perspective to examine the influence that combinations of 
security controls exert on organizational insiders’ security behaviors in different contexts. 
Research Direction and Research Questions 
Studying the effects that operational security controls exert on security behaviors 
in different organizational contexts is a broad topic. Some narrowing of the topic is 
necessary to make the project manageable. As depicted in Appendix A, the behavioral 
influence of many types of security controls has been examined in the literature, 
particularly sanctions and training. However, many important forms of control have 
received little attention. Based on our literature review, informal social controls have 
received little attention. Yet, in criminology and sociology, informal social controls are 
shown to exert a strong influence on behavior (R L Akers, 1985; Ronald L. Akers, 2009; 
Krohn, Skinner, Massey, & Akers, 1985). Thus, it is important to understand the 
influence of informal social controls in a security context. Informal social controls refer 
to operational controls that are transmitted socially or culturally rather than through 
formal administrative channels (Lange, 2008). The literature suggests that informal social 
   
9 
 
controls (e.g., norms, social sanctions, social learning) are represented by a few simple 
constructs and that few prominent theories of social control are employed in the 
literature. Research on informal social controls is absent from research on both positive 
and negative security behaviors. Thus, this study explores how informal social controls 
influence organizational insiders’ security behaviors. This paper also examines how 
informal social controls influence the development and effectiveness of formal 
administrative controls by relying on a contingency perspective. 
Other avenues of research are possible. The literature review identified multiple 
directions for future research; however, to develop a manageable project, the project was 
scoped to informal social controls. The other avenues for research will be study in other 
projects. Similarly, only a few contingency factors were selected for examination; 
however, such choices are necessary to maintain the parsimony of the model presented 
herein. 
To study informal social controls in relation to security behavior, this study draws 
from the theoretical perspectives of Akers’ social learning theory (R L Akers, 1985; 
Ronald L. Akers, 2009). Akers’ social learning theory (ASLT) is a sociological theory in 
criminology that explains how individuals learn deviant values and behaviors through 
social interaction. ASLT counters early criminological research, which provided 
biological explanations of deviant behavior. Similarly, ASLT provides different insight 
than cognition-based theories of deviant behavior, such as rational choice theory. While 
cognitive-based theories examine individual’s cognitions, ASLT describes how those 
cognitions are formed and influenced by social interaction. ASLT remains a prominent 
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theory of social corruption control (Ronald L. Akers, 2009). Although ASLT is used as a 
guiding theory, other theories were also considered, such as Bandura’s social learning 
theory, rational choice theory, and deterrence theory. Other concepts arose from the 
qualitative interviews conducted for this study. 
ASLT is an extension of Sutherland’s differential association theory (Sutherland, 
1947). ASLT and differential association theory (DAT) posit that individuals learn to be 
deviant in the same manner that they learn compliant behavior. ASLT and DAT argue 
that individuals who have more contact with norms and beliefs that favor deviance will 
be more likely to engage in deviant behavior. While DAT suggests that behaviors are 
learned, ASLT explicates important learning mechanisms that influence the social 
learning of norms and behaviors (Ronald L. Akers, 2009). ASLT is a general theory of 
deviance, meaning it can explain multiple forms of deviant behavior (Ronald L. Akers, 
2009; Pratt et al., 2010). ASLT can explain intentional behaviors with malicious or 
neutral motives, such as interpersonal violence or smoking, respectively (Pratt et al., 
2010). As such, ASLT provides an ideal theoretical perspective for our study of SDB and 
SRB in the security domain. ASLT is also based on the assumption that deviant behaviors 
form similar to compliant behaviors (Ronald L. Akers, 2009). Thus, ASLT may provide a 
lens for examining proactive and compliant security behavior as well. 
ASLT is founded on a few key variables. ASLT suggests that individuals will 
have different levels of exposure to definitions in favor of deviance or in favor of 
compliance. In ASLT, definitions refer to beliefs, values, and rationalizations that are 
learned by individuals which either favor compliant behavior or favor deviant behavior 
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(R L Akers, 1985; Sutherland, 1947). Definitions can be general, such as definitions of 
deviance, or specific, such as definitions of appropriate security behavior (Ronald L. 
Akers, 2009). Thus, specific definitions should be explored for each research context. 
The differential exposure to definitions in favor of deviant behavior, known as 
differential association, influences the likelihood that an individual will adopt the 
definitions and engage in deviant behavior. ASLT proposes two primary mechanisms 
through which the behavior is learned and reinforced. First, ASLT proposes that behavior 
is learned through mimicry. Second, ALST suggests that definitions and behaviors are 
reinforced through mechanisms, such as punishment and rewards that incentivize or 
disincentivize certain behaviors. Though ALST makes no differentiation between 
informal reinforcement (e.g., social shaming) and formal reinforcement (e.g., 
administrative sanctions), this study examines both informal and formal reinforcement.   
The research questions explored herein are founded on the premises of ASLT. 
The questions are:  
1) How do informal social processes influence security behaviors in the 
workplace?  
2) What general and security-specific definitions of deviance and compliance 
exist among employees in organizational settings?  
3) Where do employee’s security beliefs originate? 
Research Agenda 
The remainder of this study proceeds as follows. First, a literature review is 
provided to discuss the typology and contingency perspective adopted herein. Second, the 
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theoretical foundations of the dissertation are described in greater detail. Third, a 
conceptual model and hypotheses are presented. Fourth, the methods that will be used to 
test the conceptual model are explained. Finally, a discussion of the potential 
contributions of the dissertation is provided. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Overview of Controls in Behavioral Information Security Research 
A review of the literature suggests that security controls play a secondary role in 
many behavioral InfoSec studies. Many studies seek to explain why individuals commit 
deviant security-related behaviors, but fail to actively study the characteristics of security 
controls that help to mitigate the deviant behaviors. For example, some studies examine 
employees’ psychological or moral predispositions in a security context (e.g., D'Arcy & 
Devaraj, 2012; Myyry, Siponen, Pahnila, Vartiainen, & Vance, 2009). Other studies 
measure the potential behavioral outcomes of security controls while ignoring 
characteristics of the controls themselves. Bulgurcu et al. (2010), for example, measures 
the effect that information security awareness has on compliance intentions and discusses 
the role that security education, training, and awareness (SETA) programs have in 
developing security awareness. However, the study does not measure or control for the 
use of SETA programs in the organizations sampled. Similarly, Herath and Rao (2009b) 
examines concerns about security breaches using protection-motivation theory and 
discusses the role that fear appeals have in prompting protective behavior. Again, the 
study does not measure or control for the use of fear appeals in the organizations 
sampled. Further, many studies examine security-related social norms (e.g., Bulgurcu et 
al., 2010; Gagne & Deci, 2005; Guo et al., 2011; Herath & Rao, 2009b); 
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however, very little empirical work has examined ways that organizations can harness 
these security-related norms to influence employee behavior. We call for a more intimate 
study of the characteristics of security controls. In response to these findings, this study 
provides a more intimate examination of informal social controls herein. 
Classifications of Information Security Controls 
A number of scholars have classified information security controls for different 
purposes and from different perspectives. The simplest distinction between security 
controls is the difference between technical and operational controls (Hovav & D'Arcy, 
2012). Technical controls are computerized countermeasures (e.g., firewalls, anti-virus 
software, intrusion detection systems, computer monitoring, etc.) that detect and/or stop 
harmful computer behaviors committed by organizational insiders and those external to 
the organization. However, technical controls are often not enough to stop abuse from 
organizational insiders, as insiders have greater access to information and computer 
systems (Ng, Kankanhalli, & Xu, 2009; Siponen et al., 2008; Warkentin & Willison, 
2009; Workman & Gathegi, 2007). To further combat internal abuse, organizations 
develop and deploy operational controls. Operational controls are interventions (security 
policies, sanctions, rewards, security training, etc.) that attempt to motivate appropriate or 
discourage inappropriate behavior from employees. Given that distinctions between 
technical and operational controls are well defined (Hovav & D'Arcy, 2012; Warkentin & 
Willison, 2009), and technical controls are well studied (Warkentin & Willison, 2009; 
Zafar & Clark, 2009), this study focuses on distinctions between different types of 
operational controls.  
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Some typologies of security controls focus on temporal aspects of control (D. 
Straub & Welke, 1998; Willison & Warkentin, 2013). Most recently, Willison and 
Warkentin (2013) adapted Straub and Welke’s (1998) security action cycle. Straub and 
Welke’s (1998) security action cycle suggests that organizations first attempt to deter 
abusive behavior. When deterrence fails, organizations attempt to prevent abusive 
behavior. If abuse occurs despite attempts to deter and prevent it, organizations attempt to 
detect and then remedy the abuse. Willison and Warkentin (2013) extended the security 
action cycle by pointing to the importance of understanding the thought processes and 
events that lead individuals to engage or intend to engage in abusive behavior. These 
action cycles offer a useful view of the temporal nature of control. However, they do not 
capture the characteristics of controls that catalyze security behavior. Organizational 
controls are established to catalyze specific reactions in employees (e.g., fear, 
commitment, shame, etc.). To effectively link controls to employee behavior, researchers 
must understand the behavioral catalyzing characteristics of controls (Lange, 2008). 
Some attempts have been made to develop simple typologies of the behavioral 
catalyzing characteristics of controls. However, these attempts are not the sole focus of 
the papers; therefore, they are underdeveloped and piecemeal. Chen et al. (2012), for 
example, provide a distinction between two types of controls—coercive and remunerative 
controls. Coercive controls include threats and punishments, while remunerative controls 
are reward systems (e.g., bonuses, praise, recognition, etc.). The distinction between 
punishment and reward is important and has been studied in many security studies (Boss, 
Kirsch, Angermeier, Shingler, & Boss, 2009; Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Chen & Wen, 2012). 
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At their core, however, punishment and rewards are different forms of consequence 
systems (Lange, 2008). Consequence systems seek to extrinsically motivate behavior 
through deterrence or by aligning employees’ behaviors with organizational objectives 
through rewards. Though consequence systems are important, other systems of 
behavioral control exist within organizations.   
Others have studied the distinction between formal and informal controls or 
administrative and social controls. Administrative controls are established by formal 
entities within organizations and include formal consequence systems and bureaucratic 
systems of rules, policies, procedures, and training. Social controls are less formal and 
may be emergent or manipulated by the organization (Johnson & Gill, 1993; Lange, 
2008). In information security research, the distinction between formal and informal 
control systems is mostly studied as the difference between formal policies and social 
norms (Herath & Rao, 2009b; Warkentin, Johnston, & Shropshire, 2011) and the 
difference between formal sanctions and informal sanctions (D'Arcy & Devaraj, 2012; 
Siponen & Vance, 2010; Vance & Siponen, 2012). As evident in our review, studies of 
social control systems are highly understudied in information security research and are 
not well understood. Social control is an important form of control that is becoming more 
prevalent in postbureaucratic organizations (Lange, 2008; Tompkins & Cheney, 1985). 
Understanding social control will be an important endeavor for future information 
security research. Clearly, progress has been made in understanding important 
characteristics of security controls. However, understanding is currently dispersed across 
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studies. This study provides a typology that brings together important behavioral 
catalyzing characteristics of controls to provide a single and holistic reference point. 
Typological Theorizing 
Typologies are common in research.  However, some confusion and contention 
exists around the value of typologies. To some, typologies are simple classification 
mechanisms that reduce a complex phenomenon into ideal types of the phenomenon 
(Doty & Glick, 1994; Posey et al., 2013). In this way, classification systems help 
researchers to identify a particular entity or phenomenon and compare it to other entities 
or phenomena (Posey et al., 2013). However, typologies can be used for more than 
classification; typologies can be used to theorize about phenomena (Doty & Glick, 1994; 
Hollenbeck, Beersma, & Schouten, 2012). Typological theories capture the effect that 
types of an entity exert on a dependent variable. For example, we are concerned with the 
effect that types of security-related corruption controls exert on organizational insiders’ 
security behaviors, particularly SDB and SRB. We are also concerned with how security-
related corruption controls interact with controls that promote compliant and proactive 
behavior. Thus, typological theorizing moves beyond classification to making theoretical 
statements about ideal types and their underlying dimensions. 
Typological theorizing provides different ways to conceptualize the relationships 
between ideal types and the dependent variable (Doty & Glick, 1994). A common form 
of typological theorizing suggests that influence on the dependent variable will be greater 
to the extent that the characteristics of an actual object or phenomenon align with the 
theoretical dimensions of an ideal type. This is known as profile deviation (Barki et al., 
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2001; Venkatraman, 1989). Under profile deviation, a security-related corruption control 
is most effective to the extent that the actual control aligns perfectly with a profile of an 
ideal control type. Deviations in levels of the dimensions of an actual object or 
phenomenon as compared to the dimensions specified for an ideal type decrease the 
effectiveness of the object or phenomenon. Profile deviation is useful because it explains 
complex, non-linear relationships (Barki et al., 2001; Doty & Glick, 1994). Profile 
deviation is used to examine individual instances of an object and its fit with an ideal 
type. Profile deviation could assist researchers in understanding the effectiveness of a 
particular control given a particular contingency factor. However, controls do not exist in 
isolation. Organizations use multiple controls to manage security behavior. Profile 
deviation is less than ideal for studying sets of controls unless higher-level entities are 
established to represent ideal types of control sets. Unfortunately, establishing profiles for 
sets of controls from a behavioral perspective is difficult, because little is known about 
how controls interact to influence individual behavior (Chen & Wen, 2012; Lange, 2008). 
Thus, in our agenda, profile deviation is only recommended for the study of individual 
types of control. To understand the coexistence of controls and optimal control sets, 
another type of theorizing is necessary, namely moderation. 
Moderation in typological theorizing examines the effect that contingency factors 
have on the relationship between ideal types and the dependent variable (Doty & Glick, 
1994). Moderation allows researchers to understand phenomenon at a level of specificity 
that mediation and profile deviation cannot (Venkatraman, 1989). Because so little 
information exists regarding the interaction between controls, this study is primarily 
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concerned with typological theorizing using moderation. Moderation in contingency-
based typological theorizing seeks to understand which ideal types should be actualized 
to maximize the level of the dependent variable (Doty & Glick, 1994). In developing the 
typology, we seek to examine how contingency factors within the organizational 
environment influence the behavioral catalyzing effectiveness of security-related 
corruption controls and controls that promote positive security behavior in order to 
recommend appropriate controls for different situations and circumstances.  
Typological theories can also be specified conceptually or empirically. 
Conceptual specification of ideal types is best for developing theories (Doty & Glick, 
1994). Empirical specification of ideal types is prone to weaknesses that limit theorizing. 
First, empirical specification of ideal types is usually based on a single study to identify 
ideal types. Although the ideal types are grounded in practice, the theory is 
contextualized to the sample, as in grounded theory (Doty & Glick, 1994). There is no 
guarantee that the typology is representative or robust, though random selection may 
provide a more representative sample. Conceptual specification of ideal types, however, 
relies on results from multiple studies and experts. Thus, conceptual specification 
benefits from a multitude of perspectives and years of theoretical development and 
testing. Second, empirically specified typologies are limited to the ideal types that exist 
within practice (Doty & Glick, 1994). Conceptual specification, however, allows 
researchers to identify ideal types that may not exist within practice, but are theoretically 
possible. In this way, conceptual specification is amenable to design science and the 
development of new types of an object. Because our paper our purpose is to provide 
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direction to develop a theory of security-related corruption control, the investigation 
relies on conceptual specification to identify ideal types. This study draws from years of 
research on organizational controls to develop a typology of security-related corruption 
controls. This is done because SRB and SDB are understudied. Much more is known 
about controls to enhance positive security behavior. Although the typology is primarily 
concerned with categorizing security-related corruption controls, the dimensions of the 
controls also pertain to organizational controls that seeks to promote positive behavior. 
Contingency Models 
Contingency models seek to explain how phenomena manifest differently in 
different contexts. In contingency models, context is represented by contingency factors. 
Contingency factors are aspects of the context that are likely to influence actors’ 
thoughts, attitudes, and behaviors. Some common contingency factors include 
organizational size, national culture, and organizational culture. The literature review 
suggests that contingency models are primarily represented as mediation models in 
behavioral InfoSec research. However, we are not the first to examine or promote 
moderation-based contingency models in a security setting. First, several behavioral 
InfoSec studies examine the influence of contingency factors on relationships between 
different types of perceptions about security phenomenon. For example, Leonard et al. 
(2004) examine employees’ attitudes toward ethical behaviors and employees’ intentions 
to behave ethically or unethically. They examine the moderating effect that the perceived 
importance of an ethical issue has on the relationship between attitude and behavioral 
intentions. Similarly, Li et al. (2010) study how employees’ perceptions of the risk of 
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violating Internet use policy influence policy compliance intentions. They find that 
personal norms moderate the relationship between perceptions of risk and compliance 
intentions. Ng et al. (2009) examine the influence employees’ beliefs about security 
threats exert on computer security behavior. They find that the perceived severity of a 
security breach moderates the relationship between threat beliefs and security behavior. 
These studies explain how employee perceptions interact; however, they do not provide 
direction toward a contingency theory that links characteristics of controls with employee 
behavior. 
Second, some studies examine the influence of contingency factors on the use of 
controls by managers. For example, Straub and Nance (1990) examine how managers 
adjust the certainty and severity of sanctions based on contingency factors such as 
organizational size and industry. They find that managers use controls differently in 
different contexts. These types of studies provide useful insight into the application of 
controls. However, behavior is not directly measured in these types of studies, meaning 
that researchers cannot suggest controls that maximize the behavioral catalyzing 
effectiveness of the controls for different contexts.  
Finally, some studies examine the influence of contingency factors on the 
relationship between the use of controls and employee behavior. Hovav and D’Arcy 
(2012), for example, examines the effect technical and procedural security controls have 
on information systems (IS) misuse intentions. They find that national culture moderates 
the relationship between security controls and IS misuse intentions. Similarly, Harrington 
(1996) examines the use of codes of ethics on computer abuse intentions. She found that 
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employees’ denial of responsibility moderates the relationship between the use of codes 
of ethics and computer abuse intentions. Chen et al. (2012) examines the effect of 
punishment and reward on compliance intentions. They find that perceptions of the 
certainty of control moderate the relationship between punishment and reward and 
compliance intentions. They also offer a unique perspective of control by examining the 
behavioral catalyzing effectiveness of two types of controls when the controls coexist in a 
single environment. Thus, Harrington and Chen et al. are exemplar studies for those 
interested in developing contingency models in security contexts. Though Harrington and 
Chen et al. provide exemplar studies, a systematic agenda to arrive at a contingency 
theory doesn’t exist. This paper provides an agenda to arrive at such as theory. 
Another concern that arises in contingency models is how to examine contingency 
factors. Examining the influence of contingencies can be done quantitatively or 
qualitatively. Both quantitative and qualitative research allow for the comparison of 
phenomenon across situations. In quantitative research, comparisons can be made by 
examining the relative frequency of phenomena (e.g., D. W. J. Straub & Nance, 1990), 
introducing interaction terms in statistical analyses (e.g., Chen & Wen, 2012), and 
statically comparing identical structural equation models differentiated by a contingency 
factor (e.g., Hovav & D'Arcy, 2012). In qualitative studies, theoretical replication in the 
selection of cases allows for the comparison of phenomena based on conceptual criteria 
(Yin, 2002). Although many methods exist for examining contingency factors, the figures 
in this study depict traditional models of moderation (Baron & Kenny, 1986) to simplify 
the presentation of our ideas. 
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Developing a Typology of Security-Related Corruption Control 
This study has identified several ways security controls have been classified. 
Although each classification offers useful information about how controls influence 
behavior, behavioral catalyzing aspects of controls are not directly specified in these 
classifications. Without a clear conceptual link between employee behavior and 
characteristics of controls that catalyze employee behavior, it is difficult to develop 
controls that maximize behavioral outcomes (Lange, 2008). Thus, behavioral InfoSec 
research is in needs a typology grounded in control characteristics that are directly related 
to employee behavior. Such a typology could provide direction for the improvement and 
development of new security-related corruption controls.  
To develop a typology of security-related corruption control, we first conducted a 
search of general management literature to find articles on organizational control. In 
particular, the search was focused on typologies of control. The search consisted of the 
terms: “typology,” “taxonomy,” “review,” and “organizational control.” Typology and 
taxonomy were included, as these terms are often used interchangeably (Doty & Glick, 
1994). Although several papers were found, only one paper focused on corruption 
controls (Lange, 2008). Lange’s paper provided us with an initial set of dimensions that 
are not well explicated in information security research. After selecting Lange’s typology 
as a foundation, behavioral information security research was collected and an initial 
coding of the articles was conducted to determine how well the different dimensions of 
Lange’s typology fit within the security domain.  
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The article collection process began by searching the basket-11 journals identified 
by Clark et al. (2011). These journals are identified as high quality mainstream IS 
journals. Terms such as: “computer abuse,” “policy violation,” “security,” and 
“information security policy,” “noncompliance” and “compliance” were used. Although 
the focus of the typology is negative security behavior (i.e., SDB’s and SRB’s), literature 
that examined compliance was also examined, as many of these studies discuss 
noncompliance as well. After reviewing and coding the articles found in the basket-11 
journals, the first author examined the references in the articles found in the basket-11 
journals. This review of references was limited to papers that focused on deviant security 
behavior. The literature search was extended because research on noncompliance and 
computer abuse is less prevalent in the basket-11 journals than research on compliance. 
Only empirical studies were examined in the review. Theoretical papers were reviewed 
for insight, but were not coded. Empirical papers were coded to ensure that the results 
represent the research that is well-supported with evidence. Theoretical works require 
empirical testing to ensure that the underlying concepts are sound. In total, 35 articles 
were coded. The first author coded each of the articles according to the types of controls 
that were present in the articles. The coding represents a conservative estimate, and likely 
overestimates the study of each type of control. Most of the studies treat controls as a 
secondary concern and do not directly measure different characteristics of controls.  
After an initial reading of the literature, it was determined that some of the 
assumptions in Lange’s typology were not sufficiently nuanced to capture security-
related misbehavior. Thus, some revisions were made to the typology. After revising the 
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typology the lead author coded the articles again to determine what types of security-
related corruption controls have been examined in the literature. We now present Lange’s 
typology and discuss the changes made to the typology. 
Lange’s Typology of Corruption Control 
Lange (2008) suggests that corruption controls should be examined across two 
dimensions—the behavioral orientation of the control and the transmission channel of the 
control. Behavioral orientation can be outcome oriented or process oriented (Lange, 
2008; Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009). Outcome oriented controls focus on aligning 
employee behavior with desired outcomes, while process oriented, also referred to as 
procedural controls, focus on the antecedent behaviors or cognitions that lead to a 
particular outcome. Transmission channel refers to the structures in the organization 
through which controls are broadcast and enacted. Transmission channels can be 
administrative—formal channels established through legitimate organizational 
structures—or social—informal channels established through social structures. The two 
dimensions create four types of controls: outcome oriented controls transmitted socially, 
outcome oriented controls transmitted administratively, procedural controls transmitted 
socially, and procedural controls transmitted administratively (Lange, 2008). 
Lange (2008) further separates corruption control types by their functionality—
the way controls regulate behavior. He identifies four major types of functionality—
autonomy reduction, consequence systems, environmental sanctioning, and intrinsically 
oriented controls. By combining the four functionalities with the two dimensions 
mentioned above, Lange (2008) identifies eight types of corruption control. The controls 
   
26 
 
consist of: bureaucratic controls, punishment, incentive alignment, legal/regulatory 
sanctioning, social sanctioning, vigilance controls, self-controls, and concertive controls. 
Figure 1 depicts Lange’s typology.  
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Figure 1. Typology of Organizational Corruption Controls from (Lange, 2008) 
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Re-envisioning Lange’s Typology for Security Controls 
Two aspects of Lange’s (2008) typology were questioned for studying corruption 
controls—the usefulness of functionality as a discriminator of corruption control types 
and the rigid classification of controls based on the behavioral orientation dimension.  
First, functionality as used by Lange (2008) is an inappropriate discriminator for 
security control types. Environmental sanctioning—the interpretation and transmission of 
external pressures to organizational insiders (Lange, 2008)—is not at the same level of 
distinction as the other functionalities. Environmental sanctioning serves the function of 
reducing autonomy and establishing and executing consequences through external 
regulating bodies. Further, environmental sanctions are embedded into organizational 
routines, procedures, and consequence systems through the managerialization of law 
(Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009). Therefore, environmental sanctioning is subsumed in the 
autonomy reduction and consequence system functions. That is, environmental 
sanctioning is a type of autonomy reduction and consequence system. Moreover, the 
focus of Lange’s typology is organizational controls. Environmental sanctioning is the 
most incongruent with this focus. Finally, organizations rarely report employees’ security 
misbehaviors to external entities (Guo et al., 2011; D. W. J. Straub & Nance, 1990). 
Further, functionality is further removed from employee behavior than the underlying 
dimension guiding the functionalities, namely motivation. Each functionality represents 
different forms of motivation. These limitations warrant the replacing functionality with 
another dimension. 
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This paper argues that a third dimension—motivational orientation—better 
captures the nature of functionality for the security context. Motivation is a common 
theme in behavioral information security research (e.g., Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Guo et al., 
2011; Herath & Rao, 2009b). In fact, compliance intention is often defined as a 
“motivational state” that occurs prior to engaging in a security behavior (D'Arcy et al., 
2009; Hovav & D'Arcy, 2012). Further, motivation figures prominently in theories of 
behavior and compliance (e.g., Bénabou & Tirole, 2003; Deci, Koestner, & Ryan, 1999; 
Eisenberger, Pierce, & Cameron, 1999; Frey, 1997; Gagne & Deci, 2005; Ryan & Deci, 
1985, 2000; Son, 2011; Vance, Siponen, & Pahnila, 2012; Vroom, 1964). Motivational 
orientation refers to the way in which a control is intended to encourage or discourage 
employee behavior. The remaining three functionalities in Lange’s typology—
consequence systems, intrinsically oriented controls, and autonomy reduction—represent 
extrinsic, intrinsic and covert motivational orientations, respectively. Corruption controls, 
such as sanctions and punishment are designed to extrinsically motivate appropriate 
behavior (Lange, 2008). Some controls are intrinsically oriented (Lange, 2008). 
Additionally, other controls, such as bureaucratic controls are intended to naturalize 
behavior, and may be so deeply embedded in the fabric of organizational life that they 
become invisible and taken for granted (March & Simon, 1958). Therefore, the 
motivational orientation of these controls is covert. Figure 2 presents the three 
dimensions of our typology. 
Second, a more nuanced view of outcome oriented and procedural controls is 
necessary. Important nuances of control are missed by the current typology. For example, 
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bureaucratic controls are often thought of as being procedural in nature and are 
represented as such in Lange’s typology. However, bureaucratic controls, such as law and 
policy can be outcome oriented (Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009). Boss et al. (2009), for 
example, study precaution taking behaviors which capture both procedural and outcome 
oriented behaviors. This paper extends Lange’s typology by adding flexibility in the use 
of the behavioral orientation dimension. Thus, our typology provides a clearer distinction 
between procedural and outcome oriented controls than in Lange (2008). 
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Figure 2. Dimensions of Security-related Corruption Controls 
 
The three dimensions of corruption control—behavioral orientation, transmission 
channel, and motivational orientation—form 12 types of security-related corruption 
controls and three major systems of control. Although the dimensions are particularly 
designed for a typology of security-related corruption controls, they are also relevant to 
controls that seek to promote positive behavior. Promoting positive behavior can be done 
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through administrative or social channels, can be accomplished through different forms 
of motivation (e.g., intrinsic or extrinsic), and can be focused on security outcomes or 
security procedures. Thus, the typology is also pertinent to controls that promote positive 
security behavior, such as PSB and SCB. The three major systems of control include: 
structural systems, consequence systems, and commitment systems. The three major 
systems of control are derived from the motivational orientation dimension. Motivational 
orientation explains how controls catalyze behavior and why controls influence behavior, 
while transmission channel and behavioral orientation only explain who administers 
controls and what is administered. Thus, motivational orientation provides the most 
theoretically interesting distinction between control types. Each of three major systems is 
described below. Figure 3 presents the dimensions and types of security corruption 
controls. 
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Figure 3. Typology of Security-Related Corruption Controls 
 
Structural Systems 
Bureaucratic controls include rules, routines, policies, and hierarchical structures 
established by formal entities within the organization with legitimate power. Conversely, 
concertive controls include social norms and values and social structures established 
through interaction among peers. Thus, bureaucratic controls are administratively 
transmitted, while concertive controls are socially transmitted. In this typology, two types 
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of bureaucratic control (i.e., type 1 and type 2) and two types of concertive control (i.e., 
type 3 and type 4) were identified.  
Procedural Bureaucratic Controls (Type 1) 
Procedural bureaucratic controls are process oriented and administratively 
transmitted with a covert motivational orientation. Procedural bureaucratic controls refer 
to management interventions which seek to standardize work processes and procedures 
by controlling employees’ perceptions of what should or should not occur in their work 
routines. Bureaucratic controls tend to be procedural in nature, though they may also be 
outcome oriented. Rules, for example, can be oriented toward procedures or outcomes, 
which promote different types of behavior (Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009). Bureaucratic 
controls become deeply embedded in the fabric of organizational life so that they are 
often taken for granted (March & Simon, 1958), making their motivational orientation 
covert. Further, organizational routines and processes may be embedded in information 
systems, making them even less overt (Gosain, 2004). In this way, bureaucratic controls 
minimize violations and abuse by naturalizing security behaviors. However, despite the 
existence of procedural bureaucratic controls, many employees still engage in deviant 
behavior. Procedural bureaucratic controls are often accompanied by other controls, such 
as sanctions and rewards, which deter noncompliance and incentivize compliance, 
respectively (Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Chen & Wen, 2012; D'Arcy et al., 2009). 
Behavioral information security research tends to focus heavily on procedural 
bureaucratic controls, primarily in the form of ISP. In fact, all 35 articles reviewed in our 
study examine some form of procedural bureaucratic control. Studies primarily consider 
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how other types of controls affect compliance and noncompliance with ISP (e.g., 
Bulgurcu et al., 2010; D'Arcy et al., 2009; Herath & Rao, 2009b) and how awareness of 
ISP affects security behavior (e.g., Bulgurcu et al., 2010). D’Arcy et al. (2009) examine 
the effect awareness of security countermeasures have on intentions to misuse an 
organizations information assets. ISP is a procedural bureaucratic control to the extent 
that the policies focus on rules, work processes, and other antecedent behaviors that lead 
to secure systems. 
Outcome Oriented Bureaucratic Controls (Type 2)  
Outcome oriented bureaucratic controls are outcome oriented and administratively 
transmitted with a covert motivational orientation. Outcome oriented bureaucratic 
controls refer to management interventions which seek to standardized employees’ 
perceptions of desired security outcomes by providing a formal and official vision of the 
outcomes. Outcome oriented bureaucratic controls are likely to take the form of rules and 
policies that are oriented toward desired outcomes rather than toward the antecedent 
behaviors of the desired outcomes. Thus, they may appear more like goals or high-level 
objectives than as rules that designate appropriate behavior. Importantly, outcome 
oriented rules and policies may lead to fewer rule and policy violations than procedural 
rules and policies (Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009). Outcome oriented bureaucratic 
controls minimize violations and abuse by naturalizing the pursuit of desired outcomes 
and the avoidance of undesired outcomes. 
No security study to our knowledge directly examines outcome oriented rules and 
policies or other forms of outcome oriented bureaucratic controls. However, some studies 
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discuss outcome oriented policies indirectly through the study of outcome oriented 
behavior. Boss et al. (2009) and Bulgurcu et al. (2010), for example, define compliance 
with policy in terms of outcomes (e.g., secure computers and protected information 
technology resources) and not procedures. This is contrasted with studies that focus on 
procedural behaviors (e.g., logging off computers and using secure wireless connections). 
Studies that rely on protection motivation theory also tend to view compliance as 
outcome oriented (Herath & Rao, 2009b). In total, 13 studies examined outcome oriented 
security behaviors related to policy. However, it should be noted that these studies focus 
on the behavior and not on the characteristics of the particular control, namely ISP. 
Future research should examine outcome oriented policy to extend the work that has been 
done on outcome oriented behaviors. 
Procedural Concertive Controls (Type 3) 
Procedural concertive controls are process oriented and socially transmitted with a 
covert motivational orientation. Procedural concertive controls refer to socially 
constructed structural systems which seek to standardize work processes and procedures 
by controlling employees’ normative perceptions of what should or should not occur in 
their work routines. Whereas outcome oriented concertive controls focus on socially 
generated values, procedural concertive controls focus on the socially generated rules 
systems that are likely to develop from the social values (Barker, 1993). Thus, procedural 
concertive controls focus on the informal social rules and policies that guide and 
constrain employee behavior. Procedural concertive controls minimize violations and 
abuse by naturalizing security behaviors through the development of social norms. Like 
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procedural bureaucratic controls, procedural concertive controls are likely to be 
accompanied by deterrents and incentives, such as social shaming or the granting of in-
group status, respectively. 
Several security studies examine social norms, which are a form of procedural 
concertive control (e.g., Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Herath & Rao, 2009b; Johnston & 
Warkentin, 2010). In total, 12 studies examined procedural concertive controls. However, 
these studies examine the effect of social norms on compliance or noncompliance with 
bureaucratic policy. Future studies should examine the antecedents of compliance and 
noncompliance with concertive policies and procedures. That is, social norms should be 
considered as an important dependent variable in information security research. This is 
particularly true when studying postbureaucratic organizations, as postbureaucratic 
organizations tend to rely more heavily on social control than administrative control 
(Lange, 2008; Van Alstyne, 1997). Examining concertive controls may also be important 
when studying decentralized organizations, where bureaucratic controls may be less 
efficacious (Lange, 2008). 
Outcome Oriented Concertive Controls (Type 4) 
Outcome oriented concertive controls are outcome oriented and socially 
transmitted with a covert motivational orientation. Outcome oriented concertive controls 
refer to socially constructed values which seek to standardize employees’ perceptions of 
desired security outcomes by providing a social and cultural vision of the outcomes. 
Outcome oriented concertive controls are established through a process of negotiation 
that leads to consensually generated values (Barker, 1993; Tompkins & Cheney, 1985). 
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Barker (1993) suggests that structural systems are likely to result from the values 
identified during social negotiations; however, these structural systems are procedural in 
nature and represent procedural concertive controls. Like bureaucratic controls, 
concertive controls may be deeply embedded within the social structures in an 
organization, which help to naturalize the values and associated rules systems. This is the 
premise of critical and postmodern theories (Fairclough, Mulderrig, & Wodak, 1997; 
Lincoln, Lynham, & Guba, 2011). That is, social values, norms, and structures crystallize 
and become taken for granted (Lincoln et al., 2011; Stahl, Doherty, & Shaw, 2012). 
Outcome oriented concertive controls may manifest as security-related aspects of 
organizational culture or subcultures. Outcome oriented concertive controls minimize 
violations and abuse by naturalizing the pursuit of values related to security, such as the 
protection of organizational information or protection of clients. 
Many information security studies examine the effect that social norms have on 
security behavior. When social norms focus on outcomes, norms represent a form of 
outcome oriented concertive control. Subjective and descriptive norm (Bulgurcu et al., 
2010; Herath & Rao, 2009b), social influence (Johnston & Warkentin, 2010), 
organizational norms (Li et al., 2010), and workgroup norms (Guo et al., 2011) are some 
conceptualizations of concertive controls found in security research. However, these 
conceptualizations are mostly procedural in nature. Only one study in our review directly 
discussed outcome oriented concertive controls. Leonard et al. (2004) describe the 
importance of establishing an ethical climate which promotes outcomes such as caring. 
However, ethical climate was not operationalized or empirically evaluated in the study. 
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Understanding the effect socially constructed values have on employee behavior is an 
important direction for future research. 
Consequence Systems 
Consequence systems are high-level control systems that motivate action through 
extrinsically oriented rewards or punishments. Consequence systems can be transmitted 
administratively through formal sanctions and rewards or socially through social shaming 
and rejection or by granting individuals in-group status. Further, consequence systems 
can be procedural or outcome oriented. That is, consequence systems may offer positive 
or negative consequences for compliance or noncompliance with procedures and for 
accomplishing or failing to accomplish specified outcomes. In our typology, four types of 
consequence systems (i.e., type 5, type 6, type 7, and type 8) exist. 
Procedural Consequence Systems (Type 5) 
Procedural consequence systems are process oriented and administratively 
transmitted with an extrinsic motivational orientation. Procedural consequence systems 
refer to management interventions which seek to deter noncompliance or incentivize 
compliance with formal work processes and procedures by providing punishment or 
reward for noncompliant or compliant behavior, respectively. Procedural consequence 
systems include punishment and rewards disseminated by formal, legitimate entities in 
the organization (Lange, 2008). Thus, they are administratively transmitted. Punishments, 
such as organizational sanctions, focus on deterring misbehavior, while rewards attempt 
to incentivize correct behavior (Chen & Wen, 2012). Procedural consequence systems 
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minimize violations and abuse by providing external motivation to engage in specified 
behaviors. 
Lange (2008) suggests that punishment is process oriented, while rewards are 
outcome oriented. Sanctions are more likely to be process oriented; however, rewards are 
always outcome oriented. Sanctions are deterrent controls that are intended to discourage 
negative behavior and not necessarily to encourage positive behavior (D'Arcy & Herath, 
2011). Therefore, punishment is likely to assume a process orientation. Still, punishment 
can be administered for undesirable outcomes rather than undesirable behaviors (Lehman 
& Ramanujam, 2009). Rewards, however, can be given for complying with procedural 
policies and work processes or for accomplishing specified outcomes (Boss et al., 2009; 
Cardinal, 2001). Thus, rewards may easily be designed as either process or outcome 
oriented. When rewards are used to incentivize behaviors that are antecedent to the 
expected outcomes of the behaviors, rewards represent procedural consequence systems.   
Consequence systems are a strong focus of behavioral information security 
studies. In our review, 24 of the 35 studies examined some form of procedural 
consequence system, primarily sanctions. Many studies use general deterrence theory 
(Blumstein, 1978) to explain how perceptions of sanctions can affect compliance with 
ISP (e.g., D'Arcy et al., 2009; Hovav & D'Arcy, 2012; Siponen & Vance, 2010; D. W. J. 
Straub & Nance, 1990). Additionally, Boss et al. (2009) suggest that both process 
oriented and outcome oriented rewards can influence perceptions of the mandatoriness of 
ISP and subsequent compliance with ISP. 
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Outcome Oriented Consequence Systems (Type 6) 
Outcome oriented consequence systems are outcome oriented and 
administratively transmitted with an extrinsic motivational orientation. Outcome oriented 
consequence systems refer to management interventions which seek to align employees’ 
goals with desired security outcomes by providing punishment or reward for failing to 
achieve or achieving the desired outcomes, respectively. Outcome oriented consequence 
systems differ from procedural consequence systems in behavioral orientation. As 
suggested earlier, outcome oriented consequence systems are more likely to take the form 
of rewards rather than punishment. However, sanctions designed to punish failed 
objectives are considered outcome oriented consequence systems. Punishment for failed 
security objectives has not been considered in information security research, though it has 
received some attention in general management literature (e.g., Lehman & Ramanujam, 
2009). Outcome oriented consequence systems minimize violations and abuse by 
providing external motivation to work toward security outcomes specified by the 
organization. 
Security studies have examined outcome oriented consequence systems as 
outcome oriented rewards. Boss et al. (2009) study both outcome and behavioral rewards. 
Similarly, Bulgurcu et al. (2010) study rewards in terms of outcome beliefs. Fear appeals 
are outcome oriented consequence systems. Fear appeals attempt to motivate action by 
highlighting the natural consequences of insecure behavior (Johnston & Warkentin, 
2010) and fear appeals focus on security outcomes (i.e., threats to the security and 
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protection of organizational information). Only four articles in our review examined 
outcome oriented consequence systems.  
Procedural Social Consequence Systems (Type 7) 
Procedural social consequence systems are process oriented and socially 
transmitted with an extrinsic motivational orientation. Procedural social consequence 
systems refer to socially or culturally derived mechanisms with the organization which 
seek to deter noncompliance or incentivize compliance with formal work processes and 
procedures or social structural systems by providing punishment or reward for 
noncompliant or compliant behavior, respectively. Procedural social consequence 
systems seek to punish or reward individuals for noncompliance or compliance with 
socially generated rules or formal procedural policies. Procedural social consequence 
systems minimize violations and abuse by providing socially derived external motivation 
to engage in socially or administratively defined behaviors. 
Procedural social consequence systems are studied as informal sanctions in 
information security research (D'Arcy & Devaraj, 2012; Li et al., 2010; Siponen & 
Vance, 2010; Vance & Siponen, 2012). Four studies in our review examine social 
consequence systems. No study to our knowledge examines procedural consequence 
systems as social reward systems. Social reward systems might include receiving or 
maintaining in-group status and receiving socially generated praise and recognition. 
Social praise and recognition does not include administratively transmitted praise and 
recognition, which is the typical focus of research on rewards. Socially generated reward 
systems might be studied in future research. 
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Outcome Oriented Social Consequence Systems (Type 8) 
Outcome oriented social consequence systems are outcome oriented and socially 
transmitted with an extrinsic motivational orientation. Outcome oriented social 
consequence systems refer to socially or culturally derived mechanisms which seek to 
align employees’ goals and values with desired security outcomes and security-related 
values by providing social punishment or reward for failing to achieve or achieving the 
desired outcomes and failing to uphold or upholding the security-related values, 
respectively. The socially derived mechanisms include actions such as shaming, 
expressing disapproval, and denying or granting in-group status to individuals. Social 
consequence systems may be established to monitor compliance with socially generated 
values (Barker, 1993) or with outcome oriented policies (e.g., Bulgurcu et al., 2010; 
Herath & Rao, 2009b; Johnston & Warkentin, 2010; Siponen & Vance, 2010). However, 
social consequence systems often emerge to punish the failure to adopt social values or to 
reward the adoption  of social values (Wright & Barker, 2000). Thus, outcome oriented 
social consequence systems minimize violations and abuse by providing socially derived 
external motivation to work toward administratively defined security outcomes or to 
uphold social values established by peers, respectively. 
In security studies, informal sanctions are a form of social consequence system. 
Siponen and Vance (2010) and D’Arcy and Devaraj (2012) suggest that informal 
sanctions may decrease intentions to misuse information resources. Informal sanctions 
include “the disapproval of friends or peers for a given action” (Siponen & Vance, 2010, 
p. 491). As suggested by this quote, the informal sanctions studied in Siponen and Vance 
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(2010) are likely procedural in nature as they focus on “given actions” rather than on 
outcomes or social values. Based on our review, security studies have not examined 
social consequence systems with an outcome oriented behavioral orientation. This is an 
area for future research. 
Commitment Systems 
Commitment systems are another form of high-level systems of control. Unlike 
consequence systems, which are oriented toward extrinsic motivation, commitment 
systems seek to engender intrinsic motivation to avoid negative behavior and engage in 
positive behavior. Commitment systems may be administrative or social in nature and 
may also be process or outcome oriented. In general, commitment systems seek to engage 
employees in improving security-related policies, norms, work processes, and goals or 
educating and promoting moral behavior. Four types of commitment systems exist (i.e., 
type 9, type 10, type 11, and type 12). 
Procedural Commitment systems (Type 9) 
Procedural commitment systems are process oriented and administratively 
transmitted with an intrinsic motivational orientation. Procedural commitment systems 
refer to management interventions which seek to internalize motivation to engage in 
formal work processes and to follow formal procedures. Developing intrinsic motivation 
to engage in tasks is an important managerial concern. Intrinsically driven behaviors can 
lead to better outcomes and well-adjusted employees (Gagne & Deci, 2005; Ryan & 
Deci, 1985, 2000). Procedural commitment systems include countermeasures such as 
training, codes of ethics, and encouraging participation in the development of policy. 
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Procedural commitment systems are formal management interventions, and thus, are 
under direct control of the organization. Procedural commitment systems minimize 
violations and abuse by strengthening employees’ internal psychological commitment to 
accept and follow the organization’s security policies and to avoid noncompliance with 
the policies.  
A total of 19 studies examined some form of control that improves commitment 
to procedural aspects of ISP or measured employees’ commitment to ISP. Based on the 
review, diverse methods for gaining commitment exist. Theories of user buy-in may be 
appropriate explanations for internal commitment to procedural policies and rules (Spears 
& Barki, 2010). Employee participation in the design of security controls may help to 
increase commitment to the policies of the organization (Spears & Barki, 2010). 
Additionally, commitment to security policies may increase when organizational policies 
are congruent with employees self-identity (Guo et al., 2011). Aligning employees’ self-
identity with the organization’s security requirements may be accomplished through 
codes of ethics (Harrington, 1996). Security training may also help to align employees’ 
knowledge and beliefs with those of the organization (Puhakainen & Siponen, 2010). 
However, when training is used to promote sanctions for misbehavior, training becomes a 
part of an organization’s consequence systems. 
Outcome Oriented Commitment systems (Type 10) 
Outcome oriented commitment systems are outcome oriented and 
administratively transmitted with an intrinsic motivational orientation. Outcome oriented 
commitment systems refer to interventions which seek to internalize motivation to achieve 
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desired security outcomes as defined by the organization. While procedural commitment 
systems focus on developing internal commitment to policies and procedures, outcome 
oriented commitment systems seek to develop commitment to the goals and desired 
outcomes of the organization. Again, buy-in and participation may be the key to 
establishing commitment to security outcomes. Once commitment is achieved, 
employees may experience an internal drive to ensure the security of organizational 
assets (Spears & Barki, 2010). Commitment to the organization may also affect 
commitment to security objectives, as employees’ concern for the well-being of the 
organization may drive them to protect information assets (Herath & Rao, 2009b). Thus, 
organizations might develop controls that focus on building commitment to the 
organization. Outcome oriented commitment systems minimize violations and abuse by 
strengthening employees’ internal psychological commitment to the organization’s 
security goals and desired security outcomes. 
Ten studies in our review examined outcome oriented commitment systems. 
Again, a diverse set of controls were used. Along with improving compliance to 
procedural policy, Spears and Barki (2010) find that allowing employees to participate in 
the design of security objectives improves the extent to which security objectives and 
business objectives align, thus creating stronger commitment to the security objectives. 
Ethics training may also lead to values that commit employees to secure outcomes 
(Myyry et al., 2009). Other studies focused on outcome oriented variables, but didn’t 
examine them in relation to a security control. For example, Herath and Rao (2009b) find 
that organizational commitment leads to increased policy compliance intentions. 
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However, Herath and Rao (2009b) don’t consider the antecedent conditions that lead to 
organizational commitment. Similarly, Xue et al. (2011) examine satisfaction in relation 
to ISP compliance intentions; however, they do not study ways that organizations can 
create satisfaction. Thus, future research should examine or develop controls that lead to 
feelings of commitment to the organization or satisfaction with information technology 
(IT). 
Procedural Social Commitment systems (Type 11) 
Procedural social commitment systems are process oriented and socially 
transmitted with an intrinsic motivational orientation. Procedural social commitment 
systems refer to socially or culturally derived mechanisms with an organization which 
seek to internalize motivation to engage in formal work processes and follow formal 
procedures, and to follow socially and culturally derived structural systems. Internal 
commitment to social norms within the organization may be greater when social norms 
are congruent with hypernorms—culturally accepted behavioral norms (Lange, 2008). 
Thus, developing social norms that conform to employees’ existing normative beliefs can 
improve commitment to the social norms. Additionally, organizational culture and social 
learning systems may lead to improved behavior (Warkentin et al., 2011). Procedural 
social commitment systems minimize violations and abuse by strengthening employees’ 
internal psychological commitment to the organization’s policies and social norms and 
structural systems. 
A total of four studies in our review examined procedural social commitment 
systems. Whistleblowing can decrease computer abuse (Lowry, Moody, Galletta, & 
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Vance, 2012). Whistleblowing may focus on outcomes oriented complaints or procedural 
complaints. Therefore, whistleblowing fits as both an outcome oriented and procedural 
control depending on its behavioral orientation. Similarly, Hu et al. (2012) examine the 
effect that organizational cultural beliefs about rules have on security behaviors. They 
find that beliefs about rules affect security behaviors. Myyry et al. (2009) suggest that at 
certain levels of moral reasoning, individuals’ commitment to social groups causes 
improved behavior. Lastly, Warkentin et al. (2011) examine social learning systems. 
They find that learning from peers can lead to improved beliefs about compliance and 
affect security behaviors.  
Outcome Oriented Social Commitment systems (Type 12) 
Outcome oriented social commitment systems are outcome oriented and socially 
transmitted with an intrinsic motivational orientation. Outcome oriented social 
commitment systems refer to socially or culturally derived mechanisms which seek to 
internalize motivation to achieve formally specified security outcomes or uphold social 
values. The commitment systems previous discussed are concerned with effecting change 
through management interventions. Social commitment systems, however, are concerned 
with effecting intrinsically driven change through social and cultural means. Engendering 
an organizational culture that is open to whistleblowing is an important form of an 
outcome oriented social commitment system (Lange, 2008). Whistleblowers dissent from 
social norms to improve organizational outcomes, which requires strong intrinsic 
motivation (Warren, 2003). Thus, outcome oriented social commitment systems 
minimize violations and abuse by strengthening employees’ internal psychological 
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commitment to the organization’s desired security outcomes and social and cultural 
values. 
Two studies in our review examined outcome oriented social commitment 
systems. Lowry et al. (2012) examines whistleblowing through information systems in 
the context of computer abuse related to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. They find that 
perceptions of trust, anonymity, and risk are important in whistleblowing contexts. This 
suggests that organizational cultures must be cultivated to decrease social risks and 
increase trust. Similarly, Hu et al. (2012) describe the importance of organizational 
culture in producing secure behaviors. They examine both goal-oriented and rule-oriented 
aspects of culture. They find that organizational culture is important in promoting secure 
behavior. They also find that organizational culture can affect employees’ personal 
beliefs. Given the small amount of attention given to outcome oriented social 
commitment systems, future research should examine these controls further. 
Social Controls in InfoSec Research 
Based on the coding of the behavioral InfoSec studies in Appendix A, informal 
social controls are underrepresented in the literature. Informal social controls include 
types 3, 4, 7, 8, 11, and 12 and span the three major corruption-control systems identified 
in the typology (i.e., rule systems, consequence systems, and commitment systems). In 
other fields, social control has been identified as a highly influential form of behavioral 
control (R L Akers, 1985; Ronald L. Akers, 2009; Sutherland, 1947). Further, theories of 
social control, namely ASLT, exhibits stronger effect sizes than general deterrence theory 
and rational choice theory (Pratt et al., 2010). General deterrence theory and rational 
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choice theory are heavily studied in behavioral InfoSec research (Bulgurcu et al., 2010; 
D'Arcy & Herath, 2011). Therefore, theories of social control deserve future attention in 
behavioral InfoSec research. Informal social control is primarily represented by two 
constructs in behavioral InfoSec research, social norms and informal sanctions. However, 
a few studies integrated more robust theories of social control. We now examine these 
constructs and theories in greater detail.  
Social Norms 
Social norms in behavioral InfoSec research are conceptualized in several ways, 
such as: normative beliefs, workgroup norms, subjective norm, descriptive norm, and 
social influence (Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Guo et al., 2011; Herath & Rao, 2009a, 2009b; 
Johnston & Warkentin, 2010). Though the influence of social norms on behavior assumes 
many names, the varied conceptualizations can be reduced to two primary types of 
normative control. The first type is labeled subjective norm and the second type is labeled 
descriptive norm. Subjective norm refers to an employee’s perception of how others in 
the organization believe the employee should act, and descriptive norm refers to an 
employee’s perception of how others in the organization act (Herath & Rao, 2009b). 
Together, subjective and descriptive norm capture a more complete conceptualization of 
employees’ perceptions of concertive controls than either can alone. Studies also exam 
personal norms and moral beliefs (e.g., Myyry et al., 2009); however, these are not 
measures of social controls. Personal norms and moral beliefs are the normative attitudes 
and beliefs that are assimilated through personal experience and social interaction 
(Ronald L. Akers, 2009). Thus, they are the result of social controls.  
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Studies of social norms in InfoSec research are primarily rooted in the theory of 
reasoned action and its derivative theories (e.g., Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Guo et al., 2011; 
Herath & Rao, 2009a, 2009b; Lee, Lee, & Yoo, 2004). These theories suggest that 
behavior is planned and that cognitive and normative functions influence intentions to 
participate in a particular behavior (Ajzen, 1985; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). While these 
theories acknowledge the influence of norms on behavior and behavioral intentions, the 
theories offer a weak description of social control and mostly fail to describe how norms 
are formed and adopted. To arrive a fuller understanding of social processes, theories of 
social influence must be consulted, such a social cognitive theory (Bandura, 1986), 
differential association theory (Sutherland, 1947), and Akers’ social learning theory (R L 
Akers, 1985). From a managerial perspective, understanding how norms form and are 
adopted is a crucial concern. If managers understand the development of norms, they may 
be able to manipulate social processes to promote behaviors that benefit the organization 
(Lange, 2008). 
Informal Sanctions 
Informal sanctions and other forms of informal behavioral reinforcement are also 
studied in behavioral InfoSec research. However, informal sanctions are studied far less 
than social norms. Informal social norms include the social and self-imposed costs 
accrued for engaging in a deviant act (D'Arcy & Devaraj, 2012). Social costs have been 
studied as social desirability pressures (D'Arcy & Devaraj, 2012), loss of respect from 
peers (Siponen & Vance, 2010; Vance & Siponen, 2012), disapproval of peers (Li et al., 
2010). Self-imposed costs have been studied as shame (D'Arcy & Herath, 2011; Siponen 
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& Vance, 2010) and moral beliefs (D'Arcy & Devaraj, 2012). The behavioral influence of 
informal sanctions has received mixed support. Some studies found that informal 
sanctions have some influence (D'Arcy & Devaraj, 2012; Vance & Siponen, 2012). Other 
studies found no statistical support for the behavioral influence of informal sanctions (Li 
et al., 2010). Further, one study found that the influence of both formal and informal 
sanctions is statistically insignificant when neutralizing behaviors are considered 
(Siponen & Vance, 2010). The mixed findings are found in other fields as well. Pratt et 
al. (2010), for example, conducted a statistical meta-analysis of research on Akers’ social 
learning theory. They found that statistical support for the assertion that reinforcement 
mechanisms (i.e., formal and informal sanctions) influence behavior was weak and 
inconsistent. Despite mixed results, social sanctions are shown across several studies to 
be more influential on behavior than formal sanctions (D'Arcy & Devaraj, 2012; Pratt, 
Cullen, Blevins, Daigle, & Madensen, 2006; Siponen & Vance, 2010). These findings 
provide further evidence of the need to explore informal controls in behavioral InfoSec 
research. 
Theories of Social Control in InfoSec Research 
A few behavioral InfoSec studies explore social variables in greater depth by 
incorporating theories of social control. Lee et al. (2004) examined social control theory 
in an information security context. Social control theory suggests that an individual’s 
bond to society prevents the individual from engaging in deviant behavior (Agnew, 1991; 
Hirschi, 1969). In social control theory, delinquency is the result of weak social bonds. 
Lee et al. (2004) suggested that the strength of an individual’s trust in organizations, a 
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type of social bond, explains computer abuse behaviors in organizations. They found 
partial support for social control theory in a security context. 
Warkentin et al. (2011) examined Bandura’s social learning theory in a security 
context. Bandura’s social learning theory suggests that an individual’s self-efficacy—the 
individual’s belief that the individual is capable of performing a specific task (Bandura, 
1977a, 1977b)—influences the individual’s ability to perform the task. Bandura’s social 
learning theory suggests that self-efficacy is developed socially through verbal 
persuasion, situational support, and vicarious experience (Warkentin et al., 2011). 
Though Warkentin et al. (2011) employs a theory of social influence, the outcome 
variable was positive security behavior. Our focus is positive and negative behavior, as 
research on deviant security behavior is underrepresented (Warkentin et al., 2012). Other 
theories of social control may be better suited for explaining and predicting deviant 
security behavior than Bandura’s social learning theory. Deviant behavior, particularly 
negligent behavior, may require less skill and effort than positive behavior; therefore, 
self-efficacy may lose explanatory and predictive power for many types of deviance 
(Ronald L. Akers, 2009). Additionally, Herath and Rao (2009b) found that subjective 
norm has a larger effect size than self-efficacy and that descriptive norm has a similar 
effect size to self-efficacy. Thus, theories of norms and norm development, such as 
Akers’ social learning theory, may provide stronger explanatory and predictive power.  
Siponen and Vance (2010) use neutralization theory to explain intentions to 
violation information security policy. Neutralization theory (Sykes & Matza, 1957) 
suggests that individuals develop rationalizations for deviant behavior to accommodate 
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for the negative stigmas attached with committing deviant behaviors. These 
rationalizations make deviant behavior possible. Siponen and Vance (2010) found 
support to suggest that neutralizations negate the positive effects of formal and informal 
sanctions on computer behavior. Neutralization theory offers interesting insight into 
social influence. However, neutralization is incorporated into more extensive and robust 
theories of social control, such as Akers’ social learning theory.  
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CHAPTER III 
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS 
 
Social Structure and Social Process 
Theories of social control tend to emphasize social structures or social processes, 
though some, such as social learning and social structure theory (SSSL), attempt to 
incorporate both perspectives (Ronald L. Akers, 2009). Theories of social structure seek 
to explain how social structures produce environments conducive to deviant behavior. 
Strain theory (Merton, 1938), for example, is a common and influential structural theory 
of deviance. Strain theory suggests that societies promote specific goals (e.g., financial 
independence, happiness, etc.) and that individuals strive to achieve these goals. Strain 
theory posits that when individuals experience strain that limits their ability to achieve 
societal goals through legitimate means, they seek for unconventional ways to achieve 
the goals. Strain is depicted as emanating primarily from conditions (e.g., poverty) caused 
by social structures. Theories of social process, however, explain how individuals learn 
deviant values and behavior. Differential association theory (Sutherland, 1947), for 
example, is an influential theory of social process. Differential association theory 
suggests that individuals learn to behave in certain ways through their associations with 
family and peers by assimilating definitions favorable or unfavorable to deviance. 
Though understudied in InfoSec research, theories of social structure and social process 
are represented in a few InfoSec studies (Lee et al., 2004; Warkentin et al., 2011).
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Differential Association Theory 
Differential association theory (Sutherland, 1947) is a prominent theory of social 
corruption control in criminology (Ronald L. Akers, 2009). Differential association 
theory (DAT) suggests that individuals learn to be deviant. DAT assumes that individuals 
learn deviant behavior in the same way that they learn compliant behavior. The learning 
process occurs as a focal individual has repeated interactions with important and 
respected individuals. During interactions with others, the focal individual comes in 
contact with definitions. In DAT, definitions refer to beliefs, values, and rationalizations 
that either favor compliant behavior or favor deviant behavior (R L Akers, 1985; 
Sutherland, 1947). In DAT, general definitions of the favorability of compliance and 
deviance develop at a young age; however, social learning is also situational and occurs 
at later stages of life as well (Ronald L. Akers, 2009). Social learning can occur in 
specific environments and situations, and related to specific norms and rules through 
socialization within that particular environment. Thus, definitions of behavior learned in 
childhood can change over time and general definitions of compliance and deviance may 
not influence specific definitions in new situations. Further, DAT posits that close-knit 
relationships with family and peers are more influential on social learning than weak 
relationships. DAT predicts that the ratio of contact with definitions that favor 
compliance compared to definitions that favor deviance determine the likelihood that a 
person will engage in compliant or deviant behavior. The ratio of contact an individual 
has with compliant definitions to deviant definitions is known as differential association. 
For example, if an individual comes into contact with more definitions that favor deviant 
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behavior than compliant behavior, the individual will be more likely to engage in deviant 
behavior. Many studies support the premise that differential association influences 
behavior (Ronald L. Akers, 2009; Pratt et al., 2010).  
Since its original conception, DAT has been extended in many ways. 
Neutralization theory (Sykes & Matza, 1957), for example, is an extension of DAT that 
focuses on Sutherland’s concept of definitions (Ronald L. Akers, 2009). Neutralization 
theory frames definitions as rationalizations for deviant behavior. In neutralization 
theory, rationalizations of behavior are predicted to increase engagement in deviant 
behavior (Siponen & Vance, 2010). Akers’ social learning theory (R L Akers, 1985; 
Ronald L. Akers, 2009) is another prominent extension of DAT. Akers’ Social learning 
theory (ASLT) is a more comprehensive extension of DAT that incorporates the major 
premises of DAT, concepts from neutralization theory, and concepts from behavioral 
conditioning and learning. 
Akers’ Social Learning Theory 
ASLT, like DAT, suggests that individuals learn deviant values and behavior 
through differential association with close others (e.g., family, peers, and coworkers). 
However, ASLT specifies learning mechanisms. That is, ASLT explains how individuals 
learn deviant values and behavior. DAT only specifies that learning occurs; DAT does 
not offer deep insight into learning mechanisms (Ronald L. Akers, 2009). ASLT specifies 
two primary learning mechanisms, differential reinforcement and imitation (R L Akers, 
1985). Differential reinforcement refers to the “frequency, amount, and probability of 
experienced and perceived contingent rewards and punishments” (Ronald L. Akers, 2009, 
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p. 52, pp. 52). Imitation refers to the observations and modeling of others’ behaviors and 
the associated consequences of the behaviors (Ronald L. Akers, 2009). Imitation in 
ASLT is similar to modeling in Bandura’s social learning theory (Bandura, 1977b). 
Imitation is important when an individual is first introduced to a new behavior; however, 
imitation becomes less important as the individual engages in the behavior and 
experiences differential reinforcement (Ronald L. Akers, 2009). Thus, ASLT is primarily 
concerned with four variables: differential association, definitions, differential 
reinforcement, and imitation. In ASLT, imitation and differential reinforcement occur 
within the context of differential associations and influence individuals’ definitions 
(Ronald L. Akers, 2009). A recent meta-analysis of 133 empirical studies that employed 
ASLT found that the effect sizes for differential association and definitions are strong, 
while effect sizes for differential reinforcement and imitation are moderate to weak (Pratt 
et al., 2010).  
With advances in statistical analysis, namely structural equation modeling, the 
four primary variables in ASLT are regularly represented as reflections of a higher-order 
construct, social learning (Ronald L. Akers, 2009; R L Akers & Lee, 1996; Morris & 
Higgins, 2010). Representing social learning as a higher-order construct allows 
researchers to examine social learning at different time periods. Findings suggest that 
social learning which occurs earlier in an individual’s life or earlier in a sequence of 
learning interactions influences social learning later in life or in later learning interactions 
(Ronald L. Akers, 2009; R L Akers & Lee, 1996). Figure 4 presents the higher-order 
representation of social learning. 
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Figure 4. Higher-order Social Learning Construct 
 
The relationships between some of the variables in social learning theory are 
reciprocal (Ronald L. Akers, 2009). Most importantly, differential association has been 
examined as an exogenous and endogenous variable. As an exogenous variable, 
differential association influences the definitions individuals are exposed to and the 
reinforcement individuals receive (Krohn, 1999; Krohn et al., 1985). That is, associations 
with peers influence individuals’ values and behaviors. As an endogenous variable, 
differential association is influenced by anticipated reinforcement (R L Akers, 1998; 
Krohn, 1999). That is, individuals select who they associate with based on the values and 
behaviors that their peers display. This reciprocal relationship has been demonstrated 
through non-recursive structural equation modeling (Krohn, Lizotte, Thornberry, Smith, 
& McDowall, 1996). The complex relationships between social differential association 
and other variables presents another reason for constructing a simplified, higher-order 
social learning construct. Further, reflective measurement assumes that the measures or 
factors are mutually reinforcing, whereas formative measurement assumes that the 
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measures or factors are distinct (Diamantopoulos & Siguaw, 2006; Petter, Straub, & Rai, 
2007). Thus, representing social learning as a second order construct consisting of 
reflective factors is in-line with the reinforcing nature of ASLT variables. 
ASLT has been used in a few instances to examine security-related topics. Several 
of the studies examine college students’ online behaviors. For example, Skinner and 
Fream (1997) studied ASLT in the context of computer crime among college students. 
Using a survey and regression analysis, they found support of the influence of imitation, 
differential association, reinforcement, and definitions across different behaviors (e.g., 
software piracy and password guessing). Morris and Higgins (2010) also found that 
ASLT explains digital piracy among college students. Similarly, ASLT can explain e-
cheating behavior by college students (Stogner, Miller, & Marcum, 2013). Rogers (2001) 
examined ASLT in the context of computer crime by studying convicted criminals’ 
records and survey responses from general criminals (i.e., not computer criminals) and 
non-criminals’ responses to a survey. Rogers was unable to collect data directly from 
computer criminals. Rogers found that convicted criminals had associated with more 
deviant individuals and had encountered more definitions in favor of crime than non-
criminals. However, the data for computer crimes was assessed from criminal records and 
not through surveys. Further, no data is offered to suggest whether the computer 
criminals were organizational insiders or external hackers. Nor did the data suggest that 
the attacks were levied against organizations. The data for non-criminals was collected 
through surveys. These studies show the potential for ASLT to be used in behavioral 
InfoSec research to study employees’ negative security behaviors.  
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CHAPTER IV 
CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
 
Conceptual Overview 
The model presented herein is founded primarily on ASLT. Additionally, we 
incorporate variables of formal controls (i.e., formal sanctions and formal training) and 
environmental factors (i.e., national origin) in an attempt to further develop a contingency 
theory of security-related corruption control. Thus, we examine how social learning 
influences PSB, SCB, SRB, and SDB in different cultures and in the presence of formal 
administrative controls. We adopt the higher-order social learning construct (Ronald L. 
Akers, 2009; R L Akers & Lee, 1996; Morris & Higgins, 2010) in order to examine how 
learning in early social interactions influence learning in later interactions. Specifically, 
we seek to understand how general tendencies toward deviant or compliant behavior 
learned in childhood and adolescence influence the learning of security-specific values 
and behaviors developed through interaction with peers at an individual’s organization. 
We also consider how security-specific social learning at an individual’s previous 
organization influences the individual’s social learning at the individual’s current 
organization. Figure 5 presents the conceptual framework that guides the examination 
herein.
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Figure 5. Conceptual Framework 
 
Social Learning 
Social Learning Overtime Time 
Social learning is both stable and situational. That is, values and behaviors learned 
in childhood and adolescence are likely to have a strong effect on the adoption of values 
and behaviors in adulthood; however, situational factors may influence the adoption of 
values and behaviors contrary to those learned in childhood and adolescence (Ronald L. 
Akers, 2009). Although this is assumed in ASLT, few studies have examined how 
consistent beliefs are over time. For example, it is assumed that an individual who 
learned in adolescence that deviant behavior is highly valued and rewarded will likely 
develop general tendencies toward deviance in adulthood. However, deviant tendencies 
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developed in adolescence may not influence all forms of behavior. An individual with 
deviant tendencies can learn positive security behaviors (i.e., PSB and CSB) through 
differential association with others who value security. Conversely, individuals with 
compliant tendencies developed in adolescence can learn deviant security behaviors 
through differential association with others who value SRB and SDB. 
We posit that general values toward deviance or compliance learned in childhood 
and adolescence influence social learning in organizational contexts. This may occur for 
several reasons. First, individuals who learn deviant values in their childhood and 
adolescence are more likely to associate with peers that favor deviance (Ronald L. Akers, 
2009). Thus, individuals with deviant tendencies may seek out close relationships with 
deviant co-workers, while avoiding close relationships with highly compliant co-workers. 
Conversely, those who learn compliant values may be more likely to associate with 
compliant co-workers. Second, individuals with tendencies toward deviance or 
compliance may be more likely to associate with deviant or compliant peers outside of 
the workplace. If non-work peers exhibit negative values toward information security or 
workplace policies and share stories about SRB or SDB, the focal individual may be 
influenced more by these non-work peers than by work peers. This may occur because 
close peer relationships, such as friendships, have greater influence on social learning 
than casual relationships, such as work relationships (R L Akers, 1985; Sutherland, 
1947). Non-work relationships and values learned in childhood and adolescence do not 
figure into existing behavioral InfoSec research. Studies of norms in existing behavioral 
InfoSec research limit normative influence strictly to individuals within the target 
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employee’s organization. This simplistic view of norms and social influence fails to 
acknowledge that social learning is a historical and ongoing process. In summary, we 
posit:  
Proposition 1a and 1b: General tendencies toward deviance or compliance 
learned in childhood will influence social learning perceptions in the workplace 
(previous and current organizations). 
Social learning that occurs during an individual’s tenure at a prior organization is 
also likely to influence the social learning of security values and behaviors at the 
individual’s current organization. This may occur for several reasons. First, social 
learning in the individual’s prior organization will include specific learning related to 
organizational policy and information security. This is contrasted with general values, 
beliefs, and behaviors developed in childhood and adolescence. Not every organization 
adopts the same security values, norms, policies and procedures. If an individual learns 
deviant or compliant security behaviors in a prior organization through imitation 
reinforcement, the individual may carry the values and behaviors from the previous 
organization to the current organization. Deviant or compliant security behaviors learned 
in the prior organization may persist unless strong reinforcement and modeling of the 
opposite kind is encountered in the current organization. However, as we discuss later, 
with time, prior behaviors may be dropped to accommodate the norms of the new 
organization. By examining the behavior learned in previous and current organizations, 
we seek to understand how individuals carry behaviors from organization to organization. 
In summary, we posit: 
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Proposition 2: Secured values, beliefs, and behaviors learned in previous 
organizations will influence the social learning process in an employee’s current 
organization. 
Social Learning and Security Behavior 
According to ASLT, a deviant or compliant behavior is learned by adopting 
definitions in favor of the deviant or compliant behavior through differential association 
(R L Akers, 1985; Ronald L. Akers, 2009). The behavior is learned through imitation and 
differential reinforcement (Ronald L. Akers, 2009). In organization settings, learning 
occurs through association with managers and coworkers (Ruiz-Palomino & Martinez-
Cañas, 2011; Zey-Ferrell & Ferrell, 1982). During the socialization process which occurs 
when an employee joins an organization, the employee learns definitions regarding what 
is appropriate and inappropriate security behavior. Individuals learn more from peers 
with close relationships than from peers with weak relationships. The learning of deviant 
or compliant values and behaviors produces the foundations and motivations to engage in 
deviant or compliant behavior (Ronald L. Akers, 2009). Based on the premises of ASLT, 
we propose:  
Proposition 3: values, beliefs, and behaviors learned through social interaction in 
the workplace will influence information security behaviors. 
Contingency Effects 
The Intervening Role of the Formal Workplace Environment 
ASLT suggests that reinforcement mechanisms influence social learning (R L 
Akers, 1985). In ASLT, differential reinforcement consists of formal and informal 
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reinforcement. However, we separate formal reinforcement from informal reinforcement. 
We examine social learning strictly from the perspective of informal learning through 
informal learning mechanisms. We do this to understand the different effects that 
administratively and informal social control exerts on employee behavior. We seek to 
understand how social learning influences perceptions of administrative mechanisms and 
how administrative mechanisms influence social learning. Social learning is an organic 
process between peers, but the organic social learning process can be influenced by 
administrative influence, such as formal sanctions and formal training. Through formal 
sanctions, organizations provide reinforcement to deter deviant behavior (D'Arcy et al., 
2009; D. W. J. Straub & Nance, 1990). Similarly, formal rewards provided by the 
organization can reinforce positive security behavior (Boss et al., 2009; Bulgurcu et al., 
2010). Further, organizations can disseminate their own definitions of appropriate and 
inappropriate behavior through security policy and formal training. Through training, 
employees learn definitions in favor of compliant behavior (Puhakainen & Siponen, 
2010) and against noncompliant behavior (D'Arcy et al., 2009). Similarly, social learning 
consists of definitions that favor different perspectives. Deviant social learning is likely 
to lead to negative attitudes toward formal controls and compliant social learning is likely 
to lead to positive attitudes toward formal controls. Thus, we propose: 
Proposition 4a and 4b: Social learning will influence employees’ perceptions of 
administrative controls and administrative controls will influence social learning. 
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The Intervening Role of National Origin 
Although ASLT is not a cultural theory of deviance (R L Akers, 1996), social 
learning happens much the same way in different national cultures (Hwang & Akers, 
2003; Jensen & Akers, 2003; Wang & Jensen, 2003). Although the process of social 
learning may be similar across cultures, the content of social learning (i.e., the values and 
behaviors learned) is likely to differ across cultures. Social learning takes place within 
different cultural and political environments throughout the world. That is, social learning 
occurs within the value systems supported by different cultures and governments. Social 
learning occurs within the legal systems supported by governments of different nations. 
Laws differ across nations. Thus, legal definitions influence individuals differently across 
nations. For example, copyright violations may be less of a concern in China than in the 
US due to weak governmental restrictions and the creation of a copycat culture (Harney, 
2011). Thus, national culture may influence how security behaviors are learned in 
different nations. Because national culture subsumes organizational culture and IT culture 
(Leidner & Kayworth, 2006), national culture is likely to influence the relationships 
between social learning from childhood and throughout an individual’s employment. 
Thus, we propose: 
Proposition 5: Social learning takes place in cultural and political national 
environments. These environments influence what is learned and what is 
considered deviant or compliant. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE QUALITATIVE STUDY 
 
Research Design 
ASLT consists of four primary variables: definitions, differential association, 
differential reinforcement, and imitation. Although the process of social learning may be 
similar in different settings (Hwang & Akers, 2003; Jensen & Akers, 2003; Wang & 
Jensen, 2003), the content of definitions, influential peers, and reinforcement mechanisms 
may differ across contexts. Few studies examine ASLT in organizational settings (Ruiz-
Palomino & Martinez-Cañas, 2011; Zey-Ferrell & Ferrell, 1982), and no behavioral 
InfoSec studies empirically examine ASLT in organizational settings. Given the lack of 
rich data concerning ASLT in organizational settings, we qualitatively explored 
definitions, influential peers, and social reinforcement mechanisms in relation to 
information security in organizations. We also explored the possibility that other 
constructs beyond the four mentioned in ASLT influence information security attitudes 
and behaviors. Further, we seek to explore the relevance of ASLT with regard to 
compliant behavior. Traditionally, ASLT has been used as a theory of deviance. 
However, it assumes that deviant and compliant behavior are both learned phenomena. 
An interpretive study was conducted using semi-structured interviews to explore 
employees’ beliefs and behaviors related to rules and information security. This is a first 
step toward determining the applicability of ASLT to behavioral InfoSec research. To 
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ensure that we were open to other possible explanations of information security beliefs 
and behavior, we examined other theories besides ASLT. Exploring multiple theories 
before conducting a qualitative study and coding data helps to sensitize researchers to a 
variety of perspectives (Glasser, 1978). This sensitization process helps to minimize 
potential bias and one-sided perspectives during data collection and analysis, and 
provides a greater number of codes to consider while analyzing the qualitative data 
(Glasser, 1978, 1992). We examined a number of other theories, including: general 
deterrence theory, protection motivation theory, fear appeals theory, habit theories, 
rational choice theory, and Bandura’s social learning theory. We also considered the 
dimensions in Lange’s (Lange, 2008) typology of corruption controls. The sensitization 
process provided us with new codes other than those provided by ASLT. Additionally, 
some codes emerged from the transcripts that were unrelated to any of the 
aforementioned theories. Thus, we were open to new concepts derived from the 
respondents’ perceptions as well. 
Before collecting large amounts of data through interviews, we pre-tested the 
interview questions with a panel of three information systems professors and one 
sociology professor. The pre-test was used to ensure the questions were understandable 
and likely to elicit relevant information. Based on the review by the panel, some changes 
were made to the initial set of questions. The primary list of questions are presented in 
Table B-1 in Appendix B. 
After pre-testing the survey questions, we conducted three pilot interviews to 
ensure that the questions elicited pertinent information. After conducting the three pilot 
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interviews, we added some new questions pertaining to topics we had not considered. 
Respondents directed our attention to different explanations of their beliefs and 
behaviors. To allow each respondent to direct the conversation toward new topics, we 
started and ended each interview with a broad question asking the respondents how they 
believed their information security beliefs and behaviors developed. Because we used a 
semi-structured interview, we were able to explore some of the novel perceptions the 
interviewees mentioned, while still maintaining consistency in the topics that were 
discussed. 
Participants 
We interviewed 20 individuals (Creswell, 2007) who work in organizations to 
identify different information security beliefs and behaviors. The participants were 
selected to highlight a diverse set of perspectives. To explore the extremes of pro-security 
beliefs and behaviors, we interviewed employees who work for the information 
technology (IT) function of the organization. To explore less extreme pro-security beliefs 
and behaviors, we interviewed employees who use IT, but who are not strongly tied to 
the IT function. Security concerns are directly related to the job responsibilities of many 
IT employees. However, security concerns are relatively less important to non-IT 
employees. Thus, we expected IT employees to provide more extreme pro-security 
perspectives and non-IT employees to provide relatively less extreme viewpoints. Table 1 
presents the number of IT and non-IT employees that were interviewed. 
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Table 1. Number of Interview Participants Based on Employee Type 
Type of Employee Number of employees 
IT employee 10 
Non-IT employee 10 
 
Data Collection and Analysis 
Data was collected through interviews with organizational employees. Employees 
were selected from a broad set of industries, but due to the sample size, we did not use 
stratified sampling or other advanced sampling techniques. These methods are more 
appropriate for quantitative survey research and not for qualitative studies. We used 
theoretical sampling to identify respondents. For example, we sought to interview 
employees in IT and non-IT industries. Theoretical sampling seeks to identify 
respondents that should differ on key attributes or perspectives based on some condition. 
Theoretically speaking, one would expect employees in an IT industry to have a greater 
knowledge of and closer ties to information security than employees in a non-IT industry. 
In some instances, our selection of individuals was purposeful to identify a diverse set of 
beliefs and behaviors. We employed several recruitment methods to identify participants. 
First, we recruited personal contacts who were known to hold different rule-related 
beliefs and behaviors. We also asked respondents for the names of others with unique 
perspectives on rules and policies. In additional to these recruitment methods, we also 
posted recruitment messages on LinkedIn. Finally, we recruited some interviewees using 
Amazon Mechanical Turk. Respondents recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk 
were paid ten dollars for the interview. While Amazon Mechanical Turk is a new 
recruitment method, it is found to provide a diverse population of respondents 
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(Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Mason & Suri, 2012; Paolacci, Chandler, & 
Ipeirotis, 2010). 
Interviews lasted between 30 to 75 minutes. Only two interviews were shorter 
than 45 minutes, and most of the interviews were 55-60 minutes. Interviews were 
conducted in-person, by phone, and via Skype. The interviews were transcribed using the 
Express Scribe transcription software. Table B-1 in Appendix B presents the semi-
structured interview questions asked to participants, along with some common follow-up 
questions that were asked. 
   
71 
 
CHAPTER VI 
RESULTS OF THE QUALITATIVE STUDY 
 
Open coding (Corbin & Strauss, 1990) was used to determine the emergent, low-
level codes in the interview transcripts. Axial coding (Corbin & Strauss, 1990) was then 
used to determine how the low-level codes related to form higher-level themes. Axial 
coding was also used to determine how the different themes relate to one another. NVivo 
10 was used to code the interview transcripts and combine the low-level codes into larger 
themes. 
Qualitative Themes and Codes 
Through open coding, 50 different codes were identified. Through axial coding, 
the 50 codes were grouped into nine high level themes. The nine themes include: 
individuals’ security-related values, individuals’ beliefs and behaviors regarding rules in 
general, individuals’ beliefs and behaviors regarding information security policies, 
individuals’ beliefs about authority, behavioral influencers, the workplace environment, 
and major events. Each of the nine major themes is described briefly and the frequency 
with which they occurred across interviews is provided in the following sections. 
Following the description of each theme, the manner in which the themes relate to one 
another is considered later. Table 2 presents the major qualitative themes.
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Table 2. Major Qualitative Themes 
Major Themes 
Security-related values 
General rule-related beliefs 
General rule-related behaviors 
Information security policy beliefs 
Information security policy behaviors 
Authority-related beliefs 
Behavioral influencers 
Workplace environment 
Major life events 
 
 
Security-Related Values 
 Throughout the interviews, respondents brought up values related to information 
security. Most of the values directly supported individuals’ efforts to follow policies and 
protect confidential information. However, three of the espoused values may be related to 
insecure behaviors. For example, respondents noted that they valued utility and personal 
convenience over security. These respondents felt that security interfered with their 
ability to perform their work responsibilities. They valued their other work 
responsibilities over their security responsibilities. Respondents also noted that they 
valued trust among their coworkers. These respondents felt that their coworkers would 
not abuse their systems, and therefore, they were less cautious with their computer 
systems, such as allowing coworkers to use their computers unsupervised. They were also 
less critical of their coworkers’ negligent or rule-breaking security behaviors, because 
they felt that their coworkers would not do anything to harm the organization. 
The most frequently cited value was that of protecting others. Eight respondents 
noted that their security behaviors were guided by a desire to protect others. Discussion 
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of protection was most prominent from respondents who worked with potentially at-risk 
clients, such as elementary students, clients of nonprofits, healthcare patients, and clients 
of financial firms. Other frequently cited values that support strong security behaviors 
are: a concern about information privacy, respect for others and for authority, and a desire 
to do no harm to others. Table 3 presents the codes related to security-related values. 
 
Table 3. Codes for Security-Related Values 
Code Quote 
Do no harm Generally, if I broke some kind of rule that was 
important, I would find out that it was important by the 
repercussion of it. If it was just sort of a punitive 
response, I didn’t really see it as a big deal. If it seemed 
to hurt someone or someone’s feelings, that was a big 
deal. And that always would impact me in a meaningful 
way. 
Honesty/obedience I signed the acceptable use policy like everyone else did. 
I should also have to follow the rules, even if it is just on 
the honor system. 
Privacy It is personal information and I believe that personal 
information should be kept safe. I would want someone 
who had my personal information to keep it safe. 
Protection of self and others I feel like security is important, because it… in a lot of 
circumstances it keeps a lot of people safe, particularly 
in the situation where you deal with unaccompanied 
minors. Sometimes there are custody issues with 
children and someone’s name is not on the list of people 
we are allowed to release the child to. 
Respect for others/authority When I was growing up we were taught respect for our 
elders. 
Responsibility Being employed at the one web development company 
gave me a sense of ownership over my systems. That 
probably gives some strength to the security side. Yeah, 
a sense of responsibility. That’s why I do frequent 
backups so that if anything blows up I can get us back to 
at least the day before. 
Safety/Caution I felt uncomfortable. I don’t think it is really safe to use 
that when there are other things you could use. 
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*Trust of others Like trusting. I was raised… I grew up in a really small 
town and you knew everybody and you trusted 
everybody. And you can’t do that on the Internet, 
because people are not trustworthy. And that is hard for 
me, because I want to give people the benefit of the 
doubt and think they are good. 
*Utility/Convenience Some policies are being changed now which make it 
more difficult to do my job. And of course that is the 
eternal tradeoff between security and utility. I work for a 
group on in the organization that is interested in utility, 
and only cares about security as a risk factor. So, that is 
the attitude that I take. I figure I want to minimize the 
risk to my group and let us get as much done as we can 
up against these policies that are intended to protect the 
organization, clients, and employees. 
* Refers to a value that may support insecure behavior 
 
Beliefs and Behaviors Regarding Rules, Policies, and Authority 
Respondents spoke frequently about security beliefs and security behaviors. 
Beliefs were coded into the beliefs of the respondent and the beliefs of those close to the 
respondent. Beliefs were broken down further by whether they favored compliance or 
noncompliance with rules. Finally, beliefs were coded as relating to rules in general or to 
security policies in specific. Similarly, Behaviors were coded into the behaviors of the 
respondent and the behaviors of those close to the respondent. Behaviors were further 
coded as compliant, noncompliant, or ignorant (i.e., the person was unaware of the rule 
violation). Finally, behaviors were coded as related to rules in general or to security in 
specific. Respondents spoke readily about the beliefs and behaviors of others. They also 
spoke openly about their own beliefs and behaviors. Table 4 presents the codes related to 
the beliefs and behaviors of the respondents. 
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Table 4. Codes for Beliefs and Behaviors  
Code Quote 
General rule beliefs 
 Others’ beliefs 
  In favor of compliance I guess I would have to say that, in 
general, they demonstrated and taught 
me that rules are in place for a reason. 
  In favor of noncompliance I think for him, it was a lack of respect 
for people and a feeling that he wanted 
to do… he wanted that feeling of 
freedom. He didn’t want to have any 
limitations. 
 Personal beliefs 
  In favor of compliance You follow them. I was a rule follower. 
I followed after my parents. I followed 
what my parents said very good for 
several reasons. First, it was just 
pounded into me when I was a kid. You 
know… over and over and over and 
over. I think that sticks with you. But 
nonetheless, I still thought about things 
and thought about, “is this a legitimate 
rule that I want to follow.” And if I 
didn’t want to follow it I just did what 
my dad said, I said “okay well, I don’t 
think this rule applies to me or it 
shouldn’t; it should be changed.” And 
then I would just talk to people and try 
to get in changed. And a lot of times 
you would be surprised that there is a 
lot of flexibility in there. 
  In favor of noncompliance I don’t like a lot of laws. I think we over 
legislate. A great deal of our laws… 
when I was growing up, seatbelts 
weren’t required and we lived. It has 
been legislated to the point of 
ridiculousness. You know, kids are 
living at home now until they’re 26 
years old, which in my opinion is part 
of legislation. We don’t allow kids to 
drink until they are 21 now, but we will 
throw them into prison when they are 
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14. I think the laws and authority have 
their issues right now. We can’t figure 
out whether a child is a child or an 
adult. And we need to fix that a great 
deal. I also can’t stand driving laws. I 
get pulled over for 100 different things 
that are all because someone has sued 
someone else. 
Security policy beliefs 
 Others’ beliefs 
  In favor of compliance I think a lot of that had to do with the 
nature of the business. When you deal 
with these things, if you identified a 
security loop hole, you wanted to make 
sure it was covered, so everyone took it 
very seriously. It was our job to make 
sure that the stuff in there was safe. And 
if there was anything that you could 
think of, you would bring it up and 
everyone brought it up. 
  In favor of noncompliance They are so bad. They totally sign [the 
security policy]. They don’t read it. And 
even after you explain it, they totally 
don’t do it. The other week they were 
sharing account information for running 
credit cards. I was like, “really… tell 
me why you are doing that. Don’t do 
that. This is a temp, the person is going 
to leave the company.” So they think it 
is a bunch of fluff. They don’t 
understand. They aren’t thinking about 
how somebody might use the 
information maliciously. They are just 
thinking, “oh, I’ve got to get my job 
done. I want it to be easy. So, when I’m 
gone I’m going to make sure that Sally 
down the hall has my password so she 
can log in as me so they don’t have to 
contact us.” 
 Personal beliefs 
  In favor of compliance I think it is important. Sometimes it 
makes me mad when I can’t get a 
picture of a national park, but I can’t get 
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it because it is blocked. Or if I need a 
picture of an animal that’s kind of 
irritating. But I understand why it is 
there. 
  In favor of noncompliance We’ve been dealing with Sarbanes-
Oxley for years. And just the paper trail 
and all of those changing of records 
based on Sarbanes-Oxley they have in 
place. It has been a nightmare to 
implement policies for things that 
happened in the past. If I can fit them 
in, I do, but if I am pressed for you… 
you know, legislative policies do fall by 
the wayside to get things out the door. 
General rule behaviors 
 Others’ behaviors 
  Compliant behavior It was pretty straight cut about being a 
child and knowing what the rules were 
and stuff. And I think for them as 
citizens it was the same. They were 
pretty honest. So they just followed the 
rules. 
  Noncompliant behavior He was always just pushing his 
boundaries, always pushing the limits. 
Talking back, not just to my parents, but 
to his teachers. He was a really bad 
trouble maker in school. He had 
multiple run-ins with the police. Not 
just when he was younger, but when he 
was a bit older as well. 
  Ignorant/unaware behaviors N/A 
 Personal behaviors 
  Compliant behavior I’ve always been a bit of a rule follower 
in certain aspects of my life. 
  Noncompliant behavior There is a threshold to things that I can 
do that I know I’m not necessarily 
going to get in a lot of trouble for. So 
let’s say if I’m late for an appointment 
and I have to drive ten miles over the 
speed limit to get there, that sort of stuff 
I’m okay with, but that’s about where I 
draw the line. Things that I know that 
I’m in control of, but aren’t necessarily 
   
78 
 
going to be endangering anybody or 
anything like that. 
  Ignorant/unaware behaviors N/A 
Security behavior 
 Others’ behaviors 
  Compliant behavior The sales people couldn’t care less. 
They are completely indifferent. They 
don’t live on a computer a lot like the 
rest of us do. Any rules that they 
enforce, they go right along with 
because they’re really indifferent. As far 
as management goes, they’ll do 
whatever we tell them to do as well. So 
if we notice any trends or any issues 
that they should be made aware of 
they’ll follow them pretty closely. 
  Noncompliant behavior Frustrating, very frustrating. Really 
frustrating. Some of the stuff is pretty 
major, like sharing the credit card 
information to run the credit card. 
Things like that are insecure. That’s 
hard. Some of it is minor. But it can 
also be damaging. Streaming music… it 
is written in the policy that you are not 
supposed to stream audio or video. We 
have that written in there because we 
scale the Internet connections for a 
certain speed based on the number of 
people that are there and the data usage 
we expect. If we have ten people who 
are streaming, it is going to take the 
network down. 
  Ignorant/unaware behaviors But I think a lot of it to was done out of 
ignorance. I think a lot of the people in 
the department didn’t realize or 
understand the need for security or 
maybe the critical nature of it. You 
know if they do something, what are the 
ramifications if I don’t follow this 
protocol. 
 Personal behaviors 
  Compliant behavior  
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Well I followed the rules 100% and I 
tried to educate others about not just the 
rules, but about why the rules are there. 
Because you can tell someone not to do 
something all day long, but unless they 
know why they shouldn’t do it, they are 
not going to listen to you. And so I 
played more of the role of, “this rule is 
here for this reason and here is why.” 
  Noncompliant behavior Basically, going from the large 
company with these very strict rules 
very much kept me on the straight and 
narrow. I had two computers up at all 
times. Now, I don’t have two computers 
anymore. Now I just have two monitors 
running from one computer. It is 
company equipment. I am a remote 
employee still. I flew out there and got 
the computer and that is what I work on. 
They have very relaxed rules, so I do 
what I want. And I probably do things 
that I shouldn’t do, like Amazon Turk. 
I’ll see something out there interesting 
and I’ll take a half-an-hour break and do 
that. And I do that on my company’s 
equipment because it is not monitored. 
  Ignorant/unaware behaviors I think that anytime that I was doing 
something that maybe wasn’t 
appropriate from a security standpoint 
was out of ignorance about the issue as 
opposed to blatant disregard to rules 
around security. 
Beliefs about authority 
 Obey/respect authority Respectful. You should always respect 
a person in a place of authority. And 
maybe not just authority, but all people. 
They taught me to be respectful of all 
people. And specifically an authority 
figure. You don’t go in when you are 
upset with someone and go in there 
yelling and screaming and carrying on 
about something. You walk in calmly 
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and talk to people. You talk to them the 
way you would like to be treated. 
 Challenge authority Honestly, authority is the last gang in 
town. I don’t have any respect for 
authority whatsoever except for its 
ability to influence my life. I don’t think 
that because something is authoritative 
or has authority that it deserves any 
respect. I think that respect is earned in 
whatever relationship that I have with 
my government or my boss or whatever. 
 
Behavioral Influencers 
Respondents discussed many factors that influenced their own beliefs and 
behaviors regarding information security. The major themes that arose from the 
interviews included: respondents’ observations and experiences with punishments and 
rewards; respondents’ observations and experiences with security breaches; the social 
influence of family, friends, coworkers, and managers; and mass media and books. As 
discussed later, each influencer influenced individuals differently. Although all 
respondents discussed punishment, not all respondents were strongly influenced by 
punishment. Thus, the strength of an influencer was dependent on the individual’s values 
and beliefs. This is described more in later sections. Table 5 presents the codes related to 
behavioral influencers. 
 
Table 5. Codes for Behavioral Influencers 
Code Quote 
Consequences (rewards and punishments) The reward is that you get to keep the 
job.  The punishment would be 
suspension or temporary reprimand and 
if you did it twice violating any of the 
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policies you were eligible for possible 
termination. 
Experiences with security breach 
 Others’ experiences Growing up I had friends of the family 
that had their identity stolen. When the 
friends of the family got hit by some 
scammers, a lot of things, a lot of 
activities got locked down when I was 
little. 
 Personal experiences As much as we could tell, someone had 
stolen a lot of credit card numbers from 
the bank that I bank with and they do 
the card numbers sequentially. So they 
just took a bunch of numbers and 
signed up some people on there. That 
way when the bank issued you a new 
card, the number was still on there. It 
was pretty sneaky. I never thought that I 
would be the victim of something like 
that, because I am paranoid. 
People   
 Family My parents have just been very straight 
arrowed. Good credit, follow the rules, 
do what you are supposed to. 
 Friends My parents had purchased me one. I 
stayed up that night and learned how to 
program. I was one of the 3 or 4 geeky 
kids in middle school and high school 
who actually had a modem. I was that 
kid that would sit around and do 
printouts of girls breasts based on a 
character only printing. So it was in the 
7th grade that they gave me a computer. 
So me and some of my friends did that. 
A buddy of mine in 8th grade actually 
wrote a book. You know, I hung out 
with them. That was my circle of 
friends. 
 Coworkers She has a lot to do with how I… she has 
taught me about how to use computers. 
As soon as she hears something new 
she comes and tells me. I am one of the 
first to know about stuff. 
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 Managers He wrote [the security policy]. He is 
extremely technical. He is also the 
typical computer tech. He is the type to 
sit in a dark room and they would prefer 
never to talk to anybody. That is kind of 
him. And he is great at it. He is 
fantastic at it. But part of the problem is 
that the policy was written by him and 
the users don’t always understand it 
because it was written in geek-speak, 
and they don’t know what SSH is and 
they shouldn’t, they are users. You 
know, they don’t use it as a tool. They 
don’t need to remote into a server. The 
policy is very thorough because he 
spent a lot of time on it. 
Media 
 Books One of the books that most influenced 
my thinking along these lines is The 
Moon is a Harsh Mistress by Robert 
Heinlein, which I read several times a 
year in middle school and about once a 
year since. 
 News And the news. You know the 
circumstances you hear through the 
news. That probably is a big part of the 
perception of security or reason to stay 
security. 
 
The Organizational Environment 
Another major theme that arose from the interviews was the workplace 
environment and individuals’ roles within that environment. Some work environments 
were configured to support strong security behaviors, while other environments were not 
structured to support strong security behaviors. Strong security behaviors were supported 
by the existence of formal and informal policies to guide security behavior, the regular 
dissemination of security policies, security training, and normative and top management 
   
83 
 
support. Other factors that influenced the perceived importance of security included: the 
industry, organization size, external threats to security, and the sensitivity of the 
information an organization maintained. The job responsibilities of the respondent was 
another contextual theme that influenced the respondent’s beliefs and behaviors 
pertaining to information security. Table 6 presents the codes related to organizational 
environment. 
 
Table 6. Codes for Organizational Environment 
Code Quote 
Job roles/responsibilities A number of job roles and responsibilities are 
represented in the interviews. Each interviewee 
discussed all of their jobs. Examples of job roles 
include: media specialist, regional manager, vice 
president of customer service, helpdesk, computer 
repair technician, data entry, network 
administrator, and zoologist. 
Industry A number of industries are represented in the 
interviews. Examples of industries include: 
manufacturing, primary education, higher 
education, information technology, and retail. 
Organization size A number of organizational sizes are represented 
in the interviews. These range from small, family 
owned companies to large firms with several 
locations. 
Policy 
 Formal Well, the code of ethics comes from the school 
district. Each school is site based, so the principal 
gets to decide what they want to do. They have to 
follow the general rules of the district, but there are 
certain things that they make the decisions about at 
their school. So like, with our new principle, kids 
who have medical issues… they are telling not just 
the teacher that has that student but anyone who 
associates with that child. They started giving 
information about that child. So you know if they 
are diabetic and start having sugar issues then 
we’re able to help them. 
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 Informal We kind of know that there are things that as far as 
from a security standpoint if we’re going to play 
around with a machine that has like let’s say for an 
example this is a recent example, dealing with 
machines that have the cryptal locker infection that 
target network drives using something like that we 
have the knowledge that machines like that have to 
be isolated. They have to be disconnected from the 
internet at all time. We have policies that aren’t 
necessarily by the book or from a business 
perspective, but it’s things that we’ve shared just 
through common knowledge that we’ve enforced 
amongst our group. 
 Dissemination  of I think that security was just one of those 
standardly worded policies, “read this, sign it, 
understand it, follow it.” It’s just one of those, 
“here’s what you do when you sign on” and you 
probably never see it again. 
Security threats Over time as you see more and more issues, 
incidents, you learn more about the way 
technology works. I found that my perceptions of 
security have changed a lot. Because you realize 
the extent to which damage can be done to your 
network or to yourself, such as identity theft and 
stuff like that. So yeah, I think there is something 
true about the statement ignorance is bliss. If they 
don’t know it is a risk, they go through their life 
and don’t think about it. I wasn’t in IT to begin 
with. I was a scientist. I got into IT about 10 or 11 
years ago now. Once I started learning about it and 
seeing just how much people can do… Just simple 
website browsing, for example, people can see so 
much about what you are looking at. It is amazing 
to me. Over time, I think I have gotten a little more 
secure and quite frankly a bit more paranoid 
because I have seen what people can see. 
Sensitivity of information It has peoples’ social security numbers, and their 
names and addresses, and other sorts of 
information… credit cards. Lots of personal 
information. 
Top management support What are peoples’ perceptions of those. They think 
they are a bunch of fluff. Part of that is coming 
from upper management because upper 
   
85 
 
management doesn’t care either. The vice 
president will send a 30 meg video over to his 
buddy next door in the office and they are like “oh, 
there shouldn’t be any policies at all.” Or we tried 
filtering and having proxy filters to filter out some 
of the sites that were being gone to. We got huge 
pushback from management. They said, “no, we 
don’t want that. We don’t want to block YouTube 
because I want to go to YouTube.” On the one 
hand, they are telling us that they want us to be 
secure and protect the company, but on the other 
hand, whenever we try to set a new policy in place, 
we get a lot of pushback from management. 
Training We had like a meeting with the owner of the 
company and just kind of read over the rules that 
we should be abiding by. And we signed an 
agreement to follow the HIPAA laws. It was pretty 
short. Maybe an hour or less. And that was to go 
over every rule in the company. So maybe five 
minutes to ten minutes on HIPAA laws and stuff 
like that. 
 
Major Life Events 
Major life events also emerged as an important theme in the interviews. The 
transition between different jobs was a major life event that influenced employees’ 
security beliefs and behaviors. Respondents mentioned that they had made transitions to 
new jobs with different security policies and enforcement mechanisms. In certain 
circumstances, the transition from one work environment to another prompted changes in 
respondents’ beliefs and behaviors. This is discussed further in later sections. Other major 
life events included moving away from family, and extraordinary successes related to 
information security. Major security breaches also had an important effect on individuals’ 
beliefs and behaviors. 
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Summary of Themes 
The previous sub-sections briefly describe the major themes that arose during the 
coding process. Many of the themes are consistent with ASLT. ASLT studies focus 
primarily on deviant behaviors (Ronald L. Akers, 2009). Although we find that the social 
learning process proposed in ASLT fits violations of information security policy in 
organizations, we also find that ASLT is a useful model for studying proactive and 
compliant security behaviors. ASLT suggests that individuals learn values through 
differential associations that favor compliance or noncompliance. We see this across the 
interviews. This is described more fully in later sections. We also find evidence of 
positive and negative reinforcement for positive and negative security behaviors, further 
confirming the usefulness of ASLT for the study of compliant and noncompliant 
behavior. This is also described further below. Finally, we show in later sections that 
mimicry works in similar ways for compliant and noncompliant behaviors. These 
findings provide support for the use of ASLT in models of compliant and noncompliant 
security behaviors. We now examine how all the themes relate to one another. The 
following sections describe how the nine major themes converge into a larger model of 
information security beliefs and behavior. Figure 6 presents the model that emerged from 
the interviews. 
 
   
87 
 
Social learning 
(childhood & 
adolescence)
Social learning
(prior organization)
Social learning 
(current organization)
Security compliant 
behavior intentions
Organization size
h1b
h1a
h2
h5a-d
Organization’s 
relation to IT-industry
Security risk-taking 
behavior intentions
h6 h7
Proactive security 
behavior intentions
Security damaging 
behavior intentions
Learning fit
h3
Reinforcement 
(childhood & 
adolescence)
h4a
Reinforcement 
(prior organization)
Reinforcement 
(current organization)
h4ch4b
 
Figure 6. Emergent Conceptual Model 
 
Early Rule-Related Beliefs as the Foundation for Current Security Beliefs and 
Behaviors 
ASLT suggests that the general beliefs individuals adopt early in life about 
compliance and noncompliance are relatively stable and may guide individuals’ rule-
related behaviors through much of their lives (Ronald L. Akers, 2009). Further, the 
beliefs developed early in life may guide individuals to choose associations later in life 
with individuals who share the same value system, thereby reinforcing their early value 
and beliefs (R L Akers, 1990; Ronald L. Akers, 2009). By drawing from the rule-related 
narratives of the respondents, we find evidence that supports the general stability of rule-
related beliefs. In every interview, respondents discussed their current beliefs in relation 
to the beliefs of their parents or adolescent friends. For example, one respondent noted: 
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My parents’ perceptions of rules and laws were that you abide by the rules 
and laws. Your job is just to adhere to them. It’s okay to question them. 
My dad specifically raised me to think about things before I did them. 
What if a law is immoral, for example? For example, segregation used to 
be a big issue during the civil rights movement. What do you do when the 
law is actually immoral? There are ways that you can go about changing 
that, but it doesn’t mean that even if you disagree with a law that you can 
just ignore it or pretend like it is not there. If I disagreed with the rules my 
parents had, I could argue with them on it or bring information to them 
saying “hey this rule is incorrect, and here is why,” but they had the 
authority over me to say “you have to follow that or you don’t.” So I 
learned that it was my job as a child to follow the rules of them and of 
other authority figures, like police officers and school officials. You 
follow the rules until they are changed. And if you disagree with them, 
you need to find a way to change them instead of just ignoring them. 
Throughout the interview, this same respondent referred back to these same basic 
beliefs about compliance (i.e., rules should be followed, but they can be challenged 
through legitimized avenues). Later in the interview, the respondent noted: 
You follow rules and laws. I was a rule follower. I followed after my 
parents. I followed what my parents said very good for several reasons. 
First, it was just pounded into me when I was a kid. You know, over and 
over and over and over. I think that sticks with you. But nonetheless, I still 
thought about things and thought, “is this a legitimate rule that I want to 
follow.” And if I didn’t want to follow it I just did what my dad said, I 
said, “well, I don’t think this rule applies to me or it shouldn’t; it should be 
changed.” And then I would just talk to people and try to get it changed. 
You have to be willing to ask. 
This example is not singular. Unless a major life event caused an individual to 
alter their general rule-related beliefs, the early influence of parents and adolescent peers 
continued to influence the respondents’ rule-related behaviors later in life. As another 
example, another respondent noted: 
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There’s not really any one conforming norm that I can think of that is 
outlandish for me to follow. You know, most people know what their 
boundaries are in a social aspect or in a political aspect. They know their 
place and that’s kind of how I feel. I’m not really too into rocking the boat 
either. Kind of like my dad growing up. So I’ve got a lot of that from him. 
As far as authority and respecting people in their positions goes, I follow 
all of the same characteristics as my parents. 
Individuals who associated with family members and peers that favored 
noncompliance early in life also held to these early beliefs. For example, one respondent 
labeled himself a latchkey kid. Both of his parents worked and he spent many hours alone 
and with friends. Many of his rule-related beliefs were influenced by the friends he 
associated with while his parents were working. He and his friends were part of the punk 
culture in a small town. He said the following about the early beliefs that he developed 
with his friends:  
It was like, “make whatever rules you like and I’m going to do what I’m 
going to do.” So we didn’t steal from people. We did make mix tapes. 
That was part of the culture, but it wasn’t like we were bootlegging or 
whatever. It was all more than a statute of limitations ago. And certainly, I 
wasn’t doing any of that [sarcastically with laughter]. But then at the same 
time, the Sheriff’s department would show up a lot of the times at the 
shows if it was inside city limits. And I would perfectly happily chat with 
the Sheriffs in front of the punk show. So while we were kind of 
dismissive about it, it’s not like we were actively hostile. We sort of said, 
“well that’s for you. These rules aren’t for us. They don’t help us. They 
don’t make us safer. They don’t make us better.” 
This same attitude toward rules and policies can be seen in his later descriptions 
of his attitudes toward security policies in college and at work. At one point, he noted: 
We didn’t think about [the security policies] at all. I mean seriously. We 
did whatever we wanted on the network. You know, there were others 
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with different perspectives, but my crew… our attitude was “don’t be a 
dick, and have fun playing around.” And that was kind of all of it. 
Regarding the stability of his early beliefs, the respondent also noted how he felt 
no need to justify his nonconforming beliefs and behaviors. In fact, the respondent stated 
that he felt that he had to justify his conforming behaviors. The respondent said: 
I feel like I have to rationalize my mainstream behaviors. So the fact that I 
work for a business says to me that I am part of the problem. I am 
churning out a bunch of capitalist types who are for the most part making 
the world a worse place by espousing a value system that I don’t hold. I 
look at the American dream of capitalism as a promise of eternal and 
constant growth… and the only model I have for that is cancer. I have to 
justify my mainstream activities and not my counterculture activities. 
These and other examples can be seen throughout the interviews. Individual’s 
general beliefs about rules and about compliance and noncompliance are formed early 
and remain fairly constant. Similar to ASLT, the interviews provide evidence that beliefs 
learned early in life tend to be quite stable over time. We propose that early rule-related 
learning influences behavior and learning later in life such that general rule-related social 
learning early in life acts as a foundation for future behavior and learning regarding 
specific rules, laws, and policies. Based on this proposition, the following hypotheses will 
be examined further in the quantitative study: 
Hypothesis 1a & 1b: general, rule-related social learning encountered during 
childhood and adolescence influences security-specific social learning in 
organizational settings (prior organizations and current organization). 
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Social Learning across Time 
Based on the responses from respondents, social learning was not completely 
stable across time. Beliefs and behaviors develop and change as events cause individuals 
to reassess their beliefs. In the interviews, two primary types of events emerged—major 
life events and continuous experiences. Major life events caused dramatic shifts in 
security beliefs and even general rule-related beliefs. Continuous experiences, however, 
caused subtle shifts in beliefs and behavior over time. The influence of major life events 
and continuous experience are discussed in the following sub-sections. We also explore 
one particular event because it was discussed frequently in the interviews—transitions to 
new employers.  
The Influence of Major Events 
Major security-related events emerged as an important theme in the interviews. 
ASLT does not specifically discuss the importance of major events. Rather, ASLT draws 
attention to the continuous reinforcement that individuals encounter over time. Major 
events, however, are sensational occurrences that are rare, but leave a lasting impression 
on the perspectives of the individuals who experience the events. Respondents discussed 
several major security-related events including: breaches of personal information (i.e., 
identity theft or theft of a credit card); large data breaches or security-related events at 
work; moving far from family into unfamiliar normative environments; and the 
introduction of new and extremely close social relationships.  
Personal data breaches were mentioned frequently in the interviews. Personal data 
breaches included breaches of one’s own information or breaches of a close family 
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member (i.e., parents or spouse). For example, one respondent had experienced a breach 
of personal health information. The respondent had served a proselyting mission for a 
Christian church. While serving on the mission, the respondent was struck by a car driven 
by another missionary from the same mission. One of the leaders of the mission took the 
respondent to a clinic. The leader insisted on being present in the examination room 
during the visit. The leader also invited the missionary who had hit the respondent into 
the examination room without receiving permission to do so. Additionally, the leader of 
the mission spoke with the doctor in private. The respondent said, “I don’t even know 
what they were talking about, but come on, that is private information. If she had 
influenced [the doctor] in any way, that is just not appropriate and it breaks HIPAA 
laws.” This event influenced the way the respondent viewed HIPAA rules. The 
respondent worked for a medical billing company and was very adamant about protecting 
her client’s healthcare information. She would not even describe the general types of 
information she had access to for her job. She stated that she protected the data so 
fiercely because of her own experience with a breach of medical information. 
Experience with large data breaches and other security-related events at work may 
also cause dramatic changes in security beliefs and behaviors. Given that large data 
breaches are relatively rare, we only encountered one such event in our interviews. 
However, the example provides evidence that major data breaches at work can exert a 
strong influence on security beliefs and behaviors, particularly for those intimately 
involved in the event. One respondent worked for an organization in New York. The 
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organization was affected by the attacks on the World Trade Center on September 11, 
2001. The respondent stated the following about the event: 
I worked for a company well before 9-11. I was a computer operator at the 
time, but I was trying to work my way into programming. So, I developed 
a backup system which took all of their data, they were a securities firm, 
out of their in-house servers into what we called the mountain so that data 
would be secure. That company would not have been up and running the 
next day had those measures not been in place. So holding the data secure 
in that fashion and having a way to recover from an attack, either viral or 
external. That was very eventful. 
The respondent later noted that the event altered his perceptions about how to 
protect computerized information. After the event, he was less concerned with preventing 
security breaches and more concerned with being able to recover from breaches. When 
asked toward the end of the interview what had been most influential on the development 
of his beliefs about security, he stated: 
Like I said at the very beginning, 9-11 and developing that backup system. 
And you could see in my answers in talking about which way do I go, 
backup and recovery or prevention. It was definitely a massive influence 
on my life. I go with recovery. 
Separating oneself from family or being introduced to family may also act as 
sensational events that trigger new perspectives on compliance and noncompliance. For 
example, one respondent was raised on military compounds as a child. He had been 
raised to follow rules strictly. While living with his family, he said, “I was on the straight 
and narrow path.” Later in life, he moved away from his family to a large city more than 
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500 miles away. He moved to what he called a “hardcore neighborhood.” He said the 
following of the new area:  
I lived in [city name], and I saw a great deal. I may have been the straight 
white-bred kid from the South where the kid across the street wouldn’t 
even sell me pot because they thought I was a cop, but I lived in that 
environment. It was a hardcore neighborhood. It was hard to get by. 
He stated that his experiences in the neighborhood and the behaviors and attitudes 
he observed from others in that neighborhood altered the way he perceived rules. Because 
of his experiences in that neighborhood, he changed his core perceptions of rules and 
laws. After living in the neighborhood he adopted a perspective very different from his 
early perceptions. 
Similarly, introductions to estranged family members with different values may 
also exert a strong influence on core rule-related beliefs. One respondent grew up with 
her father who opposed rules, and associated with friends who rarely followed rules. The 
respondent adopted many of the perspectives of her father and friends. She had 
confrontations with police for breaking laws. However, later in life, she was reintroduced 
to her mother. She said the following of her mother: 
She is 100% a law follower. I even looked up her record because I 
couldn’t believe that anyone could be 100%. But she does not break any 
laws. It doesn’t matter if she agrees with it or not, she is going to follow it. 
She won’t associate with anyone that doesn’t have the same beliefs as her. 
The respondent later stated that her mother’s influence in the latter part of her 
adolescence influenced her perceptions of rules and policies as she began working. 
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Reflecting on her mother’s influence, the respondent said, “I had been so much into not 
really caring and breaking the law that I kind of wanted to take a new approach and do 
what my mom does as far as listening.” The introduction of her mother who held vastly 
different beliefs than her father and friends, had a strong influence on the respondent’s 
own beliefs and behaviors. 
Based on the content of the interviews we propose that major security-related 
events and personal exposure to privacy and security breaches will influence social 
learning in favor of information policy compliance.  
The Influence of Time and Continuous Experience 
Although major events may exert a dramatic effect on individuals’ beliefs and 
behaviors, time and repeated experiences with computers and continuous exposure to 
security beliefs also influences individuals’ beliefs and behaviors. An individual’s first 
experiences with security policies, particularly when the policies are strong and well-
supported, have a positive influence of pro-security behavior. One respondent described 
her first experience working as an IT employee. She said that the position was very 
difficult because there was much to learn. She noted: 
It was difficult at first, because it was a completely different mindset than 
I was used to. I hadn’t thought about computers as being anything that 
anyone would ever try to get into. Why, why would someone try to get 
into someone’s computers? I had never thought about it that way. You 
know I was kind of innocent and trusting. 
Another respondent who worked as a customer service manager commented on 
her transition from the paper manufacturing industry to the IT services industry. The 
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respondent noted that the IT services company had many security policies and procedures 
that she was required to learn and follow. In a follow up interview, she said that she had 
not learned all of the security policies and procedures until six months into her tenure at 
the organization. The complexity of the policies and additions to the policies required a 
long socialization process. Thus, tenure at an organization can influence the adoption of 
norms. If norms require the completion of complex procedures, time is needed for the 
socialization process to have an effect on individual’s beliefs and behaviors. 
Although the first strong exposure to information security influences respondent’s 
security beliefs and behaviors, prolonged exposure to security threats also influences 
beliefs and behaviors. The influence of prolonged exposure to security threats was 
particularly influential for IT personnel. One respondent who worked in IT noted: 
Over time as you see more and more issues and incidents, you learn more 
about the way technology works. I found that my perceptions of security 
have changed a lot, because you realize the extent to which damage can be 
done to your network or to yourself, such as identity theft and stuff like 
that. I wasn’t in IT to begin with. I was a scientist. I got into IT about 10 
or 11 years ago now. Once I started learning about it and seeing just how 
much people can do… just simple website browsing for example. People 
can see so much about what you are looking at. It is amazing to me. Over 
time, I think I have gotten a little more secure and quite frankly a bit more 
paranoid because I have seen what people can see. 
Another IT employee noted: 
I say it’s based mainly on my real world experience. The kind of line of 
work that I’m in I see a lot of people that suffer from things like not 
having sufficient protection, not practicing good habits, being susceptible 
to things like identity theft and privacy issues. So I’ve seen the whole 
gambit of different issues. So as time has gone on, what wasn’t necessarily 
of importance to me has definitely grown to be, especially in the past few 
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years as phishing has really picked up and identify theft and things like 
that. So I’d definitely say that my work, and you know what I’ve seen and 
learned from others, has definitely influenced that quite a bit. 
Based on the content of the interviews, we propose that individuals with 
continued exposure to computers over time, particularly the strong exposure experienced 
by IT workers, will be more likely to comply with security policy than those with less 
exposure.  
Job Transitions and Security Beliefs 
Job transitions were mentioned by all of the respondents. Job transitions included: 
transitions to new organizations and departments within the same organization, and major 
changes in practices and processes at one’s current employer. Employees may not fully 
adopt the beliefs they encounter in these new contexts. Although organizational context 
influences the adoption of security-specific beliefs and behaviors as discussed in 
section7.3, the beliefs and behaviors developed while working in previous jobs or 
working environments also influence respondents’ current security beliefs and behaviors. 
That is, individuals carry some beliefs and behaviors learned in previous jobs or work 
environments to their current jobs or working environments. 
For example, one respondent worked as a nurse for two different hospitals. The 
first hospital had strict internal policies and had strong norms that supported adherence to 
HIPAA rules. However, when she transitioned to the second hospital, the organizational 
norms and policies were less strict. When asked if the loose policies and norms affected 
her own beliefs and behaviors, she stated: 
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No. I think I kind of stuck with how I was trained. I did my schooling at 
[the first organization]. So that was just kind of the way I did things. I just 
kind of stuck to what I knew and what I felt was the best practice for the 
patient. 
Later the respondent noted that she did not experience any negative consequences 
for maintaining her previously adopted values. Thus, her comfort with the prior 
socialization and the lack of consequences for not adopting the new norms created an 
environment where the respondent could select the beliefs and behaviors most 
comfortable to her. 
Another respondent had previously worked for an organization with strong 
security policies and procedures. The respondent then transitioned to several 
organizations with weak security norms and policies. The respondent noted his frustration 
with the employees and managers he encountered at the latter organizations. Despite the 
lack of support from co-workers and management, the respondent continued to practice 
the secure behaviors he had previously learned. These examples show that social learning 
from previous organizations can influence the adoption of social learning beliefs and 
behaviors prevalent in one’s current organization. Based on findings from the interviews, 
we propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: security-specific social learning encountered in prior organizations 
influences the adoption of security-specific social learning in an employee’s 
current organization. 
 These responses also demonstrate that individuals are more or less likely to adopt 
the beliefs and behaviors in their current organization depending on how well the 
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learning environment in the current organization fits their stable beliefs and behaviors. 
Learning fit is the extent to which an individual’s preferred beliefs and behaviors learned 
in previous life stages align with the beliefs and behaviors expected within a particular 
setting. Based on the responses, we propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: learning fit increases the adoption of social learning in 
organizational contexts. 
Explaining Differences between Early Rule-Related Beliefs and Current Security-
Specific Beliefs 
Although rule-related beliefs learned early in life influence the development of 
individuals’ policy-specific beliefs, policy-specific beliefs may also differ substantially 
from general rule-related beliefs due to context and circumstance (Ronald L. Akers, 
2009). This was present in several interviews. In some contexts, individuals favored 
compliance, but in other contexts, individuals favored noncompliance. For example, one 
respondent learned early in life that rule violations were acceptable. During adolescence, 
the respondent had confrontations with police officers for her behavior. When speaking 
of security beliefs and behaviors, the respondent mentioned that she hacked software to 
see if she could accomplish the hack and to gain access to the software for personal use. 
When she was asked whether she tried to hack software at work as well, she responded: 
No. I definitely don’t try to do that inside of work, because there are 
people that will snitch on you and I am not one of the one’s to tell my boss 
what I did. So, that is more of a… I’ll give an example. Take [software 
name]. There is a tool kit that will crack your software and turn it into the 
full version of the software. And so, I did it. I know how to do it. I have 
the software, but I don’t do it to other people’s computers. Even though I 
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know it is still wrong; I know it is stealing. And yes, I still use the 
software. That is another thing that I can’t explain. People follow certain 
things, but then they don’t follow other things… But as far as out of work 
friends, I will be like, “hey guess what I just did. I turned this into a full 
software. Or guess what, I just got [software name] for two years because 
I did this.” 
Throughout the interviews this respondent described herself as being highly 
compliant with rules at work because of sanctions and her desire to be promoted. She 
even admitted to using the company’s anonymous whistleblowing hotline to report the 
noncompliant behavior of her coworkers. Clearly, her security behaviors at home differ 
greatly from her security behaviors at work. Other examples of inconsistent and context-
specific beliefs and behaviors can be seen in many of the interviews. 
We now seek to identify some of the conditions that prompt the adoption of 
beliefs and behaviors that are inconsistent with individuals’ rule-related beliefs learned 
early in life. To begin, the contextual nature of the core tenets of ASLT is explored. The 
following sub-sections describe how differential association, reinforcement, and imitation 
are influenced by context. Next, two aspects of context that arose from the interviews are 
discussed, namely organizational size and industry type. Finally, we describe how 
organizational size, and industry type influence security-specific learning. 
Social Learning: The Contextual Natural of Differential Association 
ASLT acknowledges that differential association is contextual in nature. That is, 
individuals come into contact with different beliefs about compliance and noncompliance 
in different contexts and with regard to different rules, which influences their rule-related 
behaviors according to the context. Although ASLT acknowledges the contextual nature 
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of beliefs, many ASLT studies only examine beliefs related to one rule and in one context 
(Pratt et al., 2010). Thus, the conditions that explain why differential association is 
contextual are not well addressed in the literature. Similar compartmentalization can be 
seen in InfoSec research. Most InfoSec studies are cross-sectional in nature (Crossler et 
al., 2013). The studies primarily seek to understand the behavioral influence of security 
controls in the respondents’ current work setting, or to understand security beliefs and 
behaviors in that current setting. There is little consideration for how security beliefs 
develop outside of the current work setting. One exception is the study of habit in InfoSec 
research (Vance et al., 2012). However, even habit is examined broadly and does not try 
to account for where an individual’s security habits were formed. Based on the 
interviews, we identify some of the conditions that create differences between general 
rule beliefs and security-specific beliefs. We also highlight those events that cause 
changes in security beliefs and behaviors. 
Several respondents noted that the attitudes of their coworkers differed from 
organization to organization or even from department to department within the same 
organization. For example, one respondent discussed a transition he made from an 
organization with strict security policies to an organization with loose policies. He noted: 
Basically, going from the large company with these very strict rules kept 
me on the straight and narrow. I had two computers up at all times. Now, I 
don’t have two computers anymore. Now I just have two monitors running 
from one computer. It is company equipment. I am a remote employee 
still. I flew out there and got the computer and that is what I work on. 
They have very relaxed rules, so I do what I want. And I probably do 
things that I shouldn’t do, like Amazon Turk. I’ll see something out there 
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interesting and I’ll take a half-an-hour break and do that. Their security 
practices are very relaxed. 
Another respondent commented on his transition from one department to another 
within the same organization. He worked for the airline industry. He noted that the 
organization had policies that prohibited the use of the Internet for personal purposes 
while at work, such as browsing Facebook. The respondent stated: 
Yeah, I’ve seen people access Facebook. That is a big one we’ve been 
asked not to access and I’ve seen people access it. I don’t see the group of 
people that use to do it. I’m closest to the customer service group [now], 
but I used to have a job working outside on the ramp working with 
rampers. Working with them, they were always the ones going the 
backdoor ways in, using K-proxy or other web addresses to get into 
Facebook and email accounts. The one’s I’m closest with [now], I don’t 
see them violate the policies. 
Another respondent transitioned to a different organization and a different 
department. She started in a non-IT position in a zoological research lab as a research 
scientist. However, she returned to school to study IT. She transitioned from the research 
lab to a data center. She said the following of the transition and the new beliefs she 
encountered: 
It was difficult, because you have to think about things in a different way. 
There is no longer a walking away from the computer. There are 
repercussions for that. To go back into the datacenter, you had to know 
what the rules were and you had to know why the rules were in place. 
They went through all of that. It was difficult at first, because it was a 
completely different mindset than I was used to. I hadn’t thought about 
computers as being anything that anyone would ever try to get into. Why, 
why would someone try to get into someone’s computers? I had never 
thought about it that way. You know I was kind of innocent and trusting, 
and here I was like, well geez, you can do some real damage here.  
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These and other quotes show that individuals come in contact with different 
values and belief systems as they transition to new organizations and departments, and 
interface with others in the different social environments. Changes in organizational 
practices and processes may also engulf employees in different belief systems that may 
prompt adoption of new beliefs and behaviors. For example, a nurse respondent described 
the changes in rule-related beliefs and behaviors of her coworkers when her hospital 
transitioned from a paper-based patient charting system to a computer-based patient 
charting system. She stated that the transition brought their access of patient records 
under scrutiny, because access to the medical records became heavily monitored. The 
extra monitoring caused changes in the behaviors of the employees at the hospital. When 
asked about the transition from paper to computerized chartering, the respondent noted: 
I think that it was a learning curve for everyone. Because you are used to 
being able to pull out patient charts and look at this or look at that, and 
really know nobody is checking on you. It is not that they were doing 
anything wrong, but you know that information now is out there. Now, 
with the computerized charting and everything, every time somebody logs 
into that patient chart there is a record of that. Whereas, back in the day 
when we were just using paper charts it wasn’t quite as obvious. But now 
anytime anyone logs into a patient chart there is a record of it. If nothing, 
it has gotten more secure than before. 
Social Learning: The Contextual Nature of Reinforcement 
ASLT, general deterrence theory, and rational choice theory all suggest that 
positive or negative reinforcement exert influence on individuals’ beliefs and behaviors. 
Consistent with these theories, we find that reinforcement through punishment, shaming, 
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praise, and rewards influences individuals to change their beliefs and behaviors based on 
the contextualized reinforcement they receive.  
For example, one respondent noted that he received drastically different levels of 
reinforcement while working for different organizations. At one organization, the 
respondent encountered heavy monitoring and sanctions. He said, “every keystroke that I 
ever took during my 17 years at that company are sitting on a computer someplace.” He 
spoke of the company as “big brother” and frequently stated, “big brother is watching 
you.” When asked about policies at the organization he transitioned to after working for 
the strict company, the respondent stated, “I have to have Skype. That is basically the 
policy. They’ve been in business for a bunch of years, but they really don’t have laid out 
policies.” Regarding the difference in reinforcement he received at the two organizations, 
the respondent stated: 
Rule breaking and what not are more prominent in my current life, which 
is probably the real question that should be asked here. Now that I’ve 
moved on from that heavy duty, tight security to another small company 
with very relaxed security policies, what was that transition like? That is a 
more interesting answer. 
Later the respondent suggested that his security behaviors became very relaxed at 
the less strict organization. He knew he would not be punished and that he was not 
monitored at the latter organization. He was willing to do things that he didn’t do at the 
previous organization. 
Similarly, another respondent stated that she was comfortable violating a rule in 
one setting, but would not violate the same rule under different circumstances. In 
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particularly, she was willing to hack software at home, but not at work. She suggested 
that her decision to hack the software at home was based on the lack of negative 
reinforcement. She noted: 
Well the whole not stealing thing. I wouldn’t go into the store and steal. I 
wouldn’t go to my friend’s house or parent’s house to steal, but then when 
it comes to the whole breaking of the software for my own computer, yeah 
that is still stealing. Even though you know you are stealing from the 
company and maybe they are losing revenue and somebody is getting laid 
off, no one is in front of you. So you don’t see who you are doing it to. It 
is kind of like out of sight out of mind. 
Because the respondent didn’t see the consequences of her hacking behaviors, she 
received no negative reinforcement for hacking the software.  
Although differential association is somewhat contextual, differential 
reinforcement seems to be much more contextual. Organizations have very different 
reinforcement structures as do parents and friends. As shown in the quotes above, 
individuals experience different levels of reinforcement at any given time based on the 
context in which they are placed. Thus, individuals may behave differently at home and 
work because reinforcement is drastically different. Based on the highly contextual nature 
of reinforcement, we do not see it as part of the larger social learning system. However, 
differential reinforcement is highly influential on the adoption of social beliefs and 
behaviors as depicted in the quotes above. Thus, rather than modeling social learning as a 
process consisting of definitions, differential association, differential reinforcement, and 
imitation, we propose an alternative perspective that places differential reinforcement as 
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an external force that influences the social learning process. Figure 7 depicts the revised 
modeling of the larger social learning process. 
 
Social learning
Definitions
Differential 
association
Differential 
reinforcement
Reinforcement
 
Figure 7. Revised Model of the Social Learning Construct 
 
Based on our findings regarding differential reinforcement, we propose the 
following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 4a: differential reinforcement during childhood and adolescence 
influences social learning in childhood and adolescence.  
Hypothesis 4b & 4c: differential reinforcement during employment at an 
organization influences social learning in the organization (prior and current 
organization). 
Social Learning: The Contextual Nature of Mimicry and Modeling 
ASLT and Bandura’s social learning theory both suggest that individuals learn by 
observing others behaviors and mimicking and modeling those behaviors (R L Akers, 
1985; Bandura, 1977b). ASLT suggests that the importance of mimicry and modeling 
diminishes over time as individuals learn how to perform the actions they mimic (Ronald 
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L. Akers, 2009). However, mimicry and modeling can be extremely important when an 
individual is learning new behaviors. For example, one respondent reflected on her first 
IT position. She stated: 
I was absolutely fascinated. They had people whose jobs it was to break 
into peoples’ stuff. I was fascinated by that. They would do things like 
dress up like a worker out having a smoke break and try to break into 
peoples’ offices. They would leave thumb drives that were infected with 
viruses out in the parking lot to see who would pick them up. People 
would pick them up and put them in their computers. The stuff they did it 
was astounding. I was completely fascinated by that and freaked out a 
little bit. They would call and try to get peoples’ passwords. And if you 
left your computer unlocked, people would send a note out that you were 
buying drinks afterward. The amount of knowledge they had, it was just 
astounding. I was fascinated by computers. I knew I didn’t know much 
about them. I had taken a few night classes, but here were all of these 
brilliant minds trying to find ways to break into systems or secure systems. 
And they were fighting back and forth. It was just these epic battles and it 
was awesome. 
Speaking further, this respondent described the importance of her training with 
her coworkers: 
When you started, you would get training from a manager, but then most 
of the training was done by your coworkers, because they were the real 
experts. Management was kind of the overseer, but they didn’t know 
things quite the same. Sometimes you think that the manager is the expert, 
but it wasn’t really like that there. The people doing it every day were the 
experts. So you would get initial training from them, but coworkers were 
the main ones who would help you understand the right mindset. 
Many non-IT employees lacked the formal and informal training necessary to 
facilitate behavioral modeling. These employees’ focused their conversation on password 
security and the requirements of acceptable use policies. In one extreme case, a 
   
108 
 
respondent mentioned passwords 20 times during the interview. Similarly, 60 percent of 
the non-IT respondents mentioned acceptable use agreements and limitations on visiting 
sites like Facebook. Only 30 percent of IT respondents mentioned the use of such sites. In 
many cases, training for non-IT employees was either nonexistent or consisted of reading 
and signing policies at the time the individual was hired. 
While many non-IT employees didn’t encounter strong formal training, some 
encountered strong informal training. For example, one respondent had learned about 
security behaviors through a colleague from the IT department. Formal training was 
weak. The respondent was required to read and sign an acceptable use agreement once 
per year, and she received occasional emails from the IT department about potential 
phishing threats. However, no formal training was in place to assist her learn other 
security responsibilities. Although she didn’t encounter strong formal training, she 
received strong informal training through regular contact with the organization’s only IT 
employee. The office of the IT employee was next to the office of the respondent. The 
respondent and the IT employee developed a good personal and working relationship. 
The respondent said the following of the IT employee, “She has a lot to do with how I… 
she has taught me about how to use computers. As soon as she hears something new, she 
comes and tells me. I am one of the first to know about stuff.” The respondent stated that 
the IT employee had the greatest influence on her security beliefs and behaviors. 
While many non-IT employees lacked sufficient training, a few employees 
received excellent training. One respondent worked in the IT services industry providing 
customer support for clients. The respondent’s organization handled sensitive data for 
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several large businesses, such as Verizon and Walmart, through a software as a service 
architecture. Because of the sensitive information the organization handled, security was 
heavily stressed. The respondent went through an all-day training when she was hired and 
received follow up training on several occasions. Quality training and a strong culture 
that supports pro-security behaviors provides an ideal learning environment for 
individuals. By mimicking the behaviors of others and those behaviors taught in 
trainings, employees were able to perform their security behaviors well. 
In the following sub-sections the core tenets of ASLT are presented based on 
insight from the interviews. Based on the discussion in the previous sections, we propose 
the following hypotheses for further testing: 
Hypothesis 5a: the likelihood that an individual will develop intentions to engage 
in proactive security behavior increases to the extent that the individual has been 
socialized to engage in positive security behavior in the individual’s current 
organization. 
Hypothesis 5b: the likelihood that an individual will develop intentions to engage 
in security compliant behavior increases to the extent that the individual has been 
socialized to engage in positive security behavior at the individual’s current 
organization. 
Hypothesis 5c: the likelihood that an individual will develop intentions to engage 
in security risk-taking behavior increases to the extent that the individual has 
been socialized to engage in security misbehavior at the individual’s current 
organization. 
Hypothesis 5d: the likelihood that an individual will develop intentions to engage 
in security damaging behavior increases to the extent that the individual has been 
socialized to engage in security misbehavior at the individual’s current 
organization. 
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Contextual Influencers: Organizational Size and Industry Type 
The contextual nature of differential association and differential reinforcement is 
somewhat dependent on organizational size and industry type. Small organizations 
tended to have less strict security policies and enforcement mechanism than large, highly 
bureaucratic organizations. Similarly, organizations in IT-related industries tended to 
have stricter security policies and more enforcement mechanisms than organizations in 
nonIT-related industries. Some of these differences were quite marked. For example, one 
respondent worked for a small engineering firm with less than ten employees. According 
to the respondent, the organization’s only information security policy was, “don’t leak 
information.” Even many small IT organizations had weak security controls. When asked 
about the policies at a small website design company, one respondent stated:  
It was basically, get your job done and do it as best as you can. I wrote all 
of our code for a long time and then I kind of technically managed the 
folks who were writing code. I mean active code, not just HTML. And the 
attitude was, keep it as secure as you know how to keep it. We did not 
have a large number of policies. I think at our peak we got to maybe five 
people. The intention was to keep it a small close-knit group. Yeah, we 
were not policy oriented. We operated under the principle that 99 percent 
of your managing gets done when you decide who to hire. And that is the 
single best management technique I’ve learned. There are different 
constraints that you operate under in a big agency. But yeah, we just hired 
people that we knew weren’t going to rip us off and that we could trust. 
Similarly, another respondent who worked for a small computer repair shop said 
that he was surprised to learn of the weak security controls at the organization. When 
asked whether the policies at the organization were strict, the respondent stated: 
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No. Alarmingly, [the policies are] not strict. Every computer as it came 
into the shop was immediately connected to a network that had no security 
whatsoever. On top of that, they had a wireless network that had wireless 
access to that network that had no encryption at all. So, the second the 
computer got there, it was completely exposed to anyone who wanted to 
get to it. Plus it had total exposure to every other computer on the 
network; that includes the computers they used for their servers and other 
work computers. They seemed to understand that it was important to have 
some sort of antivirus. That was as far as they went. 
Larger, bureaucratic organizations tended to have stricter policies, particularly 
organizations in IT-related industries. Speaking of her experiences across companies, one 
respondent noted: 
I think it was mostly about the types of companies that I worked for. The 
two largest companies I worked for were the consulting company and the 
energy company. The energy company had exceptionally strict rules. They 
had all kinds of security issues because they are considered critical 
infrastructure in the United States. They had very stringent security 
policies, as stringent as the other place that I worked, the [IT] consulting 
firm. So, the larger companies have been very strict. The smaller 
companies haven’t been. That is also probably related to the type of 
companies they are; a school district and a manufacturing company. My 
current boss is very smart, but from the company as a whole, we get a lot 
of pushback within the smaller organization. At the larger organizations, 
there is more at stake, and I think they choose specific people with the 
capacity to do that or to learn that. 
Another respondent worked for a mid-sized, secure data center. She stated that 
policies were strict and that employees sought to make the policies even stricter. The 
respondent said the following about the support of security policies in that organization: 
They would think about it, and if they didn’t think that it was strict 
enough, they would find ways to improve it. I think a lot of that had to do 
with the nature of the business. When you deal with these things, if you 
identified a security loop hole, you wanted to make sure it was covered. 
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So, everyone took it very seriously. It was our job to make sure that the 
stuff in there was safe. And if there was anything that you could think of, 
you would bring it up, and everyone brought it up. Everyone took it real 
seriously. Everyone was interested in making it better. 
Based on the interviews, we propose that employees in large organizations and 
organizations related to the information technology (IT) industry will be socialized to 
obey information security policies more than employees in small organizations and 
organizations unrelated to the IT industry. Thus we quantitatively test the following 
hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 6: the likelihood that an individual will learn deviant security 
behaviors decreases to the extent that the individual works for a large 
organization. 
Hypothesis 7: the likelihood that an individual will learn deviant security 
behaviors decreases to the extent that the individual works for an organization in 
the IT industry. 
Trust among Coworkers 
Another important theme that emerged from the interviews was employees’ trust 
in their coworkers. With regard to information security behavior, trust is a relatively 
understudied topic (Posey, Bennett, Roberts, & Lowry, 2011). Trust research in 
organizational contexts focuses on how employees’ trust in their organizations influences 
the employees’ behaviors. Trust among coworkers has not been studied as an antecedent 
to information security behaviors. In the interviews, we identified several instances in 
which trust in one’s coworkers seemed to decrease adherence to information security 
policies. For example, one respondent related her experiences with information security 
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at a large paper manufacturing company. The respondent stated that security beliefs were 
relaxed and policies were ignored by many employees. While explaining why the 
environment was relaxed with regard to information security policies, she stated: 
There were people who had been [with the company] for more than 24 
years. A lot of people were there long term. I think that familiarity also 
breeds a little bit of… I’m not sure the word I’m looking for. Because we 
knew one another and worked together so long, you tend to become more 
relaxed because you trust people that they won’t do anything that would 
jeopardize anyone’s job; they wouldn’t do anything to jeopardize the 
company knowingly. Once you understand that person, you trust that they 
will do what is in the best interest of the company without disturbing 
anything that shouldn’t be disturbed, at least intentionally. I don’t think 
they would intentionally disclose information without realizing the 
ramifications of that. So I think a lot of it has to do with the fact that we 
had worked together so long that over time we became accustomed to. I 
trust that they will do nothing to jeopardize the company or their job. 
Because the respondent trusted her coworkers, she was not concerned with their 
relaxed security behaviors. Another respondent who worked in an elementary school 
shared a similar story. The respondent was employed as a media specialist and managed 
the school’s library. The school had a policy that employees must log out of their 
computers upon leaving their workstations. They also had a policy that employees should 
not use another employee’s computer account for any purpose. Although the respondent 
was careful to lock her computer when students’ parents were at the school, she often left 
her computer unlocked to allow faculty members to check out books for their students. 
This action violated both of the aforementioned policies. The respondent said, “I really 
trust the people I work with.” She further stated, “A lot of time I just trust that nobody’s 
going to mess with my stuff.” 
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In another instance, the hiring model of a company was based on trust. Formal 
policy was of lesser importance to the organization and its operations. The respondent 
who worked for the company stated: 
Yeah, we were not policy oriented. We operated under the principle that 
99 percent of your managing gets done when you decide who to hire, and 
that is the single best management technique I’ve learned. There are 
different constraints that you operate under in a big agency. But yeah, we 
just hired people that we knew weren’t going to rip us off and that we 
could trust. 
Based on the discussions of respondents, trust among coworkers seems to create a 
vulnerability in information security. Trust seems to focus the attention of employees on 
social norms rather than formal policy. Trust also seems to create a feeling of comfort 
and security, which may provide a false sense of security. Thus, trust among coworkers 
may lead to the development of weak security norms. Trust is not examined in this study 
do to the current complexity of the model. It also lies outside of the scope of the current 
study. However, it may be studied in future research to further confirm the findings in 
this study. 
Managing Security Behavior 
Based on the interviews, a one-size-fits-all management approach may not be an 
appropriate solution to manage internal security risks. Employees’ security beliefs can be 
categorized into two major groups. Employees expressed pro-policy beliefs and anti-
policy beliefs. Pro-policy beliefs include beliefs that favor compliance with security 
policies, and in some cases, beliefs that favor engagement in extra-policy behaviors 
designed to protect the organization and its clients. Anti-policy beliefs include beliefs that 
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favor noncompliance with policy or strong negative perceptions of policy. In this study, 
anti-policy beliefs do not include malicious actions intended to cause harm to the 
organization. Although malicious behaviors have been identified as an important type of 
security behavior (Willison & Warkentin, 2013), we did not encounter malicious beliefs 
and behaviors in the interviews. 
Managing Employees with Pro-policy Beliefs 
Employees with pro-policy beliefs believe that following policies is important and 
that policies are “in place for a reason.” These employees also tend to believe in the 
importance of rules and laws in general. Respondents with pro-policy beliefs commonly 
labeled themselves as rule followers. As long as they understood the security policies, 
these respondents were eager to follow the security policies. Some respondents even 
stated that they felt uncomfortable in environments that did not support adherence to 
security policies. 
Based on the respondents’ statements, employees with pro-policy beliefs required 
two forms of support to follow through on their pro-policy beliefs: training oriented 
toward awareness and skill development, and normative support. In the context of this 
study, normative support refers to the extent to which the organizational culture and 
social norms within an organization support positive security behaviors.  
Security training was an important tool to strengthen pro-security beliefs and 
improve security behavior. Respondents who expressed pro-policy beliefs often blamed 
their security-related indiscretions on their lack of awareness. For example, one 
respondent noted: 
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I’m always more cautious anyway because I’ve had some experiences and 
I understand that… there are people out there that have intentions that are 
not necessarily good intentions. If they want to hack into your system they 
are going to hack into your system, but I don’t want to participate by 
taking a relaxed approached to my security and making it any easier for 
them than it already is. I think that to the degree that I understand it and 
understand what to do to prevent it, I do that. 
Unfortunately, as previous discussed, many of the respondents had not 
encountered strong training. For many respondents, particularly non-IT respondents, their 
knowledge of security was limited to the use of passwords and to acceptable use 
agreements. Based on the interviews, it seems that training can have a very strong 
influence on individuals with pro-policy beliefs. 
Normative support was also extremely important to respondents with pro-policy 
beliefs. Employees with pro-policy beliefs felt most comfortable in environments where 
workplace norms favor compliance with policies. When the normative environment does 
not support policy following behaviors, employees with pro-policy beliefs find it more 
difficult to follow policy. This may be in-part because the norms become the policies that 
they follow. One respondent, a customer service manager, who labeled herself as a rule-
follow explained the discomfort she felt in a work environment that did not support 
information security policies. While discussing the information security norms at a 
previous organization, she noted: 
When you are in an environment and working with the same people long 
enough, they influence you in certain ways. I do believe that with the 
prevailing attitude [at my previous employer], I was a little more relaxed 
than… the truth of the matter was that because everyone was relaxed, and 
that was the prevailing attitude, there was really no way for me to enforce 
the policy when no one else was enforcing the policy. So I kind of ended 
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up going with the flow. As much as it sometimes bothered me, I felt like I 
couldn’t really buck the system because there were people… if I were the 
only manager enforcing the policy then what does it matter? It would have 
made me the manager who was really coming down on people and being 
difficult, when in fact, if everyone were enforcing it, it would have been 
an easier thing. 
IT employees in charge of information security shared similar sentiments. When 
IT employees are not supported by top management and the workplace norms do not 
favor compliance with information security policies, IT employees face major 
frustrations and difficulties. For example, one IT employee had moved from an 
organization which was highly supportive of information security to an organization that 
cared little about information security. When asked about the transition, the respondent 
noted: 
[It is] frustrating, very frustrating. Really frustrating. Some of the stuff 
[they do] is pretty major, like sharing the credit card information to run the 
credit card. Things like that are insecure. That’s hard. Some of it is minor, 
but it can also be damaging. Streaming music… it is written in the policy 
that you are not supposed to stream audio or video. We have that written 
in there because we scale the Internet connections for a certain speed 
based on the number of people that are there and the data usage we expect. 
If we have ten people who are streaming, it is going to take the network 
down. So sometimes it is fighting that battle. It is pretty frustrating and I 
feel like we fight the same battles over and over again, because people 
don’t listen.  
Respondents with pro-policy beliefs were particularly interested in following 
information security policies when they felt as though they were protecting a vulnerable 
client. For example, one respondent worked with small children. She believed that 
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following information security policies is extremely important. When asked if she 
thought that information security policies are important, she stated: 
Yes I do, especially when you are working with young children. 
Especially working at an elementary school… you don’t want teachers 
looking on child porn. That doesn’t make it safe for the children. Yes I 
think security is an important part, especially where I’m working right 
now in an elementary school. 
Two respondents working in the healthcare industry both noted that they felt it 
was their responsibility to protect patient privacy. They both claimed that they are careful 
to follow information security policies. Another respondent who worked for a non-profit 
organization that sought to protect women from spousal abuse felt strongly that following 
security policies was important, because it protected the organization’s clients. Similarly, 
IT employees, particularly those who are in charge of security, also felt an increased need 
to follow policies. They felt it was their responsibility to protect the organization from 
internal and external threats.  
Managing Employees with Anti-policy Beliefs 
Multiple respondents noted that they did not believe that some information 
security policies were important or necessary. Although these employees expressed anti-
policy beliefs, they did not always violate the policies. Their anti-policy beliefs did not 
always result in insecure behavior because the respondents were influenced by 
organization controls. For example, one respondent stated the following about 
information security policies:  
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I believe some of them are unnecessary or violate your rights in other 
ways. So I still don’t agree with most of them… well I wouldn’t say most 
of them, because I understand why they are there. There are still 10 to 20 
percent that I don’t agree with. I follow them until they tell me not to. 
Earlier in the respondent’s life, her anti-policy opinions of security policies were 
even stronger. Other respondents shared similar sentiments. When asked about his 
perceptions of security policies, another respondent noted: 
I think they are good. I think that most of them do solve issues, but once 
again, I see a bunch of policies come into place because of over 
legislation. We’ve been dealing with Sarbanes-Oxley for years, and just 
the paper trail and all of those changing of records based on Sarbanes-
Oxley they have in place. It has been a nightmare to implement policies 
for things that happened in the past. If I can fit them in, I do, but if I am 
pressed for, you know… Legislative policies do fall by the wayside to get 
things out the door. 
Respondents with anti-policy beliefs were those individuals who were influenced 
early in life to believe that rules were unnecessary or who were influenced later in their 
lives to see rules as negative because of major events. Employees with anti-policy beliefs 
stated that they followed policies to avoid negative consequences. In most cases, values 
of protecting others were less important to these respondents. These respondents were 
primarily concerned with their own well-being. These respondents spoke regularly of 
monitoring and sanctions. For example, one respondent spoke about sanctions and 
monitoring on several occasions. In one instance, he stated: 
They monitored our usage and stuff and then if you were caught you 
would lose your computer privileges. If you misuse your computer they 
will fire you. Like for pornography or for religious purposes. There is 
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zero-tolerance on that. They send a monthly Internet usage… sites we’ve 
visited…. what we’re looking at. 
Another respondent admitted to violating several information security policies 
while he worked for an organization with weak policies and enforcement. However, he 
stated that he was highly compliant with policies while working for an organization with 
monitoring and severe sanctions. Similarly, yet another respondent admitted to avoiding 
rules because he could avoid consequences. The respondent worked as an IT employee in 
an organization with a federated IT governance structure. The respondent worked for a 
department of the organization that “is interested in utility, and only cares about security 
as a risk factor.”  He avoided working with the personnel in the centralized IT department 
who were more process and rule oriented. Regarding the centralized IT department, he 
said: 
The central IT group is very much process driven. At least from the 
outside, it seems to be a very process driven organization. And they need 
to follow [policies] to get it to work the way they want it to work. That is 
not to say that there are people there who might have different attitudes, 
but they have to live there. They have to follow the policy and the rules or 
whatnot. I do as much as possible by myself rather than relying on the 
central IT group or another unit. My reaction to their process driven and 
more reasoned way of doing things is, “well I’ll just do it. Get it done.” So 
yeah, disengaging, that is my way of dealing with it. If their system won’t 
do it, I’ll just find another way that will work. 
The respondent also noted that the enforcement of policy was weak at the 
organization. The respondent shared several stories in which employees made large 
security-related mistakes, including major data leaks, but were not terminated or 
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reprimanded. In fact, the respondent suggested that one of the employees was promoted 
to remedy the error that he had created. 
Based on the interviews, employees with anti-policy beliefs were best controlled 
by highlighting the consequences of insecure behavior. When strong, negative 
consequences were not in place, employees with anti-policy beliefs were far more likely 
to engage in insecure and policy violating behaviors. Again, hypotheses could be 
generated based on these findings. However, they go beyond the scope of the current 
paper and should be considered in future research. 
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CHAPTER VII 
THE QUANTIATIVE STUDY 
 
To further validate the findings from the qualitative study, a quantitative study 
was conducted. An online survey with Qualtrics survey software was administered to 
determine how generalizable the qualitative findings are. The online survey was 
distributed through Amazon Mechanical Turk. Amazon Mechanical Turk is increasingly 
used in academic research to reach a diverse population at a reasonable cost (Buhrmester 
et al., 2011; Mason & Suri, 2012; Paolacci et al., 2010). The demographics of Amazon 
Mechanical Turk respondents is similar to those found in other types of studies 
(Buhrmester et al., 2011; Mason & Suri, 2012). Panels, such as Amazon Mechanical Turk 
users, may also provide a greater diversity in respondents than convenience sampling 
methods, such as surveying the employees in a single organization (Posey, Bennett, 
Roberts, et al., 2011). Recruitment on Amazon Mechanical Turk was limited to 
respondents from the US and India. Before distributing the survey to the Amazon 
Mechanical Turk panel, the survey instrument was pre-tested and pilot tested. The 
instrument was pre-tested with three information systems professors, one sociology 
professor, and three information systems Ph.D. students. After making some adjustments 
to the questions based on the pre-tests, the survey was pilot tested on a group of 
undergraduate students in a business school in the Eastern United States. Based on more 
than 100 responses, the pilot test showed that the instrument exhibited high reliability and 
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strong validity. After pilot testing the instrument, the survey was administered to the 
Amazon Mechanical Turk panel. 
The survey included three items to ensure that the respondent was reading 
carefully. For example, one item stated: Please select “Strongly Agree” for this question. 
These questions were used to identify respondents whose answers were haphazardly 
provided. If respondents failed these attention traps, they were removed from the sample. 
Similarly, we filtered for respondents who had worked in at least two jobs and who used 
computers at work multiple times per week. The US sample consisted of 384 responses. 
However, 137 responses were dropped because of incomplete surveys (9 percent), failing 
the filters (42 percent), or failing the attention traps (51 percent). The India sample 
consisted of 452 responses. However, 277 responses were dropped because of incomplete 
surveys (13 percent), failing the filters (35 percent), or failing the attention traps (52 
percent). In the US sample, 64 percent of the responses were retained. In the India 
sample, 39 percent of the responses were retained (25 percent difference across samples). 
The difference in the number of responses dropped may be due to differences in comfort 
with Amazon Mechanical Turk. Participants in the India sample may have been less 
familiar with the platform, and therefore, more likely to fill out the survey when they 
were unqualified. By consistently applying our filtering methods across samples, the 
equivalence of the samples was strengthened. 
Exploring Social Learning Internationally 
The overall social learning process is consistent across national boundaries 
(Hwang & Akers, 2003). However, because certain nations exhibit different value 
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systems (e.g., individualism vs. collectivism) (Hofstede, Hofstede, & Minkov, 2010), 
aspects of the learning process, such as how influential social learning is on behavior, 
may be more pronounced in different nations. It is also possible that political and 
regulatory differences across countries may influence social learning, particularly in 
relation to information security. Security is highly publicized in the US and many laws 
and standards have been developed. In other parts of the world, there are fewer security 
regulations. The lack of national concern and regulation may translate to lower security 
concern from the citizens of that nation. Additionally, IT infrastructure is different 
throughout the world. Some nations’ IT infrastructure is relatively new. The citizens of 
these nations have had less time to learn security behaviors, simply because they have 
had less access to reliable computing devices and services. These differences are 
explored in this study at a high level by comparing the social learning process in the US 
and India.  
India was selected for several reasons. First, the US and India differ culturally. 
Hoit is known to differ from the US culturally. According to Hofestede, the US and India 
differ in national culture along several cultural dimensions (Hofstede et al., 2010). For 
example, the US culture tends to be more individualistic, while the Indian culture tends to 
be more collectivist. Similarly, the US culture tends to exhibit lower levels of power 
distance than the Indian culture. Finally, the US culture tends to be more indulgent than 
the Indian culture. The indulgent, individualistic nature of the US culture and the low 
power distance may increase the likelihood of security behaviors that are contrary to 
policy as compared to India. Thus, the social learning environment in the US may be less 
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amenable to compliant behavior than then learning environment in India. However, India 
is also a developing country and IT infrastructure is still being developed (Palvia, Palvia, 
& Whitworth, 2002). The US, on the other hand, is an advanced country with a strong 
and stable IT infrastructure (Palvia et al., 2002). A developing infrastructure may 
resulting in lower levels of knowledge pertaining to information security, as citizens have 
less access to computing devices and services. Thus, social learning in favor of secure 
behavior may be increased in the US, simply because it is a more relevant social issue. 
The exploration of cultural differences offered later attempts to understand the larger 
social learning trends in the US and India. 
Conceptual Model 
 Figure 6 depicts the model that emerged from the qualitative data. The model is 
consistent with the premise of ASLT. Due to an error in the online survey, the industry of 
the organization was not collected. Thus, we were unable to test hypothesis 7. Hypothesis 
7 was dropped from the model.  
In addition to the relationships found in the qualitative study, we included other 
important constructs found across behavioral InfoSec literature. First, we included items 
to measure formal security training to understand how security training influences social 
learning. One of the purposes of this study is to understand how the formal administrative 
environment influences social learning. Although training was important in some of the 
interviews, training was weak in many of the organizations. Thus, we could not 
conclusively determine from the interviews whether training was a strong influence on 
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social learning. To determine the extent to which formal training influences social 
learning we propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 7: formal security training influences security-specific social learning.  
Second, we included self-efficacy, which is an alternate explanation of the effect 
social influence exerts on behavior intentions and behavior (Ronald L. Akers, 2009), 
stemming from Bandura’s social learning theory (Bandura, 1977a, 1977b). Bandura’s 
social learning theory has already been tested in InfoSec research (Warkentin et al., 
2011). Thus, understanding whether self-efficacy provides a better explanation of 
behavioral intentions than Akers’ social learning construct may assist researchers in 
selecting the most appropriate social learning theory for InfoSec research. Self-efficacy is 
also important in protection motivation theory (Johnston & Warkentin, 2010). Protection 
motivation theory also posits that response efficacy is an important influencer of 
behavioral intentions and behavior (Johnston & Warkentin, 2010). In the interviews, 
protecting others was a major value and rationale for engaging in secure behavior. Thus, 
social learning should influence perceptions of response efficacy.  
 Self-efficacy and response efficacy were added to the model as mediators. Social 
learning is the process by which values, attitudes, perceptions, and behaviors are shared 
and adopted. Response efficacy are perceptions that individuals may adopt. Given that 
social learning can influence values and perceptions of the environment, it stands to 
reason that social learning should influence how individuals perceive perceptions such as 
response efficacy. Further, social learning is a persuasive process by which individuals 
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are persuaded by social actors to adopt certain beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors. 
According to Bandura’s social learning theory, persuasion can influence perceptions of 
self-efficacy (Bandura, 1977b). Thus, we would also expect social learning to influence 
self-efficacy. The question remains, however, whether social learning has a stronger 
influence on behavioral intentions and behavior than self-efficacy. Thus, we seek to 
determine if a partial mediation relationships exists between social learning and self-
efficacy with regard to behavioral intentions.  
To minimize the number of measures in the survey, self-efficacy was 
conceptualized as self-efficacy to comply with security policy and response efficacy was 
conceptualized as perceptions of security policy and its ability to protect the organization. 
Thus, self-efficacy and response efficacy were included as an explanations for proactive 
security behavior and security compliant behavior. They were not included in the models 
for security risk-taking behavior and security damaging behavior. Protection motivation 
theory, which rely on self-efficacy and response efficacy, is used to explain positive 
security behavior (Johnston & Warkentin, 2010). Thus, they are not included in the 
models for negative behavior. Table 8 presents the revised conceptual model. Based on 
this information, we propose the following hypotheses in addition to those previously 
described in the qualitative section: 
Hypothesis 8: security-specific social learning influences self-efficacy to comply 
with security policies. 
Hypothesis 9: security-specific social learning influences perceptions of response 
efficacy related to security policies. 
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Hypothesis: 10a-b: self-efficacy to comply with security policies influences 
individuals’ proactive security behavior intentions and security compliant 
behavior intentions. 
Hypothesis: 11a-b: response efficacy influences individuals’ proactive security 
behavior intentions and security compliant behavior intentions. 
Social learning 
(childhood & 
adolescence)
Social learning
(prior organization)
Social learning 
(current organization)
Security compliant 
behavior intentions
Learning fit
h1b
h1a
h2
h5a-d
Organization size
Security risk-taking 
behavior intentions
h3
Proactive security 
behavior intentions
Security damaging 
behavior intentions
Self-efficacy
Response efficacy
h8
h9
Reinforcement 
(childhood & 
adolescence)
h4a
Reinforcement 
(prior organization)
Reinforcement 
(current organization)
h4ch4b
h10a-b
h11a-b
h6
Security training
h7
 
Figure 8. Revised Conceptual Model 
 
 
Measures 
The survey consisted of social learning measures derived from previous studies 
and adapted to the security context using insights from the qualitative study. The survey 
questions are provided in Appendix C. The questions captured the four major elements of 
the social learning process: definitions, differential association, differential 
reinforcement, and mimicry. These questions were asked three times with slight 
variations to measure social learning in childhood and adolescence, social learning at the 
respondent’s previous job, and social learning at the respondent’s current job. 
Randomization was used within question sets and question sets were also presented in a 
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random order to prevent bias due to ordering effects. The instrument also included 
several common security constructs, including: self-efficacy, response efficacy, the 
certainty of sanctions, and the severity of sanctions. The survey included four dependent 
variables to represent security behaviors, including: proactive security behavior, security 
compliant behavior, security risk-taking behavior, and security damaging behavior. 
Again, questions were randomly ordered and question sets representing each dependent 
variable were randomly order to prevent biases due to ordering effects. All questions 
were asked on a 7-point Likert scale. Finally, the survey contained demographic 
questions pertaining to age, job tenure, work experience, job position (i.e., are they a 
manager or an IT employee), and organizational size. Gender, and whether the employee 
was an IT employee and manager were coded with a dummy variable. Gender was 
represented as 0 for female and 1 for male. IT employees were coded as 1 and non-IT 
employees were coded as 0. Managers were also coded as 1 and non-managers as 0. 
Social learning was measured as a higher order construct (Ronald L. Akers, 
2009). The four dimensions of social learning include: definitions, differential 
association, differential reinforcement, and mimicry. However, based on the interviews, 
we found that reinforcement is highly contextual, while the other three constructs are 
more stable over time and across contexts. Thus, we proposed a revised higher order 
construct which consists of definitions, differential association, and mimicry. Differential 
reinforcement is viewed as an external, contextual factor that influences the social 
learning process. Figure 7 presents the revised higher order construct and the relationship 
between reinforcement and social learning. The definitions dimension was measured 
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reflectively with three items. The differential association and mimicry dimensions were 
measured as reflective-formative constructs. Differential association and mimicry were 
measured by two dimensions each: family and friends for social learning in childhood 
and adolescence, and managers and coworkers for social learning in the workplace. The 
differential reinforcement dimension was measured with four formative measures 
representing positive social reinforcement, positive administrative reinforcement, 
negative social reinforcement, and negative administrative reinforcement.  
Learning fit was also measured on a 7-point Likert scale. However, it was then 
converted to a 4 point scale. The center of the original 7-point scale represented the point 
at which individuals and the organization shared common beliefs about the importance of 
information security as depicted in Appendix C. Thus, we needed to make 4 represent the 
highest score, demonstrating the highest fit. To remedy this, we first calculated the 
absolute value of the distance of the original score from 4. For example, a score of 7 
would be a distance of 3 from 4. Second, the absolute distance was subtracted from 4. So, 
a score of 7 was represented by a 1 (4-3 = 1), showing low fit. A score of 1 on the 
original scale was also represented by a 1, showing low fit. The score of 4 represented 
good fit between the organization and individual. The constructs are presented in Table 7. 
 
Table 7. List of Key Constructs with Acronyms 
Construct 
Social learning (adolescence & childhood) (SLEA) 
 Definitions of compliance (DFCA) 
 Differential association (DAEA) 
  Family (DAPA) 
  Friends (DAFA) 
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 Imitation (IMEA) 
  Family (IMPA) 
  Friends (IMFA) 
Differential reinforcement (adolescence & childhood) (DREA) 
Social learning (previous organization) (SLPO) 
 Definitions of compliance (DFCP) 
 Differential association (DAPO) 
  Manager (DAMP) 
  Coworker (DACP) 
 Imitation (IMPO) 
  Manager (IMMP) 
  Coworker (IMCP) 
Differential reinforcement (previous organization) (DREP) 
Social learning (current organization) (SLCO) 
 Definitions of compliance (DFCC) 
 Differential association (DACO) 
  Manager (DAMC) 
  Coworker (DACC) 
 Imitation (IMCO) 
  Manager (IMMC) 
  Coworker (IMCC) 
Differential reinforcement (current organization) (DREC) 
Learning fit (LFIT) 
Response efficacy (REFF) 
Self-efficacy (SEFF) 
Certainty of sanctions (CERT) 
Severity of sanctions (SEVR) 
Security training (TRAN) 
 
Participants 
The US sample consisted primarily of individuals between the ages of 25-44. 
Most had earned a Bachelor’s degree or higher. Nearly an equal number of men and 
women responded to the survey. Most of the respondents had a household income less 
than $70,000. Most of the respondents held a job that was not part of the IT function and 
most employees were not in management. Most of the respondents worked for 
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organizations with 1-500 employees, although organizations of all sizes were included in 
the sample. Most employees had worked for their organization for 1-6 years and had 
varying levels of work experience. Overall, the sample was diverse. Table 8 presents the 
demographic details of the US sample. 
 
Table 8. Demographic Factors for US Sample 
Demographic Item Level Number Percent 
Age 18-24 34 14 
25-34 101 41 
35-44 61 25 
45-54 27 11 
55-64 22 9 
65+ 1 0 
Education Less than high school 0 0 
High school or equivalent 9 4 
Some college 48 19 
Two-year degree 29 12 
Bachelor’s degree 112 45 
Master’s degree 40 16 
Doctorate degree 9 4 
Gender Male 114 46 
Female 133 54 
Income Less than $30,000 34 14 
$30,000-$39,000 43 17 
$40,000-$49,000 27 11 
$50,000-$59,000 34 14 
$60,000-$69,000 22 9 
$70,000-$79,000 24 10 
$80,000-$89,000 12 5 
$90,000-$99,000 19 8 
$100,000+ 31 13 
IT Staff Yes 55 22 
No 192 78 
Manager Yes 63 26 
No 184 74 
Organizational size 1-99 84 34 
100-499 59 24 
500-999 28 11 
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1000-4999 32 13 
5000+ 44 18 
Tenure (current organization) Less than 1 year 49 20 
1-3 years 93 38 
4-6 years 48 20 
7-9 years 26 11 
10+ years 29 12 
Work experience Less than 1 year 1 0 
1-5 years 36 15 
6-10 years 64 26 
11-15 years 45 18 
16-20 33 13 
21+ 66 27 
 
Similar to the US sample, the India sample consisted primarily of individuals 
between the ages of 25-44. Like the US sample, most had earned a Bachelor’s Degree or 
higher. Unlike the US sample, the India sample had far more male respondents than 
female respondents; 71 percent were male. Most of the respondents had a household 
income less than $60,000. A little more than half of the respondents held a job in IT and a 
little more than half of the employees were not in management. Like the US sample, most 
of the respondents worked for organizations with 1-500 employees, although 
organizations of all sizes were included in the sample. Most employees had worked for 
their organization for 1-6 years and had 1-15 years of total work experience. Overall, the 
sample was diverse. Other than the level of male and female respondents, both samples 
were reasonably similar. Table 9 presents the demographic details of the India sample. 
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Table 9. Demographic Factors for India Sample 
Demographic Item Level Number Percent 
Age 18-24 12 7 
25-34 112 64 
35-44 42 24 
45-54 8 5 
55-64 0 0 
65+ 0 0 
Education Less than high school 0 0 
High school or equivalent 0 0 
Some college 5 3 
Two-year degree 6 3 
Bachelor’s degree 95 55 
Master’s degree 66 38 
Doctorate degree 2 1 
Gender Male 125 71 
Female 50 29 
Income Less than $30,000 41 23 
$30,000-$39,000 24 14 
$40,000-$49,000 20 11 
$50,000-$59,000 13 7 
$60,000-$69,000 10 6 
$70,000-$79,000 7 4 
$80,000-$89,000 8 5 
$90,000-$99,000 11 6 
$100,000+ 41 23 
IT Staff Yes 102 58 
No 73 42 
Manager Yes 74 42 
No 101 58 
Organizational size 1-99 44 25 
100-499 51 29 
500-999 33 19 
1000-4999 23 13 
5000+ 24 14 
Tenure (current organization) Less than 1 year 8 5 
1-3 years 82 47 
4-6 years 52 30 
7-9 years 19 11 
10+ years 14 8 
Work experience Less than 1 year 0 0 
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1-5 years 50 29 
6-10 years 71 41 
11-15 years 36 21 
16-20 11 6 
21+ 7 4 
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CHAPTER VIII 
RESULTS OF THE QUANTIATIVE STUDY 
 
Partial least squares structural equation modeling (PLS-SEM) was used to analyze 
the data. SmartPLS (version 2.0M3) (Ringle, Wende, & Will, 2005) was used to assess 
the measurement and structural model. Because we had four dependent variables, we ran 
four models, each with one of the four dependent variables. A MANOVA was not 
employed because mediation and other complex path relationships were explored which 
are not supported by a MANOVA analysis. Four separate models were also run because 
information security research focuses primarily on single dependent variables. We also 
ran separate models for the US and India samples to compare path coefficients, statistical 
significance, and R2 values (Hovav & D'Arcy, 2012). To ensure that differences between 
the US and India models are caused by differences in nationality and not by other factors, 
measurement invariance can be assessed. At its core, measurement invariance seeks to 
identify whether the measurement models of different groups are similar. To assess this, 
we compared factor loadings across the US and India models. The factor loadings were 
similar across the US and India samples, providing evidence that the US and India 
models are measuring the same constructs and are comparable. In total, eight models 
were analyzed. 
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Two Stage Analysis Approach 
Because the differential association and mimicry dimensions of social learning are 
reflective-formative measurement, a two-stage analysis method was employed (Becker, 
Klein, & Wetzels, 2012; Wetzels, Odekerken-Schöder, & Oppen, 2009). The two-stage 
method is necessary because the formative relationship between the lower and higher 
order construct fully explains the variance in the higher order construct. Thus, other paths 
leading to the higher order construct will have coefficients of 0.0 because all of the 
variance in the higher order construct is explained by the lower order constructs. To 
remedy this, a model is constructed in the first stage of the process with the higher and 
lower order constructs and all of the associated items. The items are repeated from lower 
order constructs to the higher order constructs (Becker et al., 2012; Wetzels et al., 2009). 
Figure 9 presents a reflective formative model as it would be used in the first stage of 
analysis. Note that the measures for the lower order constructs are combined and repeated 
as measures for the higher order construct. 
After running the first model, the latent variable scores are extracted for each 
lower order dimension (i.e., definitions, differential association, and mimicry) of the 
higher order construct (i.e., social learning). The latent variable scores are then included 
in the dataset and used as items to represent the higher order construct in a second model 
(Becker et al., 2012). Thus, definitions, differential association, and mimicry are not used 
as constructs in the second stage model. Their latent variable scores, however, are used as 
items of social learning. Figure 10 presents the second stage model after calculating the 
latent variables scores for the lower order constructs following the example in Figure 9. 
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In the second stage, the second model consists of solely first order constructs. The higher 
order constructs are represented by the latent variable scores of the lower order constructs 
calculated in the first model, and each other construct is represented by its original items 
(Becker et al., 2012). 
 
Higher-order 
construct
Lower-order 
construct A
Lower-order 
construct B
Item a1
Item a2
Item a3
Item b1
Item b2
Item b3
Item a1
Item a2
Item a3
Item b1
Item b2
Item b3
 
Figure 9. First Stage Model of the Reflective Formative Construct 
  
Higher-order 
construct
Latent variable score 
for lower-order 
construct A
Latent variable score 
for lower-order 
construct B
 
Figure 10. Second Stage Model of the Reflective Formative Construct 
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Assessing the Psychometric Properties of the Higher Order Constructs 
The two-stage analysis approach reduces the lower order constructs of a higher 
order construct to single indicators using latent variables scores as indicators. In doing so, 
information about the lower order constructs of the higher order construct is lost. 
However, some of this information is available in the model in the first stage of the two-
stage analysis approach.  
We examined eight separate models. To ensure consistency between all of the 
models, we examined the measurement properties for each model. By analyzing the 
psychometric properties of the first stage model, we found that some of the items of the 
first-order constructs of the higher order constructs did not perform equally well across 
the US and India samples. To maintain consistency, we dropped items from the models 
that did not perform well across both samples and across all eight models. Performance 
issues were caused by low loadings (less than 0.7) and high cross loadings (less than 0.1 
difference between loadings and cross loadings). Issues arose for at least one of the six 
items on at least one of the first order differential association constructs. These first order 
constructs include differential association (parents), differential association (friends), 
differential association (co-workers from previous job), differential association 
(managers from previous job), differential association (co-workers from current job), and 
differential association (managers from previous job). In reflective-formative 
measurement, it is advised to maintain the same number of items for each first order 
construct that forms the second order construct (W. W. Chin, Marcolin, & Newsted, 
2003). For example, if a measure was dropped from differential association (parents), a 
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measure was also dropped from the associated differential association (friends) construct. 
After making these adjustments, each of the first-order constructs for all of the second-
order differential association construct were represented with two items.  
One of the measures for the certainty of sanctions construct was also removed due 
to low loadings in the India sample. All other constructs are represented with at least 
three items. The remaining items for the first-order constructs loaded highly (above 0.70), 
exhibited strong reliability (above 0.80), and demonstrated average variance extracted 
(AVE) values above 0.5. These values suggest that the first-order constructs of the higher 
order constructs demonstrate satisfactory psychometric properties. 
Because the two dimensions of differential association and mimicry were reduced 
to latent variable scores, the validity of the formative measurement was assessed through 
the first stage model as well. To assess the validity of the formative measures, we 
assessed whether the weights leading from the lower order constructs to the higher order 
constructs were statistically significant (Becker et al., 2012). In all cases, the weights 
were statistically significant (p < 0.01). This provides evidence of validity for the 
reflective-formative measurement. The remainder of the measurement is examined in the 
sections that follow. 
Assessing the Psychometric Properties of the Formative Constructs 
Each model contained three constructs representing differential reinforcement 
during the respondents’ childhood/adolescence, previous job, and current job. The three 
differential reinforcement constructs were measured formatively. The validity of 
formative measurement is assessed differently than for reflective measurement. To assess 
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formative measurement, the statistical significance of the weights of each formative 
measure are examined and the variance inflation factor (VIF) of each measure is 
examined to determine whether each measure contributes uniquely to the variance in the 
construct (W W Chin, 1998). VIF values should be below 3.3 for all items (Petter et al., 
2007). VIF was calculated in SAS (version 9.4) with PROC REG. Ideally, t-values 
should be above 1.96. However, items with insignificant t-values may be retained to 
maintain the content validity of the construct (Diamantopoulos & Winklhofer, 2001; 
Jarvis, MacKenzie, & Podsakoff, 2003). For the US sample, VIF was below the cutoff 
value, suggesting that multicollinearity was not an issue. Some t-values were below the 
cutoff. However, we retained the items to maintain the theoretical meaning of the 
construct. The items capture non-social punishment and reward for rule following and 
rule breaking behavior, and social shame and praise for rule following and rule breaking 
behavior. Removing any of these items would eliminate conceptual information about 
reinforcement. Thus, the items were retained in the analysis. Table 10 presents the t-
values and VIF values for the US sample. 
 
Table 10. t-values and VIFs for Formative Constructs for US sample 
Construct Item t-value VIF 
Differential reinforcement 
(childhood/adolescence) 
DREA1 1.9080 1.6122 
DREA2 2.0355 1.5368 
DREA3 0.0391 1.6394 
DREA4 5.6550 1.6219 
Differential reinforcement 
(previous job) 
DREP1 1.2523 1.8260 
DREP2 3.1269 2.5659 
DREP3 1.1098 1.9690 
DREP4 1.9182 2.5556 
Differential reinforcement DREC1 2.1091 1.3566 
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(current job) DREC2 1.8197 1.8969 
DREC3 1.4104 1.3767 
DREC4 3.4208 1.8815 
 
For the India sample, VIF was also below the cutoff value, suggesting that 
multicollinearity was not an issue. Again, some t-values were below the cutoff. However, 
we retained the items to maintain the theoretical meaning of the construct. Table 11 
presents the t-values and VIF values for the India sample. 
 
Table 11. t-values and VIFs for Formative Constructs for IN sample 
Construct Item t-value VIF 
Differential reinforcement 
(childhood/adolescence) 
DREA1 1.8726 1.5029 
DREA2 5.6350 1.4498 
DREA3 0.1482 1.4973 
DREA4 3.2389 1.4326 
Differential reinforcement 
(previous job) 
DREP1 1.5728 1.3193 
DREP2 7.2666 1.7824 
DREP3 0.2387 1.2949 
DREP4 2.0491 1.8175 
Differential reinforcement 
(current job) 
DREC1 3.0047 1.2907 
DREC2 3.7628 1.5389 
DREC3 0.6405 1.3024 
DREC4 4.4678 1.5267 
 
A post-hoc analysis shows that removing the formative items whose weights were 
not statistically significant has no major effect on the relationships between differential 
reinforcement and social learning. Both the path and t-values were nearly identical after 
removing the insignificant items. Thus, to maintain the theoretical meaning of the 
differential reinforcement construct, they remained in the analysis. 
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Models 1 and 2: Security Assurance Behavior in the US and India 
Models 1 and 2 represent security assurance behavior in the US and India, 
respectively. The measurement model and structural model are examined below. 
Measurement Model 
In the models, the quality of the reflective scales was assessed by examining 
reliability, convergent validity, and discriminant validity. The US sample exhibited high 
composite reliabilities for all reflective scales. Composite reliabilities should exceed 0.70 
(Fornell & Larcker, 1981). The composite reliabilities for the US model exceeded 0.90 as 
depicted in Table 12, suggesting that the measures are reliable. 
 
Table 12. Model 1: AVE and Composite Reliability for US Sample 
  AVE Composite Reliability 
LFIT 0.8380 0.9539 
PINT 0.7867 0.9171 
REFF 0.7951 0.9208 
SEFF 0.8165 0.9302 
SLCO 0.8249 0.9339 
SLEA 0.7738 0.9112 
SLPO 0.8828 0.9576 
TRAN 0.9050 0.9662 
 
The India sample also exhibited high composite reliabilities for all reflective 
scales. All composite reliability scores exceeded 0.85 as depicted in Table 13. Although 
composite reliabilities were slightly lower for the India sample, they still exceeded the 
recommended cutoff of 0.70, suggesting reliable measures. 
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Table 13. Model 2: AVE and Composite Reliability for India Sample 
  AVE Composite Reliability 
LFIT 0.8320 0.9519 
PINT 0.7441 0.8971 
REFF 0.6587 0.8519 
SEFF 0.6755 0.8617 
SLCO 0.8795 0.9563 
SLEA 0.8377 0.9393 
SLPO 0.8679 0.9517 
TRAN 0.8504 0.9446 
 
Convergent validity was assessed by ensuring that all factor loadings exceeded 
0.70 and that the average variance extracted (AVE) exceeded 0.5 (Fornell & Larcker, 
1981; Gefen & Straub, 2005). The US sample exhibited high factor loadings as depicted 
in Table 14. AVE was also above 0.5 for all constructs as depicted in Table 12. The 
values suggest that the US sample exhibits convergent validity. 
 
Table 14. Model 1: Loadings and Cross Loadings for US Sample 
      LFIT PINT REFF SEFF SLCO SLEA SLPO TRAN 
LFIT
1 0.9301 0.0172 0.1780 0.2182 0.2249 0.0953 0.1065 0.0747 
LFIT
2 0.9267 0.0551 0.1221 0.2129 0.2021 0.0847 0.0965 0.0462 
LFIT
3 0.8899 -0.0187 0.0846 0.1247 0.1153 0.0520 0.0290 0.0431 
LFIT
4 0.9145 0.0246 0.1161 0.1830 0.1140 0.0626 0.0648 0.0401 
PINT
1 0.0389 0.8864 0.1108 0.1696 0.1784 0.1682 0.0481 0.2076 
PINT
2 -0.0082 0.8680 0.1594 0.2288 0.2032 0.1721 0.1550 0.2451 
PINT
3 0.0446 0.9060 0.1415 0.1716 0.1923 0.1367 0.0678 0.2234 
REFF
1 0.1353 0.1152 0.8900 0.6108 0.5374 0.2638 0.3716 0.3337 
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REFF
2 0.0982 0.1444 0.9212 0.5458 0.6089 0.3710 0.3413 0.3739 
REFF
3 0.1565 0.1569 0.8629 0.5910 0.5915 0.3129 0.3611 0.3884 
SEFF
1 0.1977 0.2180 0.6279 0.9384 0.5547 0.4032 0.4110 0.2797 
SEFF
2 0.1712 0.1964 0.5558 0.8656 0.4391 0.2813 0.3625 0.2672 
SEFF
3 0.2014 0.1748 0.5801 0.9053 0.5288 0.3736 0.4296 0.2842 
SLC
O1 0.1699 0.2126 0.6686 0.5532 0.8782 0.4004 0.3942 0.4392 
SLC
O2 0.1732 0.2071 0.5681 0.5146 0.9487 0.4716 0.4435 0.4298 
SLC
O3 0.1892 0.1683 0.5294 0.4656 0.8964 0.4494 0.4544 0.3996 
SLE
A1 0.0973 0.2132 0.3624 0.3164 0.4605 0.8566 0.3262 0.2125 
SLE
A2 0.1048 0.0971 0.3065 0.3950 0.4391 0.8978 0.3307 0.1716 
SLE
A3 0.0214 0.1643 0.2694 0.3291 0.3756 0.8841 0.3782 0.1855 
SLPO
1 0.1177 0.1524 0.4220 0.4280 0.4573 0.3800 0.9341 0.1723 
SLPO
2 0.0623 0.0710 0.3645 0.4415 0.4875 0.3897 0.9515 0.1674 
SLPO
3 0.0725 0.0752 0.3385 0.3781 0.3775 0.3277 0.9331 0.1390 
TRA
N1 0.0704 0.2240 0.4156 0.3041 0.4631 0.2146 0.1857 0.9491 
TRA
N2 0.0610 0.2520 0.3796 0.2667 0.4450 0.2247 0.1438 0.9483 
TRA
N3 0.0357 0.2556 0.3759 0.3039 0.4221 0.1757 0.1576 0.9565 
 
Though slightly different from the US sample, the India sample also exhibited 
high factor loadings as depicted in Table 15. AVE was also above 0.5 for all constructs as 
depicted in Table 13. The values suggest that the India sample also exhibits convergent 
validity. 
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Table 15. Model 2: Loadings and Cross Loadings for India Sample 
      LFIT PINT REFF SEFF SLCO SLEA SLPO TRAN 
LFIT
1 0.9206 -0.2381 -0.4241 -0.4039 -0.4272 -0.3794 -0.3321 -0.3561 
LFIT
2 0.9342 -0.2630 -0.4240 -0.3834 -0.4479 -0.3936 -0.3164 -0.3833 
LFIT
3 0.8961 -0.2341 -0.4353 -0.3752 -0.4234 -0.3659 -0.3061 -0.3918 
LFIT
4 0.8970 -0.2090 -0.4108 -0.3561 -0.3901 -0.3549 -0.2845 -0.3846 
PINT
1 -0.1505 0.8622 0.2947 0.2870 0.3446 0.2639 0.4333 0.2534 
PINT
2 -0.3108 0.8581 0.4074 0.3644 0.4204 0.4002 0.4242 0.3236 
PINT
3 -0.1881 0.8674 0.2803 0.3192 0.3570 0.3533 0.4181 0.2974 
REFF
1 -0.2325 0.2342 0.7139 0.4933 0.4221 0.2949 0.3920 0.4941 
REFF
2 -0.4300 0.3676 0.8542 0.6599 0.6047 0.4695 0.5343 0.5546 
REFF
3 -0.4312 0.3241 0.8585 0.7173 0.6708 0.4763 0.5867 0.5677 
SEFF
1 -0.3508 0.3684 0.6380 0.8392 0.6497 0.5064 0.5636 0.5317 
SEFF
2 -0.4211 0.3247 0.7319 0.8591 0.6984 0.4924 0.5943 0.5374 
SEFF
3 -0.2276 0.2221 0.5322 0.7643 0.4989 0.3343 0.4041 0.4658 
SLC
O1 -0.4350 0.4235 0.7226 0.7622 0.9184 0.5443 0.6993 0.6435 
SLC
O2 -0.4307 0.3878 0.6337 0.6964 0.9458 0.5610 0.7567 0.6662 
SLC
O3 -0.4382 0.4196 0.6437 0.6749 0.9490 0.6026 0.7419 0.6414 
SLE
A1 -0.3765 0.3329 0.4480 0.4810 0.4753 0.8896 0.4546 0.3514 
SLE
A2 -0.3620 0.3557 0.4952 0.5131 0.5955 0.9359 0.5785 0.3546 
SLE
A3 -0.3893 0.4025 0.4866 0.5168 0.5817 0.9197 0.5922 0.3877 
SLPO
1 -0.2724 0.4790 0.5958 0.5848 0.6848 0.5340 0.9046 0.6222 
   
147 
 
SLPO
2 -0.3352 0.4345 0.6124 0.6315 0.7460 0.5717 0.9454 0.6214 
SLPO
3 -0.3402 0.4665 0.5601 0.5847 0.7496 0.5645 0.9443 0.6314 
TRA
N1 -0.3441 0.2981 0.5968 0.5370 0.6101 0.3759 0.6100 0.9324 
TRA
N2 -0.3898 0.3252 0.6268 0.6115 0.6677 0.3829 0.6279 0.9231 
TRA
N3 -0.4123 0.3189 0.6101 0.5758 0.6383 0.3435 0.6163 0.9109 
 
Discriminant validity was assessed by ensuring that the square root of AVE for 
each construct was greater than the corresponding latent variable correlations for 
construct (W W Chin, 1998), and that factor loadings were greater than cross loadings by 
at least 0.1 (W W Chin, 2010; D'Arcy, Herath, & Shoss, 2014). For the US sample, the 
square root of AVE for each construct was greater than the corresponding latent variable 
correlations. Table 16 presents latent variable correlations for the US sample with the 
square root of AVE along the diagonal. As depicted in Table 14, the factor loadings for 
each item exceeded cross loadings by at least 0.1 in every instance. These tests suggest 
that the US sample exhibits discriminant validity. 
 
Table 16. Model 1: Latent Variable Correlations for US Sample 
     LFIT PINT REFF SEFF SLCO SLEA SLPO TRAN 
LFIT 0.9154        
PINT 0.0259 0.8870       
REFF 0.1454 0.1567 0.8917      
SEFF 0.2111 0.2174 0.6519 0.9036     
SLCO 0.1951 0.2169 0.6515 0.5651 0.9082    
SLEA 0.0857 0.1803 0.3568 0.3944 0.4844 0.8797   
SLPO 0.0898 0.1067 0.4008 0.4450 0.4734 0.3918 0.9396  
TRAN 0.0591 0.2559 0.4110 0.3065 0.4668 0.2162 0.1711 0.9513 
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For the India sample, the square root of AVE for each construct was also greater 
than the corresponding latent variable correlations. Table 17 presents latent variable 
correlations for the India sample with the square root of AVE along the diagonal. As 
depicted in Table 15, the factor loadings for each item exceeded cross loadings by at least 
0.1 in every instance. These tests suggest that the India sample exhibits discriminant 
validity. 
 
Table 17. Model 2: Latent Variable Correlations for India Sample 
     LFIT PINT REFF SEFF SLCO SLEA SLPO TRAN 
LFIT 0.9121        
PINT -0.2596 0.8626       
REFF -0.4644 0.3869 0.8116      
SEFF -0.4166 0.3790 0.7802 0.8219     
SLCO -0.4637 0.4379 0.7122 0.7596 0.9378    
SLEA -0.4099 0.3991 0.5221 0.5511 0.6069 0.9153   
SLPO -0.3401 0.4930 0.6322 0.6445 0.7809 0.5979 0.9316  
TRAN -0.4151 0.3411 0.6634 0.6246 0.6937 0.3986 0.6706 0.9222 
 
Structural Model 
The structural model was assessed in SmartPLS using the second stage model 
which included the latent variable scores of the lower order constructs as items for the 
higher order constructs (Becker et al., 2012). Figure 11 presents the results of the models 
1 and 2. Scores for the US sample are above or to the left of the scores for the India 
sample. Only the relationships that differ in models 3-8 from models 1 and 2 are 
presented in the figures for models 3-8, because the relationships that are consistent 
between the models have the same scores as presented in models 1 and 2. 
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SLEA
SLPO
0.3062/0.4615
SLCO
0.5204/0.7201
LFIT
0.2393***
0.1516*
0.3110***
0.4421***
0.1687*
0.3225*
SIZE
 0.1057**
-0.1120*
PINT
0.2528/0.2089
SEFF
0.3192/0.5768
REFF
0.4241/0.5071
0.5649***
0.7595***
0.6513***
0.7121***
0.1690*
0.0273ns
-0.0772ns
0.1417ns
-0.0519ns
-0.0090ns
TRAN
0.3167***
0.2533**
0.2885***
0.4118***
US value
India value
* = p < 0.05
** = p < 0.01
*** p < 0.001  
Figure 11. Results of Models 1 and 2 
 
The data suggests that perceptions of social learning that favor compliant 
behavior encountered during childhood and adolescence increases perceptions of social 
learning that favor compliant behavior encountered during tenure at one’s previous job (β 
= 0.3110; p-value < 0.001). Similarly, perceptions of social learning that favor compliant 
behavior encountered during childhood and adolescence increases perceptions of social 
learning that favor compliant behavior encountered during tenure at one’s current job (β 
= 0.2393; p-value < 0.001). The data provides support for hypotheses 1a and 1b. The data 
also suggests that perceptions of social learning that favor compliant behavior 
encountered during tenure at one’s previous job increases perceptions of social learning 
that favor compliant behavior encountered during tenure at one’s current job (β = 0.2885; 
p-value < 0.001). The data provides support for hypothesis 2. 
The data provides evidence that perceptions of learning fit increase perceptions of 
social learning that favor compliant behavior encountered during tenure at one’s current 
job (β = 0.1057; p-value < 0.01). The data provides support for hypothesis 3. 
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The data suggests that differential reinforcement increases perceptions of social 
learning in favor of compliance. The data provides evidence that perceptions of 
differential reinforcement from childhood and adolescence increase perceptions of social 
learning that favor compliant behavior encountered during childhood and adolescence (β 
= 0.4394; p-value < 0.001). The data also provides evidence that perceptions of 
differential reinforcement from one’s previous job increase perceptions of social learning 
that favor compliant behavior encountered during tenure at one’s previous job (β = 
0.3990; p-value < 0.001). Similarly, the data provides evidence that perceptions of 
differential reinforcement from one’s current job increase perceptions of social learning 
that favor compliant behavior encountered during tenure at one’s current job (β = 0.2479; 
p-value < 0.001). The data provides support for hypotheses h4a, h4b, and h4c. 
The data provide evidence that perceptions of social learning that favor compliant 
behavior encountered during tenure at one’s current job increase intentions to engage in 
proactive security behavior (β = 0.1687; p-value < 0.05). The data provides support for 
hypothesis 5. 
Statistical evidence does not exist to suggest that organizational size influences 
social learning at one’s current organization (β = -0.0519; p-value > 0.05). The data do 
not provide support for hypothesis 6. However, the data provide evidence that security 
training increases perceptions of social learning that favor compliant behavior 
encountered during tenure at one’s current job (β = 0.3167; p-value < 0.001). Thus, the 
data provide support for hypothesis 7. 
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The data also provide evidence that perceptions of social learning that favor 
compliant behavior encountered during tenure at one’s current job increase self-efficacy 
to comply with ISP (β = 0.5649; p-value < 0.001). Similarly, the data provide evidence 
that perceptions of social learning that favor compliant behavior encountered during 
tenure at one’s current job increase response efficacy perceptions (β = 0.6513; p-value < 
0.001). The data provides support for hypotheses 8 and 9. Finally, the data provide 
evidence that self-efficacy to comply with ISP increases intentions to engage in proactive 
security behavior (β = 0.1690; p-value < 0.05). Statistical evidence does not exist to 
suggest that response efficacy increases intentions to engage in proactive security 
behavior (β = -0.0772; p-value > 0.05). Thus, the data provide support for hypothesis 10, 
but not for hypothesis 11. Table 18 presents each hypothesis with its coefficient, t-value, 
p-value, and whether the hypothesis was supported by the data. 
 
Table 18. Model 1: Statistical Support for Hypotheses for US Sample 
Relationship Coefficient t-value p-value Supported 
h1a: SLEA → SLPO 0.3110 5.4063 p < 0.001 Yes 
h1b: SLEA → SLCO 0.2393 4.3356 p < 0.001 Yes 
h2: SLPO → SLCO 0.2885 4.6171 p < 0.001 Yes 
h3: LFIT → SLCO 0.1057 2.5985 p < 0.01 Yes 
h4a: DREA → SLEA 0.4394 8.6530 p < 0.001 Yes 
h4b: DREP  → SLPO 0.3990 7.8661 p < 0.001 Yes 
h4c: DREC → SLCO 0.2479 4.3431 p < 0.001 Yes 
h5: SLCO → PINT 0.1687 1.9813 p < 0.05 Yes 
h6: SIZE → SLCO -0.0519 0.8238 p > 0.05 No 
h7: TRAN → SLCO 0.3167 4.5550 p < 0.001 Yes 
h8: SLCO → SEFF 0.5649 9.3063 p < 0.001 Yes 
h9: SLCO → REFF 0.6513 13.8742 p < 0.001 Yes 
h10: SEFF → PINT 0.1690 2.2115 p < 0.05 Yes 
h11: REFF → PINT -0.0772 0.9561 p > 0.05 No 
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The Sobel mediation test (Sobel, 1982) was conducted to assess whether self-
efficacy is a mediating variable. The Sobel test provides evidence that self-efficacy is a 
mediating variable (test statistic = 2.1521, p-value < 0.05). Because response efficacy 
was not significantly related to intentions to engage in proactive security behavior, the 
Sobel test was not used for response efficacy. Significance between the mediating 
variable and the dependent variable is a requirement for mediation (MacKinnon, 
Lockwood, & Hoffman, 2002). 
Age, education, gender, income, job position, organizational size, tenure, work 
experience were used as control variables. The data provide evidence that education 
decreases intentions to engage in proactive security behavior (β = -0.1131; p-value < 
0.05). Educated individuals may feel that they possess sufficient knowledge and do not 
need further information about security, which may explain the decrease in proactive 
behaviors that often require extra research. This finding should be explored further in 
future research. The data also provide evidence that being an IT employee increases 
intentions to engage in proactive security behavior (β = 0.3568; p-value < 0.001). All 
other control variables were statistically insignificant. Table 19 presents the coefficient, t-
value, p-value, and whether the relationship was supported for each control variable. 
 
Table 19. Model 1: Statistical Support for Control Variables for US Sample 
Control Variable Coefficient t-value p-value Supported 
Age -0.0882 1.1484 p > 0.05 No 
Education -0.1131 2.1399 p < 0.05 Yes 
Gender 0.0726 1.2390 p > 0.05 No 
Income -0.0596 1.0298 p > 0.05 No 
IT employee 0.3568 6.7493 p < 0.001 Yes 
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Manager 0.0332 0.4824 p > 0.05 No 
Organizational size -0.0519 0.8936 p > 0.05 No 
Tenure 0.0518 0.7408 p > 0.05 No 
Work experience 0.1288 1.7144 p > 0.05 No 
 
The model explained 25.28 percent of the variance in intentions to engage in 
proactive security behavior, 42.41 percent of the variance in response efficacy, 31.92 
percent of the variance in self-efficacy, 52.04 percent of the variance in social learning 
(current organization), 30.62 percent of the variance in social learning (previous 
organization), and 19.30 percent of the variance in social learning (adolescence and 
childhood). Table 20 presents the R2 values for each endogenous construct. 
 
Table 20. Model 1: R2 Values for Endogenous Constructs for US Sample 
Construct R2 Value 
PINT 0.2528 
REFF 0.4241 
SEFF 0.3192 
SLCO 0.5204 
SLEA 0.1930 
SLPO 0.3062 
 
For the India sample, the data suggest that perceptions of social learning that 
favor compliant behavior encountered during childhood and adolescence increases 
perceptions of social learning that favor compliant behavior encountered during tenure at 
one’s previous job (β = 0.4421; p-value < 0.001). Similarly, perceptions of social learning 
that favor compliant behavior encountered during childhood and adolescence increases 
perceptions of social learning that favor compliant behavior encountered during tenure at 
one’s current job (β = 0.1516; p-value < 0.05). The data provides support for hypotheses 
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1a and 1b. The data also suggests that perceptions of social learning that favor compliant 
behavior encountered during tenure at one’s previous job increases perceptions of social 
learning that favor compliant behavior encountered during tenure at one’s current job (β 
= 0.4118; p-value < 0.001). The data provides support for hypothesis 2. 
The data provides evidence that perceptions of learning fit decrease perceptions of 
social learning that favor compliant behavior encountered during tenure at one’s current 
job (β = -0.1120; p-value < 0.05). The data provides support for hypothesis 3. 
The data suggests that differential reinforcement increases perceptions of social 
learning in favor of compliance. The data provides evidence that perceptions of 
differential reinforcement from childhood and adolescence increase perceptions of social 
learning that favor compliant behavior encountered during childhood and adolescence (β 
= 0.6143; p-value < 0.001). The data also provides evidence that perceptions of 
differential reinforcement from one’s previous job increase perceptions of social learning 
that favor compliant behavior encountered during tenure at one’s previous job (β = 
0.3593; p-value < 0.001). Similarly, the data provides evidence that perceptions of 
differential reinforcement from one’s current job increase perceptions of social learning 
that favor compliant behavior encountered during tenure at one’s current job (β = 0.1449; 
p-value < 0.01). The data provides support for hypotheses h4a, h4b, and h4c. 
The data provide evidence that perceptions of social learning that favor compliant 
behavior encountered during tenure at one’s current job increase intentions to engage in 
proactive security behavior (β = 0.3225; p-value < 0.05). The data provides support for 
hypothesis 5. 
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Statistical evidence does not exist to suggest that organizational size influences 
social learning at one’s current organization (β = -0.0090; p-value > 0.05). The data do 
not provide support for hypothesis 6. However, the data provide evidence that security 
training increases perceptions of social learning that favor compliant behavior 
encountered during tenure at one’s current job (β = 0.2533; p-value < 0.01). Thus, the 
data provide support for hypothesis 7. 
The data also provide evidence that perceptions of social learning that favor 
compliant behavior encountered during tenure at one’s current job increase self-efficacy 
to comply with ISP (β = 0.7595; p-value < 0.001). Similarly, the data provide evidence 
that perceptions of social learning that favor compliant behavior encountered during 
tenure at one’s current job increase response efficacy perceptions (β = 0.7121; p-value < 
0.001). The data provides support for hypotheses 8 and 9. Finally, the data do not provide 
evidence that self-efficacy to comply with ISP increases intentions to engage in proactive 
security behavior (β = 0.0273; p-value > 0.05). Statistical evidence does not exist to 
suggest that response efficacy increases intentions to engage in proactive security 
behavior (β = 0.1417; p-value > 0.05). Thus, the data do not provide support for 
hypotheses 10 and 11. Table 21 presents each hypothesis with its coefficient, t-value, p-
value, and whether the hypothesis was supported by the data. 
 
Table 21. Model 2: Statistical Support for Hypotheses for India Sample 
Relationship Coefficient t-value p-value Supported 
h1a: SLEA → SLPO 0.4421 6.3016 p < 0.001 Yes 
h1b: SLEA → SLCO 0.1516 2.3218 p < 0.05 Yes 
h2: SLPO → SLCO 0.4118 4.0214 p < 0.001 Yes 
h3: LFIT → SLCO -0.1120 2.2132 p < 0.05 Yes 
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h4a: DREA → SLEA 0.6143 12.6724 p < 0.001 Yes 
h4b: DREP  → SLPO 0.3593 5.7639 p < 0.001 Yes 
h4c: DREC → SLCO 0.1449 3.0660 p < 0.01 Yes 
h5: SLCO → PINT 0.3225 2.2694 p < 0.05 Yes 
h6: SIZE → SLCO -0.0090 0.2573 p > 0.05 No 
h7: TRAN → SLCO 0.2533 3.0199 p < 0.01 Yes 
h8: SLCO → SEFF 0.7595 19.2013 p < 0.001 Yes 
h9: SLCO → REFF 0.7121 16.8485 p < 0.001 Yes 
h10: SEFF → PINT 0.0273 0.2137 p > 0.05 No 
h11: REFF → PINT 0.1417 1.1013 p > 0.05 No 
 
The Sobel mediation test (Sobel, 1982) was not conducted on the India sample 
because the paths leading from self-efficacy and response efficacy to intentions to engage 
in proactive security behavior were statistically insignificant. Thus, they are not 
mediators (MacKinnon et al., 2002). 
Age, education, gender, income, job position, organizational size, tenure, work 
experience were used as control variables. All control variables were statistically 
insignificant in the India sample. Table 22 presents the coefficient, t-value, p-value, and 
whether the relationship was supported for each control variable. 
 
Table 22. Model 2: Statistical Support for Control Variables for India Sample 
Control Variable Coefficient t-value p-value Supported 
Age 0.0369 0.3580 p > 0.05 No 
Education 0.0266 0.3030 p > 0.05 No 
Gender 0.0030 0.0395 p > 0.05 No 
Income -0.0529 0.6916 p > 0.05 No 
IT employee -0.0260 0.3275 p > 0.05 No 
Manager 0.0293 0.3565 p > 0.05 No 
Organizational size -0.0004 0.0053 p > 0.05 No 
Tenure 0.0386 0.3434 p > 0.05 No 
Work experience -0.0869 0.6381 p > 0.05 No 
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The model explained 20.89 percent of the variance in intentions to engage in 
proactive security behavior, 50.71 percent of the variance in response efficacy, 57.68 
percent of the variance in self-efficacy, 72.01 percent of the variance in social learning 
(current organization), 37.74 percent of the variance in social learning (previous 
organization), and 46.15 percent of the variance in social learning (adolescence and 
childhood). Table 23 presents the R2 values for each endogenous construct. 
 
Table 23. Model 2: R2 Values for Endogenous Constructs for India Sample 
Construct R2 Value 
PINT 0.2089 
REFF 0.5071 
SEFF 0.5768 
SLCO 0.7201 
SLEA 0.3774 
SLPO 0.4615 
 
Comparing the US and India samples shows that the India sample exhibited 
higher coefficients for several relationships. The higher differences were most prominent 
in the relationships between social learning (childhood and adolescence) and social 
learning (previous organization), between social learning (previous organization) and 
social learning (current organization), between differential reinforcement and social 
learning (childhood and adolescence), between social learning (current organization) and 
intentions to engage in proactive security behavior, between social learning (current 
organization) and self-efficacy, and between response efficacy and intentions to engage 
in proactive security behavior. The US sample exhibited higher coefficients in the 
relationships between learning fit and social learning (current organization), between 
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differential association and social learning (current organization), and between self-
efficacy and intentions to engage in proactive security behavior. The samples also 
differed in the statistical significance of the path leading from self-efficacy to intentions 
to engage in proactive security behavior. The US sample exhibited a statistically 
significant path, but the path in the India sample was statistically insignificant. Table 24 
presents the primary differences between the US and India samples. 
 
Table 24. Comparison of Path Coefficients for US and India Samples 
Relationship Coefficient (US – India) Supported (US/India) 
h1a: SLEA → SLPO -0.1311 Yes/Yes 
h1b: SLEA → SLCO 0.0877 Yes/Yes 
h2: SLPO → SLCO -0.1233 Yes/Yes 
h3: LFIT → SLCO 0.2177 Yes/Yes 
h4a: DREA → SLEA -0.1749 Yes/Yes 
h4b: DREP  → SLPO 0.0397 Yes/Yes 
h4c: DREC → SLCO 0.1030 Yes/Yes 
h5: SLCO → PINT -0.1538 Yes/Yes 
h6: SIZE → SLCO -0.0429 No/No 
h7: TRAN → SLCO 0.0634 Yes/Yes 
h8: SLCO → SEFF -0.1946 Yes/Yes 
h9: SLCO → REFF -0.0608 Yes/Yes 
h10: SEFF → PINT 0.1417 Yes/No 
h11: REFF → PINT -0.2189 No/No 
 
The India sample also exhibited higher R2 values for more endogenous constructs 
than the US sample. The most substantial differences were in the R2 values for: self-
efficacy, social learning (childhood and adolescence), social learning (previous 
organization), and social learning (previous organization). Table 25 presents differences 
between R2 values for the US and India samples. 
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Table 25. Comparison of R2 Values for US and India Samples 
Construct R2 Values (US – India) 
PINT 0.0439 
REFF -0.0830 
SEFF -0.2576 
SLCO -0.1997 
SLEA -0.1844 
SLPO -0.1553 
 
Models 3 and 4: Security Compliant Behavior in the US and India 
Models 3 and 4 represent security compliant behavior in the US and India, 
respectively. The measurement model and structural model are examined below. 
Measurement Model 
In the models, the quality of the reflective scales was assessed by examining 
reliability, convergent validity, and discriminant validity. The US sample exhibited high 
composite reliabilities for all reflective scales. Composite reliabilities should exceed 0.70 
(Fornell & Larcker, 1981). The composite reliabilities for the US model exceeded 0.90 as 
depicted in Table 26, suggesting that the measures are reliable. 
 
Table 26. Model 3: AVE and Composite Reliability for US Sample 
  AVE Composite Reliability 
CINT 0.8263 0.9345 
LFIT 0.8380 0.9539 
REFF 0.7951 0.9208 
SEFF 0.8162 0.9301 
SLCO 0.8247 0.9338 
SLEA 0.7738 0.9112 
SLPO 0.8828 0.9576 
TRAN 0.9050 0.9662 
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The India sample also exhibited high composite reliabilities for all reflective 
scales. All composite reliability scores exceeded 0.85 as depicted in Table 27. Although 
composite reliabilities were slightly lower for the India sample, they still exceeded the 
recommended cutoff of 0.70, suggesting reliable measures. 
 
Table 27. Model 4: AVE and Composite Reliability for India Sample 
  AVE Composite Reliability 
CINT 0.8088 0.9269 
LFIT 0.8320 0.9519 
REFF 0.6599 0.8528 
SEFF 0.6763 0.8622 
SLCO 0.8795 0.9563 
SLEA 0.8377 0.9393 
SLPO 0.8679 0.9517 
TRAN 0.8504 0.9446 
 
The US sample exhibited high factor loadings as depicted in Table 28. AVE was 
also above 0.5 for all constructs as depicted in Table 26. The values suggest that the US 
sample exhibits convergent validity. 
 
Table 28. Model 3: Loadings and Cross Loadings for US Sample 
      CINT LFIT REFF SEFF SLCO SLEA SLPO TRAN 
CINT
1 0.9211 0.1599 0.3720 0.4187 0.4859 0.3295 0.2487 0.3034 
CINT
2 0.8816 0.1511 0.3121 0.4143 0.4135 0.2709 0.2263 0.2118 
CINT
3 0.9237 0.2133 0.3722 0.4128 0.4476 0.2782 0.2757 0.2495 
LFIT
1 0.1726 0.9301 0.1781 0.2183 0.2248 0.0953 0.1065 0.0747 
LFIT
2 0.1798 0.9268 0.1222 0.2127 0.2021 0.0847 0.0965 0.0462 
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LFIT
3 0.1758 0.8899 0.0848 0.1253 0.1151 0.0520 0.0291 0.0431 
LFIT
4 0.1801 0.9144 0.1164 0.1839 0.1139 0.0627 0.0648 0.0401 
REFF
1 0.3189 0.1353 0.8902 0.6102 0.5382 0.2638 0.3716 0.3337 
REFF
2 0.3499 0.0982 0.9204 0.5458 0.6098 0.3710 0.3413 0.3739 
REFF
3 0.3666 0.1565 0.8635 0.5911 0.5924 0.3129 0.3611 0.3884 
SEFF
1 0.4393 0.1977 0.6282 0.9379 0.5554 0.4033 0.4110 0.2797 
SEFF
2 0.3415 0.1713 0.5561 0.8611 0.4393 0.2813 0.3625 0.2672 
SEFF
3 0.4459 0.2014 0.5804 0.9095 0.5295 0.3736 0.4296 0.2842 
SLC
O1 0.5200 0.1699 0.6685 0.5543 0.8807 0.4005 0.3942 0.4392 
SLC
O2 0.4387 0.1732 0.5681 0.5151 0.9480 0.4717 0.4435 0.4298 
SLC
O3 0.3785 0.1893 0.5293 0.4659 0.8943 0.4494 0.4544 0.3996 
SLE
A1 0.2749 0.0973 0.3622 0.3173 0.4608 0.8567 0.3262 0.2125 
SLE
A2 0.2998 0.1048 0.3063 0.3958 0.4388 0.8978 0.3308 0.1716 
SLE
A3 0.2776 0.0214 0.2692 0.3294 0.3748 0.8840 0.3782 0.1855 
SLPO
1 0.2974 0.1177 0.4221 0.4286 0.4575 0.3800 0.9341 0.1723 
SLPO
2 0.2672 0.0623 0.3647 0.4422 0.4871 0.3897 0.9514 0.1674 
SLPO
3 0.2029 0.0725 0.3386 0.3786 0.3768 0.3277 0.9330 0.1390 
TRA
N1 0.2825 0.0704 0.4156 0.3044 0.4634 0.2146 0.1857 0.9491 
TRA
N2 0.2733 0.0610 0.3796 0.2665 0.4454 0.2247 0.1438 0.9483 
TRA
N3 0.2472 0.0357 0.3760 0.3040 0.4222 0.1757 0.1576 0.9565 
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Though slightly different from the US sample, the India sample also exhibited 
high factor loadings as depicted in Table 29. AVE was also above 0.5 for all constructs as 
depicted in Table 27. The values suggest that the India sample also exhibits convergent 
validity. 
 
Table 29. Model 4: Loadings and Cross Loadings for India Sample 
      CINT LFIT REFF SEFF SLCO SLEA SLPO TRAN 
CINT
1 0.9000 -0.3128 0.5020 0.4473 0.4579 0.4128 0.3710 0.3992 
CINT
2 0.9246 -0.2993 0.5588 0.4950 0.4844 0.4506 0.4118 0.4896 
CINT
3 0.8726 -0.2778 0.4102 0.4492 0.4606 0.4023 0.3909 0.3817 
LFIT
1 -0.3152 0.9206 -0.4207 -0.4016 -0.4272 -0.3794 -0.3321 -0.3561 
LFIT
2 -0.3212 0.9341 -0.4210 -0.3813 -0.4478 -0.3936 -0.3164 -0.3833 
LFIT
3 -0.3180 0.8961 -0.4344 -0.3731 -0.4233 -0.3659 -0.3061 -0.3918 
LFIT
4 -0.2449 0.8971 -0.4077 -0.3546 -0.3902 -0.3549 -0.2845 -0.3846 
REFF
1 0.3927 -0.2325 0.7274 0.4935 0.4220 0.2949 0.3920 0.4941 
REFF
2 0.5429 -0.4300 0.8593 0.6578 0.6046 0.4695 0.5343 0.5546 
REFF
3 0.3946 -0.4312 0.8439 0.7157 0.6707 0.4763 0.5867 0.5677 
SEFF
1 0.4603 -0.3508 0.6370 0.8356 0.6496 0.5064 0.5636 0.5317 
SEFF
2 0.4311 -0.4211 0.7267 0.8556 0.6983 0.4924 0.5943 0.5374 
SEFF
3 0.3775 -0.2276 0.5307 0.7739 0.4987 0.3343 0.4041 0.4658 
SLC
O1 0.4848 -0.4350 0.7190 0.7614 0.9180 0.5443 0.6993 0.6435 
SLC
O2 0.4719 -0.4307 0.6295 0.6939 0.9460 0.5610 0.7567 0.6662 
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SLC
O3 0.5059 -0.4382 0.6401 0.6725 0.9492 0.6026 0.7419 0.6414 
SLE
A1 0.4425 -0.3765 0.4457 0.4806 0.4752 0.8896 0.4546 0.3514 
SLE
A2 0.4064 -0.3620 0.4924 0.5104 0.5956 0.9359 0.5785 0.3546 
SLE
A3 0.4466 -0.3893 0.4850 0.5145 0.5818 0.9197 0.5922 0.3877 
SLPO
1 0.3936 -0.2724 0.5934 0.5838 0.6847 0.5340 0.9045 0.6222 
SLPO
2 0.4096 -0.3352 0.6094 0.6290 0.7461 0.5717 0.9454 0.6214 
SLPO
3 0.4126 -0.3402 0.5573 0.5823 0.7497 0.5645 0.9443 0.6314 
TRA
N1 0.4367 -0.3441 0.5970 0.5371 0.6101 0.3759 0.6100 0.9324 
TRA
N2 0.4175 -0.3898 0.6241 0.6101 0.6677 0.3829 0.6279 0.9231 
TRA
N3 0.4575 -0.4123 0.6130 0.5762 0.6382 0.3435 0.6163 0.9109 
 
For the US sample, the square root of AVE for each construct was greater than the 
corresponding latent variable correlations. Table 30 presents latent variable correlations 
for the US sample with the square root of AVE along the diagonal. As depicted in Table 
28, the factor loadings for each item exceeded cross loadings by at least 0.1 in every 
instance. These tests suggest that the US sample exhibits discriminant validity. 
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Table 30. Model 3: Latent Variable Correlations for US Sample 
     CINT LFIT REFF SEFF SLCO SLEA SLPO TRAN 
CINT 0.9090        
LFIT 0.1922 0.9154       
REFF 0.3882 0.1455 0.8917      
SEFF 0.4567 0.2113 0.6520 0.9034     
SLCO 0.4950 0.1951 0.6525 0.5664 0.9081    
SLEA 0.3231 0.0857 0.3566 0.3952 0.4842 0.8797   
SLPO 0.2755 0.0898 0.4010 0.4457 0.4731 0.3918 0.9396  
TRAN 0.2819 0.0591 0.4111 0.3066 0.4671 0.2162 0.1711 0.9513 
 
For the India sample, the square root of AVE for each construct was also greater 
than the corresponding latent variable correlations. Table 31 presents latent variable 
correlations for the India sample with the square root of AVE along the diagonal. As 
depicted in Table 29, the factor loadings for each item exceeded cross loadings by at least 
0.1 in every instance. These tests suggest that the India sample exhibits discriminant 
validity. 
 
Table 31. Model 4: Latent Variable Correlations for India Sample 
     CINT LFIT REFF SEFF SLCO SLEA SLPO TRAN 
CINT 0.8993        
LFIT -0.3301 0.9121       
REFF 0.5495 -0.4615 0.8123      
SEFF 0.5166 -0.4144 0.7753 0.8224     
SLCO 0.5201 -0.4637 0.7080 0.7574 0.9378    
SLEA 0.4701 -0.4099 0.5196 0.5490 0.6069 0.9153   
SLPO 0.4351 -0.3401 0.6293 0.6424 0.7810 0.5979 0.9316  
TRAN 0.4739 -0.4151 0.6635 0.6242 0.6937 0.3986 0.6706 0.9222 
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Structural Model 
The structural model was assessed in SmartPLS using the second stage model 
which included the latent variable scores of the lower order constructs as items for the 
higher order constructs (Becker et al., 2012). Figure 12 presents the results of models 3 
and 4, excluding the relationships that were identical in models 1 and 2. The identical 
relationships result in the same scores. 
 
SLCO
0.3631***
0.3225*
CINT
0.3329/0.3916
SEFF
0.3206/0.5735
REFF
0.4254/0.5011
0.5662***
0.7573***
0.6522***
0.7080***
0.2856**
0.0964ns
-0.0755ns
0.2302ns
US value
India value
* = p < 0.05
** = p < 0.01
*** p < 0.001
 
Figure 12. Results of Models 3 and 4 
 
The data suggests that perceptions of social learning that favor compliant 
behavior encountered during childhood and adolescence increases perceptions of social 
learning that favor compliant behavior encountered during tenure at one’s previous job (β 
= 0.3110; p-value < 0.001). Similarly, perceptions of social learning that favor compliant 
behavior encountered during childhood and adolescence increases perceptions of social 
learning that favor compliant behavior encountered during tenure at one’s current job (β 
= 0.2390; p-value < 0.001). The data provides support for hypotheses 1a and 1b. The data 
also suggests that perceptions of social learning that favor compliant behavior 
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encountered during tenure at one’s previous job increases perceptions of social learning 
that favor compliant behavior encountered during tenure at one’s current job (β = 0.2882; 
p-value < 0.001). The data provides support for hypothesis 2. 
The data provides evidence that perceptions of learning fit increase perceptions of 
social learning that favor compliant behavior encountered during tenure at one’s current 
job (β = 0.1057; p-value < 0.05). The data provides support for hypothesis 3. 
The data suggests that differential reinforcement increases perceptions of social 
learning in favor of compliance. The data provides evidence that perceptions of 
differential reinforcement from childhood and adolescence increase perceptions of social 
learning that favor compliant behavior encountered during childhood and adolescence (β 
= 0.4394; p-value < 0.001). The data also provides evidence that perceptions of 
differential reinforcement from one’s previous job increase perceptions of social learning 
that favor compliant behavior encountered during tenure at one’s previous job (β = 
0.3990; p-value < 0.001). Similarly, the data provides evidence that perceptions of 
differential reinforcement from one’s current job increase perceptions of social learning 
that favor compliant behavior encountered during tenure at one’s current job (β = 0.2478; 
p-value < 0.001). The data provides support for hypotheses h4a, h4b, and h4c. 
The data provide evidence that perceptions of social learning that favor compliant 
behavior encountered during tenure at one’s current job increase intentions to engage in 
security compliant behavior (β = 0.3631; p-value < 0.001). The data provides support for 
hypothesis 5. 
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Statistical evidence does not exist to suggest that organizational size influences 
social learning at one’s current organization (β = -0.0751; p-value > 0.05). The data do 
not provide support for hypothesis 6. However, the data provide evidence that security 
training increases perceptions of social learning that favor compliant behavior 
encountered during tenure at one’s current job (β = 0.3173; p-value < 0.001). Thus, the 
data provide support for hypothesis 7. 
The data also provide evidence that perceptions of social learning that favor 
compliant behavior encountered during tenure at one’s current job increase self-efficacy 
to comply with ISP (β = 0.5662; p-value < 0.001). Similarly, the data provide evidence 
that perceptions of social learning that favor compliant behavior encountered during 
tenure at one’s current job increase response efficacy perceptions (β = 0.6522; p-value < 
0.001). The data provides support for hypotheses 8 and 9. Finally, the data provide 
evidence that self-efficacy to comply with ISP increases intentions to engage in security 
compliant behavior (β = 0.2856; p-value < 0.01). Statistical evidence does not exist to 
suggest that response efficacy increases intentions to engage in security compliant 
behavior (β = -0.0755; p-value > 0.05). Thus, the data provide support for hypothesis 10, 
but not for hypothesis 11. Table 32 presents each hypothesis with its coefficient, t-value, 
p-value, and whether the hypothesis was supported by the data. 
 
Table 32. Model 3: Statistical Support for Hypotheses for US Sample 
Relationship Coefficient t-value p-value Supported 
h1a: SLEA → SLPO 0.3110 5.7391 p < 0.001 Yes 
h1b: SLEA → SLCO 0.2390 3.8713 p < 0.001 Yes 
h2: SLPO → SLCO 0.2882 4.6384 p < 0.001 Yes 
h3: LFIT → SLCO 0.1057 2.0772 p < 0.05 Yes 
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h4a: DREA → SLEA 0.4394 7.5845 p < 0.001 Yes 
h4b: DREP  → SLPO 0.3990 7.0485 p < 0.001 Yes 
h4c: DREC → SLCO 0.2478 4.0487 p < 0.001 Yes 
h5: SLCO → CINT 0.3631 4.2522 p < 0.001 Yes 
h6: SIZE → SLCO -0.0751 0.7114 p > 0.05 No 
h7: TRAN → SLCO 0.3173 4.8601 p < 0.001 Yes 
h8: SLCO → SEFF 0.5662 9.0881 p < 0.001 Yes 
h9: SLCO → REFF 0.6522 13.0911 p < 0.001 Yes 
h10: SEFF → CINT 0.2856 2.6412 p < 0.01 Yes 
h11: REFF → CINT -0.0755 0.6219 p > 0.05 No 
 
The Sobel mediation test (Sobel, 1982) was conducted to assess whether self-
efficacy is a mediating variable. The Sobel test provides evidence that self-efficacy is a 
mediating variable (test statistic = 2.5348, p-value < 0.05). Because response efficacy 
was not significantly related to intentions to engage in proactive security behavior, the 
Sobel test was not used for response efficacy. Significance between the mediating 
variable and the dependent variable is a requirement for mediation (MacKinnon et al., 
2002). 
Age, education, gender, income, job position, organizational size, tenure, work 
experience were used as control variables. The data provide evidence that work 
experience increases intentions to engage in proactive security behavior (β = 0.2142; p-
value < 0.01). All other control variables were statistically insignificant. Table 33 
presents the coefficient, t-value, p-value, and whether the relationship was supported for 
each control variable. 
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Table 33. Model 3: Statistical Support for Control Variables for US Sample 
Control Variable Coefficient t-value p-value Supported 
Age -0.0533 0.6726 p > 0.05 No 
Education -0.0020 0.0316 p > 0.05 No 
Gender -0.0368 0.6433 p > 0.05 No 
Income -0.0486 0.8281 p > 0.05 No 
IT employee 0.0093 0.1578 p > 0.05 No 
Manager -0.0925 1.3533 p > 0.05 No 
Organizational size -0.0751 1.2565 p > 0.05 No 
Tenure 0.0254 0.4002 p > 0.05 No 
Work experience 0.2142 2.6184 p < 0.01 Yes 
 
The model explained 33.29 percent of the variance in intentions to engage in 
security compliant behavior, 42.54 percent of the variance in response efficacy, 32.06 
percent of the variance in self-efficacy, 52.03 percent of the variance in social learning 
(current organization), 30.62 percent of the variance in social learning (previous 
organization), and 19.31 percent of the variance in social learning (adolescence and 
childhood). Table 34 presents the R2 values for each endogenous construct. 
 
Table 34. Model 3: R2 Values for Endogenous Constructs for US Sample 
Construct R2 Value 
CINT 0.3329 
REFF 0.4254 
SEFF 0.3206 
SLCO 0.5203 
SLEA 0.1931 
SLPO 0.3062 
 
For the India sample, the data suggest that perceptions of social learning that 
favor compliant behavior encountered during childhood and adolescence increases 
perceptions of social learning that favor compliant behavior encountered during tenure at 
   
170 
 
one’s previous job (β = 0.4421; p-value < 0.001). Similarly, perceptions of social learning 
that favor compliant behavior encountered during childhood and adolescence increases 
perceptions of social learning that favor compliant behavior encountered during tenure at 
one’s current job (β = 0.1516; p-value < 0.05). The data provides support for hypotheses 
1a and 1b. The data also suggests that perceptions of social learning that favor compliant 
behavior encountered during tenure at one’s previous job increases perceptions of social 
learning that favor compliant behavior encountered during tenure at one’s current job (β 
= 0.4118; p-value < 0.001). The data provides support for hypothesis 2. 
The data provides evidence that perceptions of learning fit decrease perceptions of 
social learning that favor compliant behavior encountered during tenure at one’s current 
job (β = -0.1120; p-value < 0.05). The data provides support for hypothesis 3. 
The data suggests that differential reinforcement increases perceptions of social 
learning in favor of compliance. The data provides evidence that perceptions of 
differential reinforcement from childhood and adolescence increase perceptions of social 
learning that favor compliant behavior encountered during childhood and adolescence (β 
= 0.6143; p-value < 0.001). The data also provides evidence that perceptions of 
differential reinforcement from one’s previous job increase perceptions of social learning 
that favor compliant behavior encountered during tenure at one’s previous job (β = 
0.3593; p-value < 0.001). Similarly, the data provides evidence that perceptions of 
differential reinforcement from one’s current job increase perceptions of social learning 
that favor compliant behavior encountered during tenure at one’s current job (β = 0.1449; 
p-value < 0.01). The data provides support for hypotheses h4a, h4b, and h4c. 
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The data provide evidence that perceptions of social learning that favor compliant 
behavior encountered during tenure at one’s current job increase intentions to engage in 
security compliant behavior (β = 0.3225; p-value < 0.05). The data provides support for 
hypothesis 5. 
Statistical evidence does not exist to suggest that organizational size influences 
social learning at one’s current organization (β = -0.0090; p-value > 0.05). The data do 
not provide support for hypothesis 6. However, the data provide evidence that security 
training increases perceptions of social learning that favor compliant behavior 
encountered during tenure at one’s current job (β = 0.2533; p-value < 0.01). Thus, the 
data provide support for hypothesis 7. 
The data also provide evidence that perceptions of social learning that favor 
compliant behavior encountered during tenure at one’s current job increase self-efficacy 
to comply with ISP (β = 0.7595; p-value < 0.001). Similarly, the data provide evidence 
that perceptions of social learning that favor compliant behavior encountered during 
tenure at one’s current job increase response efficacy perceptions (β = 0.7121; p-value < 
0.001). The data provides support for hypotheses 8 and 9. Finally, the data provide 
evidence that self-efficacy to comply with ISP increases intentions to engage in security 
compliant behavior (β = 0.0273; p-value > 0.05). Statistical evidence does not exist to 
suggest that response efficacy increases intentions to engage in security compliant 
behavior (β = 0.1417; p-value > 0.05). Thus, the data do not provide support for 
hypotheses 10 and 11. Table 35 presents each hypothesis with its coefficient, t-value, p-
value, and whether the hypothesis was supported by the data. 
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Table 35. Model 4: Statistical Support for Hypotheses for India Sample 
Relationship Coefficient t-value p-value Supported 
h1a: SLEA → SLPO 0.4421 6.5756 p < 0.001  Yes 
h1b: SLEA → SLCO 0.1517 2.3415 p < 0.05 Yes 
h2: SLPO → SLCO 0.4118 4.1536 p < 0.001 Yes 
h3: LFIT → SLCO -0.1119 2.2860 p < 0.05 Yes 
h4a: DREA → SLEA 0.6143 13.2120 p < 0.001 Yes 
h4b: DREP  → SLPO 0.3593 5.5215 p < 0.001 Yes 
h4c: DREC → SLCO 0.1450 2.9604 p < 0.01 Yes 
h5: SLCO → CINT 0.2945 2.4825 p < 0.05 Yes 
h6: SIZE → SLCO -0.0091 0.2610 p > 0.05 No 
h7: TRAN → SLCO 0.2532 3.0286 p < 0.01 Yes 
h8: SLCO → SEFF 0.7573 18.0734 p < 0.001 Yes 
h9: SLCO → REFF 0.7080 16.4388 p < 0.001 Yes 
h10: SEFF → CINT 0.0964 0.5890 p > 0.05 No 
h11: REFF → CINT 0.2302 1.7772 p > 0.05 No 
 
The Sobel mediation test (Sobel, 1982) was not conducted on the India sample 
because the paths leading from self-efficacy and response efficacy to intentions to engage 
in proactive security behavior were statistically insignificant. Thus, they are not 
mediators (MacKinnon et al., 2002). 
Age, education, gender, income, job position, organizational size, tenure, work 
experience were used as control variables. The data provide evidence that education 
decreases intentions to engage in security compliant behavior (β = -0.1446; p-value < 
0.05). The data also provide evidence that being an IT employee decreases intentions to 
engage in security compliant behavior (β = -0.1684; p-value < 0.05). All other control 
variables were statistically insignificant in the India sample. Table 36 presents the 
coefficient, t-value, p-value, and whether the relationship was supported for each control 
variable. 
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Table 36. Model 4: Statistical Support for Control Variables for India Sample 
Control Variable Coefficient t-value p-value Supported 
Age 0.0018 0.0229 p > 0.05 No 
Education -0.1446 2.5048 p < 0.05 Yes 
Gender 0.0243 0.3632 p > 0.05 No 
Income -0.0030 0.0433 p > 0.05 No 
IT employee -0.1684 2.5314 p < 0.05 Yes 
Manager 0.0908 1.3273 p > 0.05 No 
Organizational size 0.0800 1.0967 p > 0.05 No 
Tenure -0.0265 0.3550 p > 0.05 No 
Work experience 0.0269 0.2791 p > 0.05 No 
 
The model explained 39.16 percent of the variance in intentions to engage in 
security compliant behavior, 50.11 percent of the variance in response efficacy, 57.35 
percent of the variance in self-efficacy, 72.02 percent of the variance in social learning 
(current organization), 37.74 percent of the variance in social learning (previous 
organization), and 46.15 percent of the variance in social learning (adolescence and 
childhood). Table 37 presents the R2 values for each endogenous construct. 
 
Table 37. Model 4: R2 Values for Endogenous Constructs for India Sample 
Construct R2 Value 
CINT 0.3916 
REFF 0.5011 
SEFF 0.5735 
SLCO 0.7202 
SLEA 0.3774 
SLPO 0.4615 
 
Comparing the US and India samples shows that the India sample exhibited 
higher coefficients for several relationships. The higher differences were most prominent 
in the relationships between social learning (childhood and adolescence) and social 
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learning (previous organization), between social learning (previous organization) and 
social learning (current organization), between differential reinforcement and social 
learning (childhood and adolescence), between social learning (current organization) and 
self-efficacy, and between response efficacy and intentions to engage in security 
compliant behavior. The US sample exhibited higher coefficients in the relationships 
between learning fit and social learning (current organization), between differential 
association and social learning (current organization), and between self-efficacy and 
intentions to engage in security compliant behavior. The samples also differed in the 
statistical significance of the path leading from self-efficacy to intentions to engage in 
security compliant behavior. The US sample exhibited a statistically significant path, but 
the path in the India sample was statistically insignificant. Table 38 presents the primary 
differences between the US and India samples. 
 
Table 38. Comparison of Path Coefficients for US and India Samples 
Relationship Coefficient (US – India) Supported (US/India) 
h1a: SLEA → SLPO -0.1311 Yes/Yes 
h1b: SLEA → SLCO 0.0873 Yes/Yes 
h2: SLPO → SLCO -0.1236 Yes/Yes 
h3: LFIT → SLCO 0.2176 Yes/Yes 
h4a: DREA → SLEA -0.1749 Yes/Yes 
h4b: DREP  → SLPO 0.0397 Yes/Yes 
h4c: DREC → SLCO 0.1028 Yes/Yes 
h5: SLCO → CINT 0.0686 Yes/Yes 
h6: SIZE → SLCO -0.0660 No/No 
h7: TRAN → SLCO 0.0641 Yes/Yes 
h8: SLCO → SEFF -0.1911 Yes/Yes 
h9: SLCO → REFF -0.0558 Yes/Yes 
h10: SEFF → CINT 0.1892 Yes/No 
h11: REFF → CINT -0.3057 No/No 
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The India sample also exhibited higher R2 values for all of the endogenous 
constructs. The most substantial differences were in the R2 values for: self-efficacy, 
social learning (childhood and adolescence), social learning (previous organization), and 
social learning (previous organization). Table 39 presents differences between R2 values 
for the US and India samples. 
 
Table 39. Comparison of R2 Values for US and India Samples 
Construct R2 Values (US – India) 
CINT -0.0587 
REFF -0.0757 
SEFF -0.2529 
SLCO -0.1999 
SLEA -0.1843 
SLPO -0.1553 
 
Models 5 and 6: Security Risk-taking Behavior in the US and India 
Models 5 and 6 represent security risk-taking behavior in the US and India, 
respectively. The measurement model and structural model are examined below. 
Measurement Model  
The US sample exhibited high composite reliabilities for all reflective scales. 
Composite reliabilities should exceed 0.70. The composite reliabilities for the US model 
exceeded 0.90 as depicted in Table 40, suggesting that the measures are reliable. 
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Table 40. Model 5: AVE and Composite Reliability for US Sample 
  AVE Composite Reliability 
LFIT 0.8381 0.9539 
SLCO 0.8254 0.9341 
SLEA 0.7738 0.9112 
SLPO 0.8828 0.9576 
SRBI 0.9362 0.9778 
TRAN 0.9050 0.9662 
 
The India sample also exhibited high composite reliabilities for all reflective 
scales. All composite reliability scores exceeded 0.90 as depicted in Table 41. The 
composite reliability scores exceeded the recommended cutoff of 0.70, suggesting 
reliable measures. 
 
Table 41. Model 6: AVE and Composite Reliability for India Sample 
  AVE Composite Reliability 
LFIT 0.8320 0.9519 
SLCO 0.8797 0.9564 
SLEA 0.8377 0.9393 
SLPO 0.8679 0.9517 
SRBI 0.9314 0.9760 
TRAN 0.8504 0.9446 
 
The US sample exhibited high factor loadings as depicted in Table 42. AVE was 
also above 0.5 for all constructs as depicted in Table 40. The values suggest that the US 
sample exhibits convergent validity. 
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Table 42. Model 5: Loadings and Cross Loadings for US Sample 
      LFIT SLCO SLEA SLPO SRBI TRAN 
LFIT1 0.9301 0.2252 0.0952 0.1064 -0.1378 0.0747 
LFIT2 0.9266 0.2019 0.0847 0.0964 -0.1803 0.0462 
LFIT3 0.8901 0.1158 0.0519 0.0290 -0.1633 0.0431 
LFIT4 0.9145 0.1140 0.0626 0.0647 -0.1229 0.0401 
SLCO1 0.1698 0.8686 0.4002 0.3941 -0.2775 0.4392 
SLCO2 0.1731 0.9512 0.4715 0.4435 -0.2285 0.4298 
SLCO3 0.1892 0.9039 0.4495 0.4544 -0.2085 0.3996 
SLEA1 0.0973 0.4593 0.8561 0.3261 -0.1530 0.2125 
SLEA2 0.1048 0.4401 0.8979 0.3307 -0.1530 0.1715 
SLEA3 0.0214 0.3782 0.8845 0.3781 -0.1962 0.1855 
SLPO1 0.1176 0.4563 0.3800 0.9339 -0.2181 0.1723 
SLPO2 0.0622 0.4888 0.3898 0.9515 -0.2041 0.1674 
SLPO3 0.0724 0.3800 0.3278 0.9332 -0.1980 0.1390 
SRBI1 -0.1256 -0.2329 -0.1804 -0.1947 0.9593 -0.1332 
SRBI2 -0.1815 -0.2521 -0.1775 -0.2277 0.9686 -0.1417 
SRBI3 -0.1720 -0.2727 -0.1926 -0.2159 0.9748 -0.1689 
TRAN1 0.0705 0.4618 0.2146 0.1857 -0.1525 0.9491 
TRAN2 0.0610 0.4433 0.2246 0.1437 -0.1814 0.9483 
TRAN3 0.0357 0.4214 0.1757 0.1575 -0.1025 0.9565 
 
Though slightly different from the US sample, the India sample also exhibited 
high factor loadings as depicted in Table 43. AVE was also above 0.5 for all constructs as 
depicted in Table 41. The values suggest that the India sample also exhibits convergent 
validity. 
 
Table 43. Model 6: Loadings and Cross Loadings for India Sample 
      LFIT SLCO SLEA SLPO SRBI TRAN 
LFIT1 0.9206 -0.4271 -0.3794 -0.3321 0.1605 -0.3561 
LFIT2 0.9341 -0.4471 -0.3936 -0.3164 0.1211 -0.3832 
LFIT3 0.8961 -0.4228 -0.3659 -0.3062 0.0858 -0.3918 
LFIT4 0.8971 -0.3903 -0.3549 -0.2845 0.1092 -0.3846 
SLCO1 -0.4350 0.9126 0.5443 0.6992 -0.3773 0.6435 
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SLCO2 -0.4307 0.9487 0.5611 0.7567 -0.3852 0.6662 
SLCO3 -0.4382 0.9519 0.6027 0.7419 -0.4123 0.6414 
SLEA1 -0.3765 0.4747 0.8896 0.4546 -0.3075 0.3514 
SLEA2 -0.3620 0.5966 0.9359 0.5785 -0.4022 0.3546 
SLEA3 -0.3893 0.5823 0.9197 0.5922 -0.3301 0.3877 
SLPO1 -0.2724 0.6833 0.5340 0.9044 -0.3445 0.6222 
SLPO2 -0.3352 0.7470 0.5717 0.9455 -0.3514 0.6214 
SLPO3 -0.3401 0.7516 0.5646 0.9444 -0.3010 0.6314 
SRBI1 0.1483 -0.4436 -0.3722 -0.3714 0.9719 -0.3239 
SRBI2 0.1001 -0.3856 -0.3703 -0.3482 0.9618 -0.3115 
SRBI3 0.1275 -0.3737 -0.3607 -0.3068 0.9615 -0.2960 
TRAN1 -0.3441 0.6100 0.3759 0.6100 -0.2759 0.9325 
TRAN2 -0.3898 0.6676 0.3829 0.6278 -0.3367 0.9232 
TRAN3 -0.4123 0.6376 0.3435 0.6163 -0.2764 0.9108 
 
For the US sample, the square root of AVE for each construct was greater than the 
corresponding latent variable correlations. Table 44 presents latent variable correlations 
for the US sample with the square root of AVE along the diagonal. As depicted in Table 
42, the factor loadings for each item exceeded cross loadings by at least 0.1 in every 
instance. These tests suggest that the US sample exhibits discriminant validity. 
 
Table 44. Model 5: Latent Variable Correlations for US Sample 
     LFIT SLCO SLEA SLPO SRBI TRAN 
LFIT 0.9155      
SLCO 0.1952 0.9085     
SLEA 0.0856 0.4853 0.8797    
SLPO 0.0897 0.4743 0.3918 0.9396   
SRBI -0.1662 -0.2620 -0.1899 -0.2204 0.9676  
TRAN 0.0591 0.4655 0.2161 0.1711 -0.1538 0.9513 
 
For the India sample, the square root of AVE for each construct was also greater 
than the corresponding latent variable correlations. Table 45 presents latent variable 
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correlations for the India sample with the square root of AVE along the diagonal. As 
depicted in Table 43, the factor loadings for each item exceeded cross loadings by at least 
0.1 in every instance. These tests suggest that the India sample exhibits discriminant 
validity. 
 
Table 45. Model 6: Latent Variable Correlations for India Sample 
     LFIT SLCO SLEA SLPO SRBI TRAN 
LFIT 0.9121      
SLCO -0.4633 0.9379     
SLEA -0.4099 0.6074 0.9153    
SLPO -0.3402 0.7815 0.5979 0.9316   
SRBI 0.1309 -0.4177 -0.3812 -0.3562 0.9651  
TRAN -0.4151 0.6933 0.3986 0.6706 -0.3224 0.9222 
 
Structural Model 
The structural model was assessed in SmartPLS using the second stage model 
which included the latent variable scores of the lower order constructs as items for the 
higher order constructs (Becker et al., 2012). Figure 13 presents the results of models 5 
and 6, excluding redundant relationships presented in previous figures. 
 
SLCO
-0.2478**
-0.4268***
SRBI
0.1211/0.1948
US value
India value
* = p < 0.05
** = p < 0.01
*** p < 0.001
 
Figure 13. Results of Models 5 and 6 
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The data suggests that perceptions of social learning that favor compliant 
behavior encountered during childhood and adolescence increases perceptions of social 
learning that favor compliant behavior encountered during tenure at one’s previous job (β 
= 0.3110; p-value < 0.001). Similarly, perceptions of social learning that favor compliant 
behavior encountered during childhood and adolescence increases perceptions of social 
learning that favor compliant behavior encountered during tenure at one’s current job (β 
= 0.2404; p-value < 0.001). The data provides support for hypotheses 1a and 1b. The data 
also suggests that perceptions of social learning that favor compliant behavior 
encountered during tenure at one’s previous job increases perceptions of social learning 
that favor compliant behavior encountered during tenure at one’s current job (β = 0.2894; 
p-value < 0.001). The data provides support for hypothesis 2. 
The data provides evidence that perceptions of learning fit increase perceptions of 
social learning that favor compliant behavior encountered during tenure at one’s current 
job (β = 0.1059; p-value < 0.05). The data provides support for hypothesis 3. 
The data suggests that differential reinforcement increases perceptions of social 
learning in favor of compliance. The data provides evidence that perceptions of 
differential reinforcement from childhood and adolescence increase perceptions of social 
learning that favor compliant behavior encountered during childhood and adolescence (β 
= 0.4393; p-value < 0.001). The data also provides evidence that perceptions of 
differential reinforcement from one’s previous job increase perceptions of social learning 
that favor compliant behavior encountered during tenure at one’s previous job (β = 
0.3989; p-value < 0.001). Similarly, the data provides evidence that perceptions of 
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differential reinforcement from one’s current job increase perceptions of social learning 
that favor compliant behavior encountered during tenure at one’s current job (β = 0.2485; 
p-value < 0.001). The data provides support for hypotheses h4a, h4b, and h4c. 
The data provide evidence that perceptions of social learning that favor compliant 
behavior encountered during tenure at one’s current job decreases intentions to engage in 
security risk-taking behavior (β = -0.2478; p-value < 0.01). The data provides support for 
hypothesis 5. 
Statistical evidence does not exist to suggest that organizational size influences 
social learning at one’s current organization (β = -0.0333; p-value > 0.05). The data do 
not provide support for hypothesis 6. However, the data provide evidence that security 
training increases perceptions of social learning that favor compliant behavior 
encountered during tenure at one’s current job (β = 0.3141; p-value < 0.001). Thus, the 
data provide support for hypothesis 7. Table 46 presents each hypothesis with its 
coefficient, t-value, p-value, and whether the hypothesis was supported by the data. 
 
Table 46. Model 5: Statistical Support for Hypotheses for US Sample 
Relationship Coefficient t-value p-value Supported 
h1a: SLEA → SLPO 0.3110 5.3920 p < 0.001 Yes 
h1b: SLEA → SLCO 0.2404 4.2452 p < 0.001 Yes 
h2: SLPO → SLCO 0.2894 4.2566 p < 0.001 Yes 
h3: LFIT → SLCO 0.1059 2.1258 p < 0.05 Yes 
h4a: DREA → SLEA 0.4393 7.1236 p < 0.001 Yes 
h4b: DREP  → SLPO 0.3989 8.1386 p < 0.001 Yes 
h4c: DREC → SLCO 0.2485 4.2160 p < 0.001 Yes 
h5: SLCO → SRBI -0.2478 3.3320 p < 0.01 Yes 
h6: SIZE → SLCO -0.0333 0.7923 p > 0.05 No 
h7: TRAN → SLCO 0.3141 4.3399 p < 0.001 Yes 
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Age, education, gender, income, job position, organizational size, tenure, work 
experience were used as control variables. All control variables were statistically 
insignificant. Table 47 presents the coefficient, t-value, p-value, and whether the 
relationship was supported for each control variable. 
 
Table 47. Model 5: Statistical Support for Control Variables for US Sample 
Control Variable Coefficient t-value p-value Supported 
Age 0.0227 0.2847 p > 0.05 No 
Education -0.0211 0.3339 p > 0.05 No 
Gender -0.1247 1.8888 p > 0.05 No 
Income -0.0362 0.5548 p > 0.05 No 
IT employee -0.1058 1.5680 p > 0.05 No 
Manager -0.0082 0.1230 p > 0.05 No 
Organizational size -0.0034 0.0489 p > 0.05 No 
Scenario 0.0606 0.9761 p > 0.05 No 
Tenure 0.1142 1.5954 p > 0.05 No 
Work experience -0.1503 1.6357 p > 0.05 No 
 
The model explained 12.11 percent of the variance in intentions to engage in 
security risk-taking behavior, 52.06 percent of the variance in social learning (current 
organization), 30.62 percent of the variance in social learning (previous organization), 
and 19.30 percent of the variance in social learning (adolescence and childhood). Table 
48 presents the R2 values for each endogenous construct. 
 
Table 48. Model 5: R2 Values for Endogenous Constructs for US Sample 
Construct R2 Value 
SLCO 0.5206 
SLEA 0.1930 
SLPO 0.3062 
SRBI 0.1211 
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For the India sample, the data suggest that perceptions of social learning that 
favor compliant behavior encountered during childhood and adolescence increases 
perceptions of social learning that favor compliant behavior encountered during tenure at 
one’s previous job (β = 0.4422; p-value < 0.001). Similarly, perceptions of social learning 
that favor compliant behavior encountered during childhood and adolescence increases 
perceptions of social learning that favor compliant behavior encountered during tenure at 
one’s current job (β = 0.1517; p-value < 0.05). The data provides support for hypotheses 
1a and 1b. The data also suggests that perceptions of social learning that favor compliant 
behavior encountered during tenure at one’s previous job increases perceptions of social 
learning that favor compliant behavior encountered during tenure at one’s current job (β 
= 0.4128; p-value < 0.001). The data provides support for hypothesis 2. 
The data provides evidence that perceptions of learning fit decrease perceptions of 
social learning that favor compliant behavior encountered during tenure at one’s current 
job (β = -0.1113; p-value < 0.05). The data provides support for hypothesis 3. 
The data suggests that differential reinforcement increases perceptions of social 
learning in favor of compliance. The data provides evidence that perceptions of 
differential reinforcement from childhood and adolescence increase perceptions of social 
learning that favor compliant behavior encountered during childhood and adolescence (β 
= 0.6143; p-value < 0.001). The data also provides evidence that perceptions of 
differential reinforcement from one’s previous job increase perceptions of social learning 
that favor compliant behavior encountered during tenure at one’s previous job (β = 
0.3593; p-value < 0.001). Similarly, the data provides evidence that perceptions of 
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differential reinforcement from one’s current job increase perceptions of social learning 
that favor compliant behavior encountered during tenure at one’s current job (β = 0.1463; 
p-value < 0.01). The data provides support for hypotheses h4a, h4b, and h4c. 
The data provide evidence that perceptions of social learning that favor compliant 
behavior encountered during tenure at one’s current job decrease intentions to engage in 
security risk-taking behavior (β = -0.4268; p-value < 0.001). The data provides support 
for hypothesis 5. 
Statistical evidence does not exist to suggest that organizational size influences 
social learning at one’s current organization (β = -0.0097; p-value > 0.05). The data do 
not provide support for hypothesis 6. However, the data provide evidence that security 
training increases perceptions of social learning that favor compliant behavior 
encountered during tenure at one’s current job (β = 0.2520; p-value < 0.01). Thus, the 
data provide support for hypothesis 7. Table 49 presents each hypothesis with its 
coefficient, t-value, p-value, and whether the hypothesis was supported by the data. 
 
Table 49. Model 6: Statistical Support for Hypotheses for India Sample 
Relationship Coefficient t-value p-value Supported 
h1a: SLEA → SLPO 0.4422 6.4941 p < 0.001  Yes 
h1b: SLEA → SLCO 0.1517 2.2240 p < 0.05 Yes 
h2: SLPO → SLCO 0.4128 4.5149 p < 0.001 Yes 
h3: LFIT → SLCO -0.1113 2.2442 p < 0.05 Yes 
h4a: DREA → SLEA 0.6143 14.3512 p < 0.001 Yes 
h4b: DREP  → SLPO 0.3593 5.4948 p < 0.001 Yes 
h4c: DREC → SLCO 0.1463 3.2221 p < 0.01 Yes 
h5: SLCO → SRBI -0.4268 6.3334 p < 0.001 Yes 
h6: SIZE → SLCO -0.0097 0.2917 p > 0.05 No 
h7: TRAN → SLCO 0.2520 3.1539 p < 0.01 Yes 
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Age, education, gender, income, job position, organizational size, tenure, work 
experience were used as control variables. All control variables were statistically 
insignificant in the India sample. Table 50 presents the coefficient, t-value, p-value, and 
whether the relationship was supported for each control variable. 
 
Table 50. Model 6: Statistical Support for Control Variables for India Sample 
Control Variable Coefficient t-value p-value Supported 
Age 0.0941 0.8853 p > 0.05 No 
Education -0.0382 0.4719 p > 0.05 No 
Gender -0.0200 0.2998 p > 0.05 No 
Income -0.0397 0.6297 p > 0.05 No 
IT employee 0.0870 1.0799 p > 0.05 No 
Manager -0.0426 0.7200 p > 0.05 No 
Organizational size 0.0170 0.2086 p > 0.05 No 
Scenario -0.0637 0.8892 p > 0.05 No 
Tenure -0.0359 0.3246 p > 0.05 No 
Work experience -0.0147 0.1241 p > 0.05 No 
 
The model explained 19.48 percent of the variance in intentions to engage in 
security risk-taking behavior, 72.09 percent of the variance in social learning (current 
organization), 37.74 percent of the variance in social learning (previous organization), 
and 46.15 percent of the variance in social learning (adolescence and childhood). Table 
51 presents the R2 values for each endogenous construct. 
 
Table 51. Model 6: R2 Values for Endogenous Constructs for India Sample 
Construct R2 Value 
SLCO 0.7209 
SLEA 0.3774 
SLPO 0.4615 
SRBI 0.1948 
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Comparing the US and India samples shows that the India sample exhibited 
higher coefficients for several relationships. The higher differences were most prominent 
in the relationships between social learning (childhood and adolescence) and social 
learning (previous organization), between social learning (previous organization) and 
social learning (current organization), and between differential reinforcement and social 
learning (childhood and adolescence). The US sample exhibited higher coefficients in the 
relationships between learning fit and social learning (current organization), between 
differential association and social learning (current organization), and between social 
learning (current organization) and intentions to engage in security risk-taking behavior. 
The same hypotheses were supported across both samples. Table 52 presents the primary 
differences between the US and India samples. 
 
Table 52. Comparison of Path Coefficients for US and India Samples 
Relationship Coefficient (US – India) Supported (US/India) 
h1a: SLEA → SLPO -0.1312 Yes/Yes 
h1b: SLEA → SLCO 0.0887 Yes/Yes 
h2: SLPO → SLCO -0.1234 Yes/Yes 
h3: LFIT → SLCO 0.2172 Yes/Yes 
h4a: DREA → SLEA -0.1750 Yes/Yes 
h4b: DREP  → SLPO 0.0396 Yes/Yes 
h4c: DREC → SLCO 0.1022 Yes/Yes 
h5: SLCO → SRBI 0.1790 Yes/Yes 
h6: SIZE → SLCO -0.0236 No/No 
h7: TRAN → SLCO 0.0621 Yes/Yes 
 
The India sample also exhibited higher R2 values for all of the endogenous 
constructs. The most substantial differences were in the R2 values for: social learning 
(childhood and adolescence), social learning (previous organization), and social learning 
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(current organization). Table 53 presents differences between R2 values for the US and 
India samples. 
 
Table 53. Comparison of R2 Values for US and India Samples 
Construct R2 Values (US – India) 
SLCO -0.2003 
SLEA -0.1844 
SLPO -0.1553 
SRBI -0.0737 
 
Models 7 and 8: Security Damaging Behavior in the US and India 
Models 7 and 8 represent security damaging behavior in the US and India, 
respectively. The measurement model and structural model are examined below. 
Measurement Model 
The US sample exhibited high composite reliabilities for all reflective scales. 
Composite reliabilities should exceed 0.70. The composite reliabilities for the US model 
exceeded 0.90 as depicted in Table 54, suggesting that the measures are reliable. 
 
Table 54. Model 7: AVE and Composite Reliability for US Sample 
  AVE Composite Reliability 
LFIT 0.8381 0.9539 
SDBI 0.8442 0.9420 
SLCO 0.8254 0.9341 
SLEA 0.7738 0.9112 
SLPO 0.8828 0.9576 
TRAN 0.9050 0.9662 
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The India sample also exhibited high composite reliabilities for all reflective 
scales. All composite reliability scores exceeded 0.90 as depicted in Table 55. The 
composite reliability scores exceeded the recommended cutoff of 0.70, suggesting 
reliable measures. 
 
Table 55. Model 8: AVE and Composite Reliability for India Sample 
  AVE Composite Reliability 
LFIT 0.8320 0.9519 
SDBI 0.9143 0.9697 
SLCO 0.8797 0.9564 
SLEA 0.8377 0.9393 
SLPO 0.8679 0.9517 
TRAN 0.8504 0.9446 
 
The US sample exhibited high factor loadings as depicted in Table 56. AVE was 
also above 0.5 for all constructs as depicted in Table 54. The values suggest that the US 
sample exhibits convergent validity. 
 
Table 56. Model 7: Loadings and Cross Loadings for US Sample 
      LFIT SDBI SLCO SLEA SLPO TRAN 
LFIT1 0.9301 -0.0964 0.2251 0.0953 0.1064 0.0747 
LFIT2 0.9266 -0.0669 0.2019 0.0847 0.0964 0.0462 
LFIT3 0.8900 -0.1075 0.1157 0.0519 0.0290 0.0431 
LFIT4 0.9145 -0.0710 0.1140 0.0626 0.0647 0.0401 
SDBI1 -0.0879 0.8824 -0.2213 -0.2013 -0.1846 -0.0050 
SDBI2 -0.1059 0.9355 -0.2433 -0.1825 -0.2252 -0.0362 
SDBI3 -0.0599 0.9375 -0.2320 -0.1761 -0.1863 -0.0296 
SLCO1 0.1699 -0.2815 0.8695 0.4003 0.3941 0.4392 
SLCO2 0.1731 -0.2252 0.9513 0.4715 0.4435 0.4298 
SLCO3 0.1892 -0.1824 0.9029 0.4495 0.4544 0.3996 
SLEA1 0.0973 -0.2145 0.4595 0.8562 0.3262 0.2125 
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SLEA2 0.1048 -0.1694 0.4400 0.8979 0.3307 0.1715 
SLEA3 0.0214 -0.1491 0.3779 0.8844 0.3781 0.1855 
SLPO1 0.1176 -0.2242 0.4564 0.3800 0.9339 0.1723 
SLPO2 0.0622 -0.1717 0.4887 0.3898 0.9515 0.1674 
SLPO3 0.0724 -0.2198 0.3796 0.3278 0.9332 0.1390 
TRAN1 0.0705 -0.0410 0.4619 0.2146 0.1857 0.9491 
TRAN2 0.0610 -0.0407 0.4435 0.2246 0.1437 0.9483 
TRAN3 0.0357 0.0093 0.4214 0.1757 0.1575 0.9565 
 
Though slightly different from the US sample, the India sample also exhibited 
high factor loadings as depicted in Table 57. AVE was also above 0.5 for all constructs as 
depicted in Table 55. The values suggest that the India sample also exhibits convergent 
validity. 
For the US sample, the square root of AVE for each construct was greater than the 
corresponding latent variable correlations. Table 58 presents latent variable correlations 
for the US sample with the square root of AVE along the diagonal. As depicted in Table 
56, the factor loadings for each item exceeded cross loadings by at least 0.1 in every 
instance. These tests suggest that the US sample exhibits discriminant validity. 
 
Table 57. Model 8: Loadings and Cross Loadings for India Sample 
      LFIT SDBI SLCO SLEA SLPO TRAN 
LFIT1 0.9206 0.1642 -0.4270 -0.3794 -0.3321 -0.3561 
LFIT2 0.9341 0.1078 -0.4472 -0.3936 -0.3164 -0.3832 
LFIT3 0.8961 0.0700 -0.4228 -0.3659 -0.3062 -0.3918 
LFIT4 0.8971 0.1480 -0.3903 -0.3549 -0.2845 -0.3846 
SDBI1 0.1414 0.9724 -0.2924 -0.2345 -0.2462 -0.2326 
SDBI2 0.0914 0.9356 -0.1996 -0.2000 -0.1957 -0.1707 
SDBI3 0.1418 0.9603 -0.2472 -0.2397 -0.2355 -0.2346 
SLCO1 -0.4350 -0.2566 0.9132 0.5443 0.6992 0.6435 
SLCO2 -0.4307 -0.2656 0.9490 0.5611 0.7567 0.6662 
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SLCO3 -0.4382 -0.2182 0.9510 0.6027 0.7419 0.6414 
SLEA1 -0.3765 -0.2272 0.4747 0.8896 0.4546 0.3514 
SLEA2 -0.3620 -0.2629 0.5964 0.9359 0.5785 0.3546 
SLEA3 -0.3893 -0.1633 0.5819 0.9197 0.5922 0.3877 
SLPO1 -0.2724 -0.1960 0.6835 0.5340 0.9044 0.6222 
SLPO2 -0.3352 -0.2572 0.7472 0.5717 0.9455 0.6214 
SLPO3 -0.3401 -0.2128 0.7512 0.5646 0.9443 0.6314 
TRAN1 -0.3441 -0.1213 0.6102 0.3759 0.6100 0.9325 
TRAN2 -0.3898 -0.2563 0.6678 0.3829 0.6278 0.9232 
TRAN3 -0.4123 -0.2414 0.6377 0.3435 0.6163 0.9108 
 
Table 58. Model 7: Latent Variable Correlations for US Sample 
     LFIT SDBI SLCO SLEA SLPO TRAN 
LFIT 0.9155      
SDBI -0.0923 0.9188     
SLCO 0.1952 -0.2530 0.9085    
SLEA 0.0856 -0.2027 0.4852 0.8797   
SLPO 0.0897 -0.2168 0.4742 0.3918 0.9396  
TRAN 0.0591 -0.0262 0.4656 0.2161 0.1711 0.9513 
 
For the India sample, the square root of AVE for each construct was also greater 
than the corresponding latent variable correlations. Table 59 presents latent variable 
correlations for the India sample with the square root of AVE along the diagonal. As 
depicted in Table 57, the factor loadings for each item exceeded cross loadings by at least 
0.1 in every instance. These tests suggest that the India sample exhibits discriminant 
validity. 
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Table 59. Model 8: Latent Variable Correlations for India Sample 
     LFIT SDBI SLCO SLEA SLPO TRAN 
LFIT 0.9121      
SDBI 0.1336 0.9562     
SLCO -0.4633 -0.2632 0.9379    
SLEA -0.4099 -0.2368 0.6071 0.9153   
SLPO -0.3402 -0.2389 0.7815 0.5979 0.9316  
TRAN -0.4151 -0.2260 0.6935 0.3986 0.6706 0.9222 
 
Structural Model 
The structural model was assessed in SmartPLS using the second stage model 
which included the latent variable scores of the lower order constructs as items for the 
higher order constructs (Becker et al., 2012). Figure 14 presents the results of models 5 
and 6, excluding redundant relationships presented in previous figures. 
 
SLCO
-0.2657***
-0.2853***
SDBI
0.1554/0.1766
US value
India value
* = p < 0.05
** = p < 0.01
*** p < 0.001
 
Figure 14. Results of Models 7 and 8 
 
The data suggests that perceptions of social learning that favor compliant 
behavior encountered during childhood and adolescence increases perceptions of social 
learning that favor compliant behavior encountered during tenure at one’s previous job (β 
= 0.3110; p-value < 0.001). Similarly, perceptions of social learning that favor compliant 
behavior encountered during childhood and adolescence increases perceptions of social 
   
192 
 
learning that favor compliant behavior encountered during tenure at one’s current job (β 
= 0.2404; p-value < 0.001). The data provides support for hypotheses 1a and 1b. The data 
also suggests that perceptions of social learning that favor compliant behavior 
encountered during tenure at one’s previous job increases perceptions of social learning 
that favor compliant behavior encountered during tenure at one’s current job (β = 0.2893; 
p-value < 0.001). The data provides support for hypothesis 2. 
The data provides evidence that perceptions of learning fit increase perceptions of 
social learning that favor compliant behavior encountered during tenure at one’s current 
job (β = 0.1059; p-value < 0.05). The data provides support for hypothesis 3. 
The data suggests that differential reinforcement increases perceptions of social 
learning in favor of compliance. The data provides evidence that perceptions of 
differential reinforcement from childhood and adolescence increase perceptions of social 
learning that favor compliant behavior encountered during childhood and adolescence (β 
= 0.4393; p-value < 0.001). The data also provides evidence that perceptions of 
differential reinforcement from one’s previous job increase perceptions of social learning 
that favor compliant behavior encountered during tenure at one’s previous job (β = 
0.3990; p-value < 0.001). Similarly, the data provides evidence that perceptions of 
differential reinforcement from one’s current job increase perceptions of social learning 
that favor compliant behavior encountered during tenure at one’s current job (β = 0.2484; 
p-value < 0.001). The data provides support for hypotheses h4a, h4b, and h4c. 
The data provide evidence that perceptions of social learning that favor compliant 
behavior encountered during tenure at one’s current job decreases intentions to engage in 
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security damaging behavior (β = -0.2657; p-value < 0.001). The data provides support for 
hypothesis 5. 
Statistical evidence does not exist to suggest that organizational size influences 
social learning at one’s current organization (β = -0.0335; p-value > 0.05). The data do 
not provide support for hypothesis 6. However, the data provide evidence that security 
training increases perceptions of social learning that favor compliant behavior 
encountered during tenure at one’s current job (β = 0.3143; p-value < 0.001). Thus, the 
data provide support for hypothesis 7. Table 60 presents each hypothesis with its 
coefficient, t-value, p-value, and whether the hypothesis was supported by the data. 
 
Table 60. Model 7: Statistical Support for Hypotheses for US Sample 
Relationship Coefficient t-value p-value Supported 
h1a: SLEA → SLPO 0.3110 5.0632 p < 0.001 Yes 
h1b: SLEA → SLCO 0.2404 3.6362 p < 0.001 Yes 
h2: SLPO → SLCO 0.2893 3.9034 p < 0.001 Yes 
h3: LFIT → SLCO 0.1059 2.2863 p < 0.05 Yes 
h4a: DREA → SLEA 0.4393 8.4752 p < 0.001 Yes 
h4b: DREP  → SLPO 0.3990 7.4569 p < 0.001 Yes 
h4c: DREC → SLCO 0.2484 4.6662 p < 0.001 Yes 
h5: SLCO → SDBI -0.2657 3.8235 p < 0.001 Yes 
h6: SIZE → SLCO -0.0335 0.7127 p > 0.05 No 
h7: TRAN → SLCO 0.3143 4.5574 p < 0.001 Yes 
 
Age, education, gender, income, job position, organizational size, tenure, work 
experience were used as control variables. The data provide evidence that age increases 
intentions to engage in security damaging behavior (β = 0.1820; p-value < 0.05). The data 
also provide evidence that being an IT employee increases intentions to engage in 
security damaging behavior (β = 0.2438; p-value < 0.01). All other control variables were 
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statistically insignificant. Table 61 presents the coefficient, t-value, p-value, and whether 
the relationship was supported for each control variable. 
 
Table 61. Model 7: Statistical Support for Control Variables for US Sample 
Control Variable Coefficient t-value p-value Supported 
Age 0.1820 2.0251 p < 0.05 Yes 
Education -0.0767 1.0386 p > 0.05 No 
Gender -0.0383 0.6026 p > 0.05 No 
Income 0.0540 0.8357 p > 0.05 No 
IT employee 0.2438 3.2743 p < 0.01 Yes 
Manager 0.0763 1.1064 p > 0.05 No 
Organizational size 0.0498 0.8593 p > 0.05 No 
Scenario 0.0721 1.2012 p > 0.05 No 
Tenure -0.0471 0.6431 p > 0.05 No 
Work experience -0.0814 0.7993 p > 0.05 No 
 
The model explained 15.54 percent of the variance in intentions to engage in 
security damaging behavior, 52.05 percent of the variance in social learning (current 
organization), 30.62 percent of the variance in social learning (previous organization), 
and 19.30 percent of the variance in social learning (adolescence and childhood). Table 
62 presents the R2 values for each endogenous construct. 
 
Table 62. Model 7: R2 Values for Endogenous Constructs for US Sample 
Construct R2 Value 
SDBI 0.1554 
SLCO 0.5205 
SLEA 0.1930 
SLPO 0.3062 
 
For the India sample, the data suggest that perceptions of social learning that 
favor compliant behavior encountered during childhood and adolescence increases 
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perceptions of social learning that favor compliant behavior encountered during tenure at 
one’s previous job (β = 0.4422; p-value < 0.001). Similarly, perceptions of social learning 
that favor compliant behavior encountered during childhood and adolescence increases 
perceptions of social learning that favor compliant behavior encountered during tenure at 
one’s current job (β = 0.1513; p-value < 0.05). The data provides support for hypotheses 
1a and 1b. The data also suggests that perceptions of social learning that favor compliant 
behavior encountered during tenure at one’s previous job increases perceptions of social 
learning that favor compliant behavior encountered during tenure at one’s current job (β 
= 0.4129; p-value < 0.001). The data provides support for hypothesis 2. 
The data provides evidence that perceptions of learning fit decrease perceptions of 
social learning that favor compliant behavior encountered during tenure at one’s current 
job (β = -0.1113; p-value < 0.05). The data provides support for hypothesis 3. 
The data suggests that differential reinforcement increases perceptions of social 
learning in favor of compliance. The data provides evidence that perceptions of 
differential reinforcement from childhood and adolescence increase perceptions of social 
learning that favor compliant behavior encountered during childhood and adolescence (β 
= 0.6143; p-value < 0.001). The data also provides evidence that perceptions of 
differential reinforcement from one’s previous job increase perceptions of social learning 
that favor compliant behavior encountered during tenure at one’s previous job (β = 
0.3593; p-value < 0.001). Similarly, the data provides evidence that perceptions of 
differential reinforcement from one’s current job increase perceptions of social learning 
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that favor compliant behavior encountered during tenure at one’s current job (β = 0.1462; 
p-value < 0.01). The data provides support for hypotheses h4a, h4b, and h4c. 
The data provide evidence that perceptions of social learning that favor compliant 
behavior encountered during tenure at one’s current job decrease intentions to engage in 
security damaging behavior (β = -0.2853; p-value < 0.001). The data provides support for 
hypothesis 5. 
Statistical evidence does not exist to suggest that organizational size influences 
social learning at one’s current organization (β = -0.0091; p-value > 0.05). The data do 
not provide support for hypothesis 6. However, the data provide evidence that security 
training increases perceptions of social learning that favor compliant behavior 
encountered during tenure at one’s current job (β = 0.2522; p-value < 0.001). Thus, the 
data provide support for hypothesis 7. Table 63 presents each hypothesis with its 
coefficient, t-value, p-value, and whether the hypothesis was supported by the data. 
 
Table 63. Model 8: Statistical Support for Hypotheses for India Sample 
Relationship Coefficient t-value p-value Supported 
h1a: SLEA → SLPO 0.4422 6.0862 p < 0.001  Yes 
h1b: SLEA → SLCO 0.1513 2.2648 p < 0.05 Yes 
h2: SLPO → SLCO 0.4129 4.5418 p < 0.001 Yes 
h3: LFIT → SLCO -0.1113 2.0337 p < 0.05 Yes 
h4a: DREA → SLEA 0.6143 12.4408 p < 0.001 Yes 
h4b: DREP  → SLPO 0.3593 5.6997 p < 0.001 Yes 
h4c: DREC → SLCO 0.1462 3.3463 p < 0.001 Yes 
h5: SLCO → SDBI -0.2853 4.0063 p < 0.001 Yes 
h6: SIZE → SLCO -0.0091 0.2656 p > 0.05 No 
h7: TRAN → SLCO 0.2522 3.5611 p < 0.001 Yes 
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Age, education, gender, income, job position, organizational size, tenure, work 
experience were used as control variables. All control variables were statistically 
insignificant in the India sample. Table 64 presents the coefficient, t-value, p-value, and 
whether the relationship was supported for each control variable. 
 
Table 64. Model 8: Statistical Support for Control Variables for India Sample 
Control Variable Coefficient t-value p-value Supported 
Age -0.1350 1.1814 p > 0.05 No 
Education -0.1113 1.0881 p > 0.05 No 
Gender -0.0524 0.7664 p > 0.05 No 
Income -0.0056 0.0720 p > 0.05 No 
IT employee 0.1013 1.2793 p > 0.05 No 
Manager -0.0322 0.3654 p > 0.05 No 
Organizational size -0.1377 1.9097 p > 0.05 No 
Scenario 0.1224 1.4656 p > 0.05 No 
Tenure 0.1236 1.5269 p > 0.05 No 
Work experience -0.0901 0.6804 p > 0.05 No 
 
The model explained 17.66 percent of the variance in intentions to engage in 
security compliant behavior, 72.09 percent of the variance in social learning (current 
organization), 37.74 percent of the variance in social learning (previous organization), 
and 46.15 percent of the variance in social learning (adolescence and childhood). Table 
65 presents the R2 values for each endogenous construct. 
 
Table 65. Model 8: R2 Values for Endogenous Constructs for India Sample 
Construct R2 Value 
SDBI 0.1766 
SLCO 0.7209 
SLEA 0.3774 
SLPO 0.4615 
 
   
198 
 
Comparing the US and India samples shows that the India sample exhibited 
higher coefficients for several relationships. The higher differences were most prominent 
in the relationships between social learning (childhood and adolescence) and social 
learning (previous organization), between social learning (previous organization) and 
social learning (current organization), and between differential reinforcement and social 
learning (childhood and adolescence). The US sample exhibited higher coefficients in the 
relationships between learning fit and social learning (current organization), between 
differential association and social learning (current organization). The same hypotheses 
were supported across both samples. Table 66 presents the primary differences between 
the US and India samples. 
 
Table 66. Comparison of Path Coefficients for US and India Samples 
Relationship Coefficient (US – India) Supported (US/India) 
h1a: SLEA → SLPO -0.1312 Yes/Yes 
h1b: SLEA → SLCO 0.0891 Yes/Yes 
h2: SLPO → SLCO -0.1236 Yes/Yes 
h3: LFIT → SLCO 0.2172 Yes/Yes 
h4a: DREA → SLEA -0.1750 Yes/Yes 
h4b: DREP  → SLPO 0.0397 Yes/Yes 
h4c: DREC → SLCO 0.1022 Yes/Yes 
h5: SLCO → SRBI 0.0196 Yes/Yes 
h6: SIZE → SLCO -0.0244 No/No 
h7: TRAN → SLCO 0.0621 Yes/Yes 
 
The India sample also exhibited higher R2 values for all of the endogenous 
constructs. The most substantial differences were in the R2 values for: social learning 
(childhood and adolescence), social learning (previous organization), and social learning 
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(current organization). Table 67 presents differences between R2 values for the US and 
India samples. 
 
Table 67. Comparison of R2 Values for US and India Samples 
Construct R2 Values (US – India) 
SDBI -0.0212 
SLCO -0.2004 
SLEA -0.1844 
SLPO -0.1553 
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CHAPTER IX 
  DISCUSSION 
 
This study provides an in-depth analysis of the effect social learning has on 
information security behaviors. The review in this study provides evidence that social 
forms of control, such as the social learning environment, are underrepresented in the 
literature. However, the few variables that have been used to examine the effect of social 
influence have demonstrated that social variables strongly explain security behavior. 
Thus, to provide a more robust examination of social controls, this study uses Akers’ 
social learning theory to explain and predict why and how the social environment 
influences information security behaviors. The paper also seeks to understand how 
previous learning experiences influence security behaviors. Little research has been 
conducted to determine the external sources of influence that explain why employees 
behave as they do within their current organization. Thus, we examine general rule-
related social learning in childhood and adolescence, and security-specific learning 
encountered in individuals’ previous and current job positions.  
In order to examine these ideas, qualitative interviews were conducted with 20 
employees who had worked for at least two organizations. Although ASLT was the 
primary guiding framework for the interviews, theoretical sensitization was used to 
ensure that multiple ideas and perspectives were considered. From the qualitative 
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interviews, general patterns emerged. These patterns were explored more fully through an 
online survey of US and India respondents. The quantitative results confirm many of the 
qualitative insights gained during the interviews. The contributions of the study are now 
discussed. 
Theoretical Contributions 
The paper provides insight into the study of social learning and into the study of 
information security behaviors. 
Contributions to Social Learning Theories 
In this study, we examined concepts from Akers’ social learning theory and 
Bandura’s social learning theory. Akers’ social learning theory is a prominent 
criminological theory and Bandura’s social learning theory is a prominent sociological 
theory. First, based on insight from the qualitative study, we find that Akers’ 
representation of differential association as a reflective dimension of social learning may 
be somewhat misguided in studies of employee behavior in organizations. The qualitative 
study suggests that differential reinforcement is highly contextual and may not have the 
lasting effect on behavior suggested by Akers. Individuals change their behavior from 
one context to another because of changes in reinforcement in those environments. Thus, 
we find that reinforcement acts more as a contextual motivator. That is, reinforcement 
provides motivation to follow the behaviors learned through the social learning process. 
As such, we present differential reinforcement as a dependent variable influencing the 
social learning process. Since our study was primarily concerned with social learning in 
organizational settings, we cannot make claims about differential reinforcement in other 
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settings. Akers’ social learning theory has been used to study a number of behaviors, such 
as youth smoking and alcohol use. In these situations, reinforcement may be less 
contextual due to clearer societal perceptions of smoking and alcohol use among youth. 
In these situations, it may be appropriate to examine differential reinforcement as a 
dimension of social learning. 
Second, this study finds that social learning from previous life-periods may 
influence social learning in one’s current job. Although Akers’ suggests that social 
learning is mostly stable and should affect beliefs and behavior across groups (Ronald L. 
Akers, 2009), few studies have examined social learning beliefs across groups (i.e., 
organizations). And no study to our knowledge has examined social learning across 
organizations in the context of policy compliance and noncompliance. Through the 
qualitative and quantitative studies, we show that social learning from previous life-
periods, namely from childhood and from a previous organization, does have a 
substantial influence on one’s current beliefs, intentions, and behaviors. The quantitative 
models explained 50 percent of the variance in current, security-specific social learning 
in the US sample and 70 percent of the variance in the India sample. These R2 values 
represent strong effect sizes in the social sciences. Although this study shows that 
previous life-periods influence social learning in the present, much of the variance is still 
unexplained (between 30-50 percent). This confirms Akers’ assertion that social learning 
is mostly stable, but that it can also be influenced by context (Ronald L. Akers, 2009).  
 Third, this study identifies learning fit as an important construct when examining 
social learning from previous life-periods. As evidenced in the study, social learning from 
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previous life-periods has an influence on current learning. Values, beliefs, and behaviors 
learned earlier in life are somewhat stable. As evidenced in the interviews, these stable 
beliefs can be viewed as an individual’s preferred values, beliefs, and behaviors. 
However, in organizations, individuals may be asked to act differently than their 
preferred modus operandi. Through the interviews and survey, we identify learning fit as 
another motivator of social learning to complement reinforcement.  Individuals feel 
comfortable operating under their preferred values, beliefs, and behaviors. When the 
social environment supports their preferred values, there is no conflict for the employee 
and the employee acts according to their preferred values, beliefs, and behaviors. 
However, when there is not a fit between the social environment and an individual’s 
learned values, beliefs, and behaviors, discomfort exists. The individual is torn between 
two sets of values and beliefs and hesitates between the different value systems. This 
leads to only a partial adoption of the social learning beliefs shared in the social 
environment. 
 Finally, we compare Akers’ social learning theory with Bandura’s social learning 
theory as models to explain and predict employees’ security behaviors in organizations. 
Through the quantitative study, we find that Akers’ social learning construct is strong 
predictor of security behavior. We find that Akers’ social learning construct is partially 
mediated by self-efficacy, from Bandura’s social learning theory. This result suggests 
that both learning theories can provide insight. It also suggests that Bandura’s social 
learning theory alone does not offer a complete perspective of the social learning 
environment. This finding also challenges Akers’ assertion that self-efficacy is not a 
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strong explanation for behavior. We find that self-efficacy is important in certain 
circumstances. However, we only find that self-efficacy is a strong predictor of behavior 
in the US sample. In the India sample, self-efficacy was not a statistically significant 
predictor of security behavior. One possible explanation for this finding is the cultural 
differences between the US and India. The national culture in India is more collectivistic 
than the individualistic culture in the US. The focus on collectivism in India may place 
greater emphasis on the need to adhere to socially distributed values and standards. Self-
efficacy is an individualistic assessment of one’s ability to perform a task. Thus, it may 
be that self-efficacy is of less importance when compared with the social learning 
environment in collectivist cultures. Additionally, Bandura’s self-efficacy construct 
exhibited mixed results across the models, while social learning was more consistent. 
This finding suggests that Akers’ social learning theory may provide a better explanation 
of behavior as compared to Bandura’s social learning theory. These assertions should be 
further tested. 
Contributions to Information Security Research 
The study also provides important insight into the study of information security 
behaviors. First, we provide further evidence that social influence is an important 
construct in the study of information security behavior. Informal, social control may exert 
greater influence over behavior than formal, administrative control (Ghoshal, Korine, & 
Szulanski, 1994; Lange, 2008). The few simple examinations of informal control in 
behavioral information security research also show the relative strength of informal 
controls (Herath & Rao, 2009a, 2009b). By failing to adequately examine informal, social 
   
205 
 
controls, behavioral information security research has missed a crucial explanatory and 
predictive system of control. This study identifies a social learning construct that can be 
used in future research. 
Second, this study draws attention to the importance of considering previous life-
periods when studying information security behavior. Behavioral InfoSec research has 
noted the importance of examining different time-periods (Willison & Warkentin, 2013). 
However, those time periods have been limited to cross-sectional examinations in a 
single organization. Few, if any, studies examine influences external to the organization. 
This study demonstrates that employees’ security beliefs and behaviors are heavily 
influenced by external sources. Without this knowledge, it is difficult to determine how 
to combat noncompliant behavior or how to support compliant behavior. Understanding 
how influential learning in previous life-periods is can help researchers develop controls 
to build on positive learning and correct negative learning. 
Third, this study identifies how the organization may be able to influence social 
learning in favor of compliant behavior. The qualitative study identifies two high-level 
types of employees, employees who have been socialized in previous life-periods to 
believe that rules are unimportant and employees who have been socialized in previous 
life-periods to believe that rules are important. Based on qualitative insight, we identified 
different ways to manage these two types of employees. Individuals who believe that 
rules are unimportant need some form of external influence to prompt them to pay 
attention to and follow social norms in favor of compliant behavior. Following rules is 
contrary to their preferred value system. In many of the interviews, the motivator that 
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influenced these employees was fear of formal sanctions, such as termination. Employees 
who believed that rules were unimportant were willing to adopt social learning in favor of 
rule compliance when sanctions were known.  
Managing employees who believe that rules are important is different. These 
individuals were not motivated by sanctions. Although they knew the sanctions existed 
and were also afraid of them, their behavior was more motivated by internal drives. They 
also seemed to take comfort in the existence of formal control mechanisms such as 
sanctions. In fact, some of these employees even helped to establish stricter rules and 
more secure working environments. Their values provide intrinsic motivation to engage 
in secure behaviors and follow organizational policy. These individuals simply need an 
environment that promotes rule-following behavior. However, based on the interviews, it 
is clear that these environments do not always exist. When faced with environments that 
do not support rule-following behavior, these individuals experience discomfort and may 
uneasily abandon protective behaviors to follow the social norms. 
The quantitative study provides similar insight. The quantitative study suggests 
that individuals are more likely to notice and follow social learning in favor of 
compliance when compliant behaviors are reinforced through formal and informal reward 
and punishment. Similarly, individuals are more likely to notice and adopt compliant 
social beliefs when their own beliefs match the dominant beliefs in the social 
environment. 
Third, we find that the social learning construct may be a useful addition to the 
study of protection motivation behaviors. Protection motivation theory and fear appeals 
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theory, two similar and complementary theories, are commonly used in information 
security research to explain employees’ security behaviors (Herath & Rao, 2009b; 
Johnston & Warkentin, 2010; Johnston, Warkentin, & Siponen, 2015; Vance et al., 
2012). This study demonstrates that social learning influences self-efficacy and response 
efficacy and is partially mediated by self-efficacy. Thus, social learning can be added to 
protection motivation theory and fear appeals theory as a predictor of coping appraisals 
(i.e., self-efficacy and response efficacy). 
Fourth, the study finds interesting, yet mixed results with control variables across 
the eight models. In the US sample, IT employees exhibited higher intentions to engage 
in proactive security behavior than non-IT employees. However, they also exhibited 
higher intentions to engage in security damaging behavior than non-IT employees. This is 
somewhat alarming. IT employees tend to have elevated access to information systems to 
perform their job duties. They are also more experienced users of IT and may be better 
able to launch attacks against the organization. Although it is expected that IT employees 
would be more engaged in proactive responsibilities because of their responsibility over 
organizational IT, it is alarming that they are also more intent on damaging those same 
systems than non-IT employees.  
In the India sample, IT employees exhibited lower intentions to engage in security 
compliant behavior than non-IT employees, but did not exhibit higher intentions to 
engage in proactive security behavior than non-IT employees. This is also concerning. 
One possible explanation for the lower intentions to engage in security compliant 
behavior is that IT employees believe that they know how to protect the organization 
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better than is mandated in the information security policy. Although this may be positive 
if the IT employee truly knows better than the policy, it may be damaging when IT 
employees don’t know better than the policy. IT is also concerning that IT employees in 
India did not exhibit higher intentions to engage in proactive security behavior than non-
IT employees. As the primary defense against security threats, IT employees should be 
proactively engaged in securing information systems. 
Other findings suggest that in India, education decreases intentions to engage in 
security compliant behaviors. Similarly, in the US sample, education decreases proactive 
security behavior. Again, one possible explanation is that educated individuals feel that 
they know better how to protect computers better than policy or that policy is over 
cautious. Although education decreased positive security behavior, work experience 
increased security compliant behavior in the US. 
International Contributions  
This study also highlights some important distinctions between security practices 
across nations. From the quantitative study, it is apparent from path coefficients and R2 
values that in India, social learning has a stronger influence on social learning across time 
periods and on employees’ intentions to engage in positive security behavior and avoid 
negative security behavior. This can likely be explained by the predominantly collectivist 
national culture in India (Hofstede et al., 2010). Social collectives are of greater 
importance in India than in the individualistic US culture. Thus, it stands to reason that 
Indians will be more concerned with social influence and adhering to the collective 
influence of peers. This may also explain why self-efficacy was not influential on 
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behavior in the presence of the social learning construct. Self-efficacy is a construct that 
represents individualistic perceptions. When adopted as a covariate with social learning, 
the importance of self-efficacy may have been diminished by the importance of the goals 
and beliefs of the social collective. 
The study also shows that learning fit increases social learning in favor of 
compliance in the US, but decreases social learning in favor of compliance in India. The 
data show that the means for learning fit in the US (3.1498), where 4 means perfect fit, 
are higher than the mean in India (2.1929). Further, the India sample also shows that the 
respondents felt that the organization valued security more than they did compared to the 
US sample. This partially explains the positive coefficient in the US sample and the 
negative coefficient in the India sample. One possible explanation for the difference is the 
greater power distance between employees and employers in India compared to the US 
(Hofstede et al., 2010) Greater power distance may lead to perceptions that rules are 
stricter (Ortega, Giannotta, & Ciairano, 2013). The perceptions of strictness may cause 
the rules to appear more unreasonable, thereby decreasing perceptions of learning fit. 
These assertions should be explored further in future research. 
Managerial Contributions 
The results of this study provide important direction for managers. First, the 
results highlight possible changes to hiring procedures, particularly in organizations with 
highly confidential information. The study shows that social learning from previous life-
periods, including previous employers can influence social learning perceptions in the 
current organization, thereby influence intentions to engage in secure behavior. Hiring 
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managers should begin to consider the security-related socialization that individuals 
experience in prior jobs and general, rule-related socialization in previous life-periods. 
Such practices may be particularly important when hiring individuals to work in very 
secure areas with highly sensitive information. Similarly, hiring managers should 
carefully examine the fit between the employee’s preferred values and beliefs pertaining 
to rules and information security, and the values and beliefs that exist in the 
organizational environment. Greater fit can increase motivation to engage in secure 
behaviors and avoid negative security behaviors. 
Second, managers may be able to focus less on influencing individual users and 
more on the social learning environment. The social learning environment has a strong 
influence on security intentions. Thus, if managers are able to influence the social 
learning environment, they are likely to see more widespread individual behavioral 
improvements. This study shows that mangers can influence social learning by ensuring 
that reinforcement is in place to encourage positive behavior and to discourage negative 
behavior. Developing a strong social learning environment that favors compliant 
behavior is particularly motivating for individuals who believe, in general, that rules are 
important. Many employees simply need support from management and the social 
environment to prompt positive security behavior. Although punishment has its place to 
deter individuals who do not believe rules are important, social support is the greatest 
motivator for individuals who believe in rule following. 
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Limitations and Future Research 
Although the study provided interesting results, it was not without limitations. 
One of the largest limitations of the study was time. Because we studied social learning 
across contexts, time is an important factor. Ideally, we would have tracked employees’ 
social learning experiences through childhood and across several job transitions through a 
longitudinal study. A longitudinal study would provide a more robust examination of 
normative influence across time. However, our time was limited and it was not feasible to 
conduct a longitudinal study of the length required to assess the variables in the study. 
Therefore, we relied on self-report methods of social learning in prior organizations and 
life-periods. Although this is a limitation, life experiences can be collected and analyzed 
from a single interaction between the researcher and participant (Presser, 2008). Rather 
than examine social learning in different periods, we studied how perceptions of social 
learning in different periods influence social learning perceptions in one’s current 
organization. Future research should consider examining individuals as they transition to 
a new job. Following individuals through a transition of this sort could provide new 
insight to our model. 
The focus on social learning in prior life periods also limits the study to those who 
have had a least two jobs in their lifetime. Although this somewhat limits the extension of 
the model to new entrants to the job market, this study contributes to research on ASLT 
and information security behavior by examining social learning across different groups. 
Thus, we made a tradeoff. Future research should consider the external influences that 
influence social learning perceptions for new entrants to the job market. 
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Additionally, time limits our ability to explore other types of understudied 
controls. For example, the interaction between controls with extrinsic and intrinsic 
motivational orientations is not well represented by ASLT. Theories of motivation, such 
as self-determination theory (Ryan & Deci, 1985, 2000), would be better suited for such 
an examination. To explore interactions between controls with different motivational 
orientations, a separate exploration, model, and instrument would need to be designed 
and conducted. Ideally, this study would produce a developed theory of security-related 
corruption control. However, such an effort will require multiple studies over an extended 
period of time. Although this is a limitation of our study, it also presents opportunities for 
future studies.  
Further, we rely primarily on survey research to test the theoretical model. While 
survey research is useful and widely used in the IS discipline, it possesses limitations. 
First, we rely on self-report data from employees. While self-report surveys are used 
heavily in behavioral InfoSec research (Crossler et al., 2013), self-reports may not 
accurately reflect the phenomenon under study. Rather, self-reports reflect perceptions of 
the phenomenon. Thus, our examination is scoped to employee perceptions and 
intentions. Finally, surveys are not always representative of the larger population unless 
random sampling is used. We employed a research panel from Amazon Turk. In many 
studies, diversity in respondents is set as an alternative to random sampling, which 
research panels often provide (Posey et al., 2013). Randomly sampling from the 
population of all employees is not realistic. Thus, we relied on research panels to ensure a 
diverse and heterogeneous population.  
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We also obtained differing results between the qualitative and quantitative studies 
regarding the influence of organizational size on social learning that favors compliance 
with information security policies. In the qualitative study, organizational size was 
identified as a contextual factor that increased the likelihood that security policies were 
instituted within the organization and that social support was present to promote 
adherence to the security policies. Smaller organizations were less likely to have strong 
policies and social support. However, in the quantitative study, the relationships between 
organizational size and social learning was not statistically significant. It may be that 
other factors, such as reinforcement, are more important to the social learning process 
than organizational size. It could also be that industry and organizational size interact and 
the effect of organizational size on social learning is only prominent for certain 
industries. These ideas could be examined in future research. 
Finally, we did not examine distinct differences between the US and India 
samples, namely culture and government regulations. Thus, we are unable to say for 
certain why the two samples differed on some of the variables. This study was primarily 
exploratory in nature. Although we did not include explanatory variables, we have 
provided possible explanations for the differences. Future research should determine 
whether these assertions are supported by data. 
   
214 
 
CHAPTER X 
CONCLUSION 
 
Information security continues to be a primary concerns for organizations. 
Employees can be a great asset to information security in organizations or a threat to 
information security. We have shown how the social environment influences security 
perceptions and intentions. Social learning research may benefit more from the study of 
Akers’ social learning theory than from Bandura’s social learning theory or protection 
motivation theory. This study findings that self-efficacy and response efficacy, which are 
commonly placed as mediators in other models are inconsistent. Social learning may 
provide a better explanation of behavior than self-efficacy and response efficacy. 
Researchers should continue to study the effects of the social learning environment on 
information security behaviors. A greater emphasis should be placed on learning how 
managers can influenced the social learning environment to improve information security 
behavior. Researchers must also continue to study other types of understudied security 
controls, such as outcome-oriented controls and intrinsically oriented controls. Research 
into these controls may provide new avenues of control for practitioners. Researchers 
should also carefully consider how organizational context influences information security 
controls. This study finds that international differences in culture, regulations, and IT 
infrastructure may create differences in security beliefs and behavioral intentions.  
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Wen, 
2012)* 
X 
X    X        
(D'Arcy 
& 
Devaraj, 
2012) 
 
X    X  X      
(D'Arcy 
& Hovav, 
2007a) 
 
X        X    
(D'Arcy 
& Hovav, 
2007b) 
 
X    X    X    
(D'Arcy 
et al., 
2009) 
 
X X   X    X    
(Guo et 
al., 
2011)** 
 
X  X  X    X    
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(Harringt
on, 1996) 
X 
X    X    X    
(Herath 
& Rao, 
2009a)* 
 
X X X  X    X    
(Herath 
& Rao, 
2009b)* 
 
X X X  X    X X   
(Hovav 
& 
D'Arcy, 
2012) 
X 
X    X    X    
(Hu, Xu, 
Dinev, & 
Ling, 
2011) 
 
X    X        
(Hu et 
al., 2012)
  
 
X X          X 
(Johnston 
& 
Warkenti
n, 2010)* 
 
X X X   X       
(Lee et 
al., 2004) 
 
X  X  X    X    
(Leonard 
et al., 
2004) 
X 
X X X X X        
(Li et al., 
2010)* 
X 
X  X  X  X  X  X  
(Lowry 
et al., 
2012) 
 
X X        X X X 
(Myyry 
et al., 
2009)* 
 
X        X X X  
(Ng et 
al., 
2009)* 
X 
X    X    X X   
(Peace, 
Galletta, 
 
X  X  X        
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& Thong, 
2003) 
(Posey, 
Bennett, 
& 
Roberts, 
2011) 
X 
X  X      X    
(Posey, 
Bennett, 
Roberts, 
et al., 
2011) 
 
X    X        
(Puhakai
nen & 
Siponen, 
2010)* 
 
X  X      X X   
(Siponen 
& Vance, 
2010)* 
 
X    X  X      
(Son, 
2011)* 
 
X    X    X X   
(Spears 
& Barki, 
2010)* 
 
X X       X X   
(D. W. 
Straub, 
Jr, 1990) 
 
X    X    X    
(D. W. J. 
Straub & 
Nance, 
1990) 
X 
X    X        
(Vance & 
Siponen, 
2012) 
 
X    X  X      
(Vance et 
al., 
2012)* 
 
X X    X   X X   
(Warkent
in et al., 
2011)* 
 
X X X        X  
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(Workma
n et al., 
2008) 
 
X X    X    X   
(Xue et 
al., 
2011)* 
 
X X   X    X X   
*Study primarily examines compliance and not forms of noncompliance 
**Study primarily examines nonmalicious and not malicious forms of 
noncompliance 
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APPENDIX B 
 
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
 
 
Table B1. Semi-Structured Interview Questions 
Interview Question 
What has influenced your beliefs and behaviors regarding information security 
behaviors?  
When you were a child and adolescent, how did your family react to laws/social 
norms/authority?  
When you were an adolescent, how did your closest friends react to laws/social 
norms/authority? 
Where did you work prior to working at your current organization? What was your 
position? What did you organization do? 
In your prior organization, who was most important to you? Is there anyone who was a 
model to you? 
Why are these people so important to you? 
How did those people feel about computer security/computer security policies? 
How did your organization respond to people who violated computer security policies? 
How did the important people in your prior organization respond to people who 
violated computer security policies? What rewards and punishments existed in your 
organization related to computer security? 
In your current organization, who is most important to you? Is there anyone who is a 
model to you? 
Why are these people so important to you? 
How did those people feel about computer security/computer security policies?  
How does your organization respond to people who violate computer security policies? 
How do the people who are important to you in your current organization respond to 
people who violate computer security policies? What rewards and punishments exist in 
your organization related to computer security? 
How do you feel about computer security/computer security policies? 
Knowing that the purpose of this study is to understand how your information security 
beliefs and behaviors developed, is there anything else we haven’t discussed that has 
influenced your security beliefs and behaviors? 
 
   
232 
 
APPENDIX C 
 
SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 
The survey consisted of the primary survey questions presented in Table C1. The 
survey also contained two filtering questions asking how many organizations the person 
had worked for and how often the user used computers for work. If the respondent had 
not worked for at least two organizations, they were dropped from the responses. If the 
respondent did not use computers multiple times per week, the responses were dropped. 
Respondents were also asked questions to determine if they were paying careful attention 
to the questions (i.e., please answer “Strongly Agree” for this question). Three of these 
questions were included in the survey. If the respondent failed any of these questions, the 
responses were dropped. Demographic information was also collected, including: age, 
gender, education, income, job tenure, work experience, job position, and organizational 
size. 
Unless otherwise stated, all questions were answered on a 7-point Likert scale 
from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree.” 
The survey contained vignettes to assess SRBI and SDBI. Direct questioning of 
negative behavior can be influenced by desirability bias. Thus, we included a scenario 
where a character committed an SRB or SDB. Afterward, the respondent was asked to 
assess whether their own behaviors would be similar to the characters in the same 
situation. Four vignettes were created, two vignettes with SRBs and two vignettes with 
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SDBs. Each respondent was randomly assigned one SRB vignette and one SDB vignette. 
The SRB vignettes were: 
1) Taylor is preparing to leave on vacation. Taylor’s coworker Alex has 
been asked to complete Taylor’s work while Taylor is away. Company 
policies state that employees should not share their passwords. 
However, Taylor shares his password with Alex so that Alex can 
access important files while Taylor is on vacation. 
2) Taylor is working on a project for an important client. While Taylor is 
at lunch at a restaurant, the client calls Taylor and asks Taylor to send 
them information about the project as quickly as possible. Company 
policies state that employees should not access the company’s 
computer systems from an unsecured network. However, Taylor 
connects to the restaurant’s unsecured network and accesses the 
company’s computer system to find the information for the client. 
The SDB vignettes were: 
1) Taylor has computerized access to important client lists at work. The 
client lists are worth a lot of money and Taylor knows someone at a 
previous organization who might be interested in secretly purchasing 
the lists. Every day, Taylor writes down information about the clients 
he helps so that he can later sell the information. After collecting 
enough information, Taylor sells the client lists. 
2) Taylor has been treated poorly by his organization. Taylor is planning 
to quit, but before leaving Taylor wants to get even with the 
organization for the mistreatment. Taylor has a friend who knows 
about computer hacking. Taylor asks the friend about some viruses 
that could harm an organization’s computer systems. After learning 
about a particular virus, Taylor downloads the virus onto a USB device 
and plugs the USB device into several computers at work to infect the 
computer systems. 
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Table C1. Survey Questions 
Construct Question Source Type of 
Measurement 
Proactive security 
behavior intentions  
(PINT) 
I do more than is 
required by my 
organization’s 
information security 
policies to protect my 
computer system at 
work. 
Adapted from (Boss 
et al., 2009) 
 
First-order 
reflective 
 
I keep aware of the 
latest security threats 
so I can better protect 
my computer system. 
I take extra precautions 
beyond those required 
by my organization to 
protect computerized 
information at work. 
Policy compliance 
intentions  
(CINT) 
I intend to comply with 
the requirements of the 
ISP of my organization 
in the future. 
Adapted from 
(Bulgurcu et al., 
2010) 
First-order 
reflective 
 
I intend to use 
information and 
technology resources 
according to the 
requirements of the 
ISP of my organization 
in the future. 
I intend to carry out 
my responsibilities 
prescribed in the ISP of 
my organization when 
I use information and 
technology in the 
future. 
Security risk-taking 
behavior intentions  
If you were Taylor, 
what is the likelihood 
Adapted from 
(D'Arcy et al., 2009) 
First-order 
reflective 
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(SRBI) 
 
and  
 
Security damaging 
behavior intentions 
(SDBI) 
that you would [action 
performed in 
scenario]?  
 
(scale from: very 
unlikely to very likely) 
  
If I were Taylor, I 
could see myself 
[action performed in 
the scenario]. 
If I were Taylor, I 
would [action 
performed in the 
scenario]. 
Social Learning (adolescence and childhood) (SLEA) 
General rule-related 
definitions in favor 
of compliance  
(DFCA) 
Following rules is 
important. 
Developed from 
qualitative data 
based on (Ronald L. 
Akers, 2009; R L 
Akers & Lee, 1996) 
Second-order 
reflective 
 Rules are in place for a 
good reason. 
Complying with rules 
is good. 
Differential 
association 
(parents) 
(DAPA) 
Growing up, my 
parent(s)/legal 
guardian(s) believed 
that I should: 
  
(scale from:  always 
disobey rules to always 
follow rules) 
Developed from 
qualitative data 
based on (Ronald L. 
Akers, 2009; R L 
Akers & Lee, 1996) 
Third-order 
reflective-
formative 
Growing up, my 
parent(s)/legal 
guardian(s) believed 
that following rules is:  
 
(scale from:  always 
unimportant to always  
important) 
Differential 
association (friends) 
(DAFA) 
Growing up, my close 
friends believed that I 
should:  
Developed from 
qualitative data 
based on (Ronald L. 
Third-order 
reflective-
formative 
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(scale from:  always 
disobey rules to always 
follow rules) 
Akers, 2009; R L 
Akers & Lee, 1996) 
 
Growing up, my close 
friends believed that 
following rules is:  
 
(scale from: always 
useless to always 
useful) 
Differential 
reinforcement 
(DREA) 
Growing up, I was 
often:   
 
(scale from: punished 
for breaking rules to 
rewarded for breaking 
rules) 
 
Reverse coded 
Developed from 
qualitative data 
based on formal and 
informal 
sanctions/rewards 
(Johnston et al., 
2015) 
First-order 
formative 
 
Growing up, I was 
often: 
 
(scale from: punished 
for following rules to 
rewarded for following 
rules) 
Growing up, I was 
often: 
 
(scale from: shamed 
for breaking rules to 
praised for breaking 
rules) 
 
Reverse coded 
Growing up, I was 
often: 
 
(scale from: shamed 
for following rules to 
   
237 
 
praised for following 
rules) 
Imitation (parents) 
(IMPA) 
Growing up, my 
parent(s)/legal 
guardian(s):  
 
(scale from: always 
violated rules to 
always followed rules) 
Developed from 
qualitative data 
based on (Ronald L. 
Akers, 2009; R L 
Akers & Lee, 1996) 
Third-order 
reflective-
formative 
Growing up, my 
parent(s)/legal 
guardian(s):   
 
(scale from: always 
disobeyed the law to 
always followed the 
law) 
Growing up, my 
parent(s)/legal 
guardian(s):  
 
(scale from: defied 
those in authority to 
followed those in 
authority) 
Imitation (friends) 
(IMFA) 
Growing up, my close 
friends:  
 
(scale from: always 
violated rules to 
always followed rules) 
Developed from 
qualitative data 
based on (Ronald L. 
Akers, 2009; R L 
Akers & Lee, 1996) 
Third-order 
reflective-
formative 
Growing up, my close 
friends: 
  
(scale from: always 
disobeyed the law to 
always followed the 
law) 
Growing up, my close 
friends:  
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(scale from: were 
always in trouble to 
were never in trouble ) 
Social Learning (previous organization) (SLPO) 
Security-specific 
definitions in favor 
of compliance  
(DFCP) 
At my previous job, 
following information 
security policies was 
important. 
Same as previous 
definitions construct 
Second-order 
reflective 
 
At my previous job, 
information security 
policies were in place 
for a good reason. 
At my previous job, 
complying with 
information security 
policies was essential. 
Differential 
association 
(manager) 
(DAMP) 
At my previous job, 
my boss believed that I 
should:  
 
(scale from:  always 
disobey ISP to always 
follow ISP) 
Same as previous 
differential 
association construct 
Third-order 
reflective-
formative 
At my previous job, 
my boss believed that 
following ISP is:  
 
(scale from: always 
useless to always 
useful) 
Differential 
association 
(coworker) 
(DACP) 
At my previous job, 
most of my coworkers 
believed that I should:  
 
(scale from:  always 
disobey ISP to always 
follow ISP) 
Same as previous 
differential 
association construct 
Third-order 
reflective-
formative 
 
At my previous job, 
most of my coworkers 
believed that following 
ISP is:  
   
239 
 
 
(scale from:  always 
unimportant to always 
important) 
Differential 
reinforcement 
(DREP) 
At my previous job, I 
was often:   
 
(scale from: punished 
for breaking ISP to 
rewarded for breaking 
ISP) 
 
Reverse coded 
Same as previous 
differential 
reinforcement 
construct 
First-order 
formative 
 
At my previous job, I 
was often: 
 
(scale from: punished 
for following ISP to 
rewarded for following 
ISP) 
At my previous job, I 
was often: 
 
(scale from: shamed 
for violating ISP to 
praised for violating 
ISP) 
 
Reverse coded 
At my previous job, I 
was often: 
 
(scale from: shamed 
for following ISP to 
praised for following 
ISP) 
Imitation (manager) 
(IMMP) 
At my previous job, 
my boss:  
 
Same as previous 
imitation construct 
Third-order 
reflective-
formative 
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(scale from: always 
violated ISP to always 
followed ISP) 
At my previous job, 
my boss:   
 
(scale from: never kept 
his/her computer safe 
to always kept his/her 
computer safe) 
At my previous job, 
my boss:  
 
(scale from: never 
protected 
organizational 
information to always 
protected 
organizational 
information) 
Imitation 
(coworkers) 
(IMCP) 
At my previous job, 
most of my coworkers:  
 
(scale from: always 
violated ISP to always 
followed ISP) 
Same as previous 
imitation construct 
Third-order 
reflective-
formative 
At my previous job, 
most of my coworkers:   
 
(scale from: never kept 
his/her computer safe 
to always kept his/her 
computer safe) 
At my previous job, 
most of my coworkers:  
 
(scale from: never 
protected 
organizational 
information to always 
protected 
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organizational 
information) 
Social Learning (previous organization) (SLCO) 
Security-specific 
definitions in favor 
of compliance  
(DFCC) 
At my current job, 
following information 
security policies is 
important. 
Same as previous 
definition construct 
Second-order 
reflective 
 
At my current job, 
information security 
policies are in place for 
a good reason. 
At my current job, 
complying with 
information security 
policies is essential. 
Differential 
association 
(manager) 
(DAMC) 
At my current job, my 
boss believes that I 
should:  
 
(scale from:  always 
disobey ISP to always 
follow ISP) 
Same as previous 
differential 
association construct 
Third-order 
reflective-
formative 
At my current job, my 
boss believes that 
following ISP is:  
 
(scale from:  always 
unimportant to always 
important) 
Differential 
association 
(coworker) 
(DACC) 
At my current job, 
most of my coworkers 
believe that I should: 
  
(scale from:  always 
disobey ISP to always 
follow ISP) 
Same as previous 
differential 
association construct 
Third-order 
reflective-
formative 
 
At my current job, 
most of my coworkers 
believe that following 
ISP is:  
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(scale from: always 
useless to always 
useful) 
Differential 
reinforcement 
(DREC) 
At my current job, I am 
often:   
 
(scale from: punished 
for breaking ISP to 
rewarded for breaking 
ISP) 
 
Reverse coded 
Same as previous 
differential 
reinforcement 
construct 
First-order 
formative 
 
At my current job, I am 
often: 
 
(scale from: punished 
for following ISP to 
rewarded for following 
ISP) 
At my current job, I am 
often: 
 
(scale from: shamed 
for violating ISP to 
praised for violating 
ISP) 
 
Reverse coded 
At my current job, I am 
often: 
 
(scale from: shamed 
for following ISP to 
praised for following 
ISP) 
Imitation (manager) 
(IMMC) 
At my current job, my 
boss:  
 
(scale from: always 
violates ISP to always 
follows ISP) 
Same as previous 
imitation construct 
Third-order 
reflective-
formative 
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At my current job, my 
boss:   
 
(scale from: never 
keeps his/her computer 
safe to always keeps 
his/her computer safe) 
At my current job, my 
boss:  
 
(scale from: never 
protects organizational 
information to always 
protects organizational 
information) 
Imitation 
(coworkers) 
(IMCC) 
At my current job, my 
coworkers:  
 
(scale from: always 
violates ISP to always 
follows ISP) 
Same as previous 
imitation construct 
Third-order 
reflective-
formative 
At my current job, my 
coworkers:   
 
(scale from: never 
keeps his/her computer 
safe to always keeps 
his/her computer safe) 
At my current job, my 
coworkers:  
 
(scale from: never 
protects organizational 
information to always 
protects organizational 
information) 
Learning fit 
(LFIT)  
At my current job, my 
organization believes 
that following 
information security 
policies is: 
Based on insight 
from qualitative data 
First-order 
reflective 
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(scale from: much less 
important than I do to 
much more important 
than I do) 
At my current job, my 
organization believes 
that information 
security is: 
 
(scale from: much less 
important than I do to 
much more important 
than I do) 
At my current job, my 
organization believes 
that protecting 
organizational 
information is: 
 
(scale from: much less 
important than I do to 
much more important 
than I do) 
At my current job, my 
organization believes 
that information 
security policies are: 
 
(scale from: much less 
valuable than I do to 
much more valuable 
than I do) 
Severity of 
sanctions 
(SEVR) 
If I were caught 
violating information 
security policies, I 
would be  severely 
punished. 
Adapted from 
(D'Arcy et al., 2009) 
First-order 
reflective 
I would be punished 
harshly if I were 
caught violating 
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information  security 
policies. 
If I violated 
information security 
policy, the punishment 
would be: 
 
(scale from: not severe 
at all to very severe) 
Certainty of 
sanctions 
(CERT) 
If I violated 
information security 
policies, I would be 
caught eventually. 
Adapted from 
(D'Arcy et al., 2009) 
First-order 
reflective 
I would likely be 
caught if I violated 
information security 
policies. 
Formal training 
(TRAN) 
My current 
organization trains me 
about information 
security issues. 
Adapted from 
(D'Arcy et al., 2009) 
First-order 
reflective 
My current 
organization educates 
me about my 
information security 
responsibilities. 
My current 
organization provides 
me training about 
information security 
policies. 
Self-efficacy 
(SEFF) 
I feel capable of 
following information 
security policies. 
Adapted from 
(Johnston & 
Warkentin, 2010) 
First-order 
reflective 
I am confident that I 
can follow information 
security policies. 
I believe that I can 
successfully comply 
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with information 
security policies. 
Response efficacy 
(REFF) 
Information security 
policies work for 
protection against 
security threats. 
Adapted from 
(Johnston & 
Warkentin, 2010) 
First-order 
reflective 
Information security 
policies are effective 
for protection against 
security threats. 
When following 
information security 
policies, the 
organization is more 
likely to be protected. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
